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ABSTRACT
This dissertation argues for the critical urgency of both challenging the constitution of 
subjectivity itself and disputing the a priori exclusion of other animals from attaining 
some kind of ethico-political subject-status. Deploying a Baradian performative 
posthumanist analysis attentive to patterns of difference, I engage the theoretical tools 
of ecofeminism, critical animal studies (CAS), and material ecocriticism to interrogate 
subjectivity by attending closely and critically to twentieth and twenty-first century Euro-
American Anglophone science fiction (SF) stories about meat. Meat animal narratives 
open the subject to alternative modes of knowing that anthropocentric epistemologies 
foreclose, intervening against the structural exclusions imposed by various material-
discursive apparatuses of domination that define, authorize and enact subjectivity as 
always and only human, over and against the figure of the animal. SF, a genre of alterity 
that has long been at the vanguard of literary engagements with nonhuman 
subjectivities, likewise works to subvert hegemonic notions of the subject as always-
already human and complicate overdetermined configurations of “the subject” as an 
ontologically predetermined entity. Engaging SF narratives about human cattle 
dystopias, alien encounters, in vitro meat and alimentary xeno-symbiogenesis, I 
approach subjectivity as an emergent phenomenon born of the intra-action of 
differentially materialized agential entanglements, and—crucially—their constitutive 
exclusions. Rejecting subject-object dualism as an unliveable onto-epistemological 
paradigm that excludes anything edible from relations of respectful use, I argue for the 
necessity of enacting subjectivities in terms of concrete practices of restraint and 
humility, with humans firmly situated as embodied animal beings, enmeshed with and 
accountable to a much larger community of more than human, more than animal and 
more than animate actants on a finite planet.
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1. Introduction: Subjects in Meat Stories
“Among the fogs and miasmas which obscure our fin de millénaire," Guattarri observes, 
“the question of subjectivity is now returning as a leitmotiv” (Guattarri 1995, 122). 
Scholarly interest in ‘the animal’ has likewise never been higher than at the turn of the 
third millennium.  Critical work on animals and subjectivity typically proceeds either by 1
arguing for the ethical imperative of including (some) other animals in dominant 
conceptions of ‘the subject,’ or, on the other hand, deploying the material-semiotic figure 
of the animal as a limit case to deconstruct the notion of subjectivity altogether (Derrida 
& Roudinesco 2004, 63; Calarco 2017, 35; Glenney-Boggs 2012, 3; Braidotti 2016, 
13-4; Weil 2012, 2; Pick 2011, 2). Often construed as ill-matched projects (eg. Haraway 
2008b, 176), I argue for the critical urgency of both challenging the constitution of 
subjectivity itself and disputing the a priori exclusion of other animals from attaining 
some kind of ethico-political subject-status (Braidotti 2016). Mindful of the well-
established role of narrative in the enactment of subjectivities (Vint 2007; McHugh 2011) 
and attentive to the emergence and proliferation of subject forms through the edible 
encounter (Bennet 2010; Turner 2014), I deploy the theoretical tools of ecofeminism, 
critical animal studies (CAS) and material ecocriticism to interrogate subjectivity by 
attending closely and critically to twentieth and twenty-first century Euro-American 
Anglophone science fiction (SF) stories about meat: “the most delegitimated subject 
 Following Midgley (1979[1995)], at times I use the word ‘animal’ for convenience to denote “animal other 1
than human," “but it must never be forgotten that we have no clear basis for [this division]… Drawing 
analogies ‘between people and animals’ is, on the face of it, rather like drawing them between foreigners 
and people” (15). I am also mindful of Derrida’s (1991b) admonition that the term ‘animal’ subsumes a 
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position possible in our society,” according to Plumwood (2012, 58). Western societies 
“have developed strategies for blocking out and not hearing the speech of those in that 
position” (ibid.): listening to meat requires not only the dismantling of dualistic 
constructions of human exceptionalism, but also an understanding of the edible 
encounter as a transcorporeal process of mutual hybridization in which selves and 
others remake each other in a profoundly unequal process of becoming-with 
(Plumwood, 1993; 2002; Alaimo 2008; 2010; Haraway 2008a). Acknowledging the 
“significantly unfree” ways in which humans and animals agentially “co-shape” each 
other (Haraway 2008a, 72) means paying attention to “the way in which large scale 
forms of violence create and reproduce systems of domination” (Wadiwel 2015, 9). 
Subsequently, my analysis intervenes against the structural exclusions imposed by 
various material-discursive apparatuses of domination that define, authorize and enact 
subjectivity as always and only human, over and against the figure of the animal. At the 
same time, I argue for the critical necessity of complicating notions of subjectivity and 
subject-object dualism altogether by remaining open to the liveliness and agency of the 
more-than-human, more-than-animal and more-than-animate world. Rejecting the 
bifurcation of the biotic domain into ontologically pre-determined subjects and objects, I 
argue instead for understanding ‘reality' as a “subject-subject continuum” (Matthews 
2003, 7) wherein subjectivities coalesce as material-discursive knots within dynamic, 
multispecies webs of agency.
Following Braidotti (2013), my analysis insists that the notion of subjectivity “enables us 
to string together issues that are currently scattered across a number of domains”—
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social, political, ethical and ecological, to name a few (Braidotti 2013, 42). In other 
words, subjectivity continues to play a crucial role in structuring relations of response-
ability between variously positioned Earthly agencies. Coined by Haraway (2008a, 88), 
the neologism ‘response-ability’ surpasses “simplistic framings of ‘responsibility’ as a 
question of human agency in a passive and inert world” (van Dooren & Bird Rose 2017, 
264). To emphasise response-ability—the capacity to respond—is to stress that all 
creatures respond to their world and that “through these responses worlds are 
constituted” (ibid.). There is no singular, predetermined ‘responsible’ reaction, “only the 
constantly shifting capacity to respond to one another,” whatever that response 
constitutes (264-5).  Rather than getting rid of the concept of subjectivity altogether, 2
“[w]e need to devise new social, ethical and discursive schemes of subject formation to 
match the profound transformations we are undergoing” (Braidotti 2013, 12). The 
implicit question here, as van Wyck puts it, is “what kind(s) of subjectivity can we hope 
for in our imaginings of possible futures?” (1997, 84); even more pressingly, “we need a 
vision of the subject that is worthy of the present” (Braidotti 2013, 52). This dissertation 
engages and strives towards critical conceptions of subjectivities in the plural, 
eschewing fantasies of autonomy and the politics of exclusion in favour of an anti-
dualistic, non-hierarchical and pluralistic understanding of multiple subject-positions in 
multiple registers that far exceed the domain of ‘the human’ (Braidotti 1994; 2013; 2014; 
2016; 2017). In the pages that follow, I will outline my understanding of subjectivities 
both extant and extrapolative and contextualize my research within SF literary theory, 
 Indeed, sometimes exercising response-ability might mean doing nothing at all, as Martin, Myers and 2
Viseu point out (2015, 11). Non-interference in predator-prey encounters, despite the clear suffering of the 
prey, for example, is an obvious example of enacting care for wildlife and their ecosystems.
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before sketching key concepts like transcorporeality and the term ‘meat’ itself. I will then 
provide some methodological protocols for reading, outline the theoretical frameworks of 
ecofeminism, critical animal studies and material ecocriticism and finally provide a brief 
chapter overview.
Subjectivities and Agencies
The “multifarious theoretical jobs” the concept of subjectivity has been called upon to 
perform has no doubt contributed to the millennial fixation with the so-called question of 
the subject (Smith 1988, xxvii). By and large, the subject has been construed as “the 
unified and coherent bearer of consciousness,” “the intending and knowing manipulator 
of the object, or as the conscious and coherent originator of meanings and 
actions” (Smith 1988, xxx; xviii). Simultaneously, in more explicitly political discourse the 
subject signifies someone who is sub-jected to a particular configuration of power 
(xxxii); the subject is “the place where ideology takes its effect” (First & Woolly, 1982, 
118; in Smith 1988, 69). Both determined by larger forces (social formations, language, 
political apparatuses) and determining as a locus of agency from which to contest these 
interpellations (Williams 1983, 310), the dialectic at the heart of subjectivity only 
becomes an aporia when wedded to the notion of entirety—when the subject is 
conceived of either as entirely submitted to the domination of the ideological, or “entirely 
capable of choosing his/her place in the social by dint of possessing full consciousness” 
(Smith 1988, 24). This dissertation contests these all-or-nothing fantasies, insisting 
upon possibilities for resistance to regimes of subjectification. Following McHugh (2011), 
I maintain that animal narratives—including narratives concerning those animals who 
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become meat within carnocapitalist systems of production—can open the subject to 
alternative modes of knowing that anthropocentric epistemologies foreclose. 
Prominent among these foreclosures is the assumption that “the subject is always 
already human” (Wolfe 2003, 1), a move that betrays “an ideological commitment to 
conceptualizing human being over and against animal being and privileging ideals of 
human consciousness and freedom as the centre, agent and pinnacle of history and 
existence” (Weitzenfeld & Joy 2013, 5). According to Wolfe, this “fundamental 
repression underlies most ethical and political discourse” (2003, 1). However, political 
and ethical subjectivity has rarely been equated with mere membership in the human 
species, but rather with a particular cluster of attributes skewed towards a very gender, 
racial and class-specific kind of human: the rational, self-determining subject-as-citizen, 
bearer of inalienable rights and owner of property (Braidotti 2013, 13; Calarco 2016). By 
such a yardstick, as Braidotti points out, “not all of us can say, with any degree of 
certainty, that we have always been human ….or are even considered fully human now, 
let alone at previous moments of Western social, political and scientific history” (11). By 
“transposing a specific mode of being human into a generalized standard, which 
acquires transcendent values as the human” (26), the unmarked ‘human’ functions as a 
normative convention of ‘sameness’ by which all others are assessed and organized, a 
highly regulatory process “instrumental to practices of exclusion and 
discrimination” (26). According to Braidotti,
Central to this universalistic posture and its binary logic is the notion of 
‘difference’ as pejoration. Subjectivity is equated with consciousness, universal 
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rationality and self-regulating ethical behaviour, whereas Otherness is defined 
as its negative and specular counterpart. (15)
This obsession with sameness and reluctance to affirm difference as anything but lack 
(Minh-ha 1997) is an expression of what Plumwood (1993) has identified as a 
hierarchical dualism—man/woman, human/animal, mind/body and subject/object, to 
name a few—wherein the leading term in each pair is is constructed through the denial 
and backgrounding of its oppositional subordinate (Plumwood 1993). Resisting this 
“strange segregation of humans from their [nonhuman] kindred that has deformed much 
of Enlightenment thought” (Midgley 1983[1995], xxiv), this dissertation participates in a 
well-established trajectory of critical feminist work denaturalizing hierarchically dualistic 
configurations of the subject, remaining attentive to the ways in which subjectivity is 
always already relational, an emergent phenomenon rather than an ontic entity that 
precedes the terms of the relating (Barad 2007, 2012).
This is not to suggest that the subject is purely discursive; subjectivity is material as 
much as it is abstract (Vint 2007, 6). Rather than a linguistic mirage, I follow 
posthumanist critics in understanding subjectivity as a material-discursive construct 
produced and buttressed against the threat of the agential other in part through the 
operation of biopolitics (Foucault 1976; Agamben 2004; Rajan 2006; Chaudhuri 2007). 
Under biopolitics, life itself is explicitly put at the centre of political calculation, both at 
the level of the population and at the level of the individual corporeal body (Foucault 
1976, 135–161; Rajan 2006, 6; Agamben 2004). A “mechanism of capture of the 
multiple potentialities of the body” (Bennet 2010, 98), for Agamben biopolitics emerges 
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as part of an “anthropological machine” for the production and performance of a specific 
kind of subjectivity rooted in hierarchy and human exceptionalism (Agamben 2004). A 
material-discursive apparatus of dualism that constructs the subject against the non-
subject (Agamben 2004; Rajan 2006), the anthropological machine constitutes “the 
creative repertoire of symbolic, discursive, institutional and material means and 
taxonomies by which the category of the human produces and performs 
itself” (Pedersen 2011, 68). The anthropological machine biopolitically harnesses the 
(re)productive potential of human and nonhuman bodies alike to both generate capital 
and produce a specific type of subjectivity within any given body (Vint 2007,18)—
including the absent subjectivity of 'bare life’ stripped of all social and political meaning 
(Agamben, 2004). The paradigmatic example is of prisoners at a Nazi concentration 
camp; for a non-human animal example of ‘bare life’ of one need look no further than 
the factory farm. For Agamben (1998), sovereignty lies precisely in exercising the 
authority to determine which life forms count as “bios” (political subjects) and which are 
relegated to the bare, physical life of “zoë," a category foundational to but excluded from 
political consideration (in Glenny Boggs 2012, 13; Braidotti 2012, 302). Put another way, 
the “sovereign subject” manifests through the performative enactment of the power “to 
define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not” (Mbembe 
2003, 27); white and heterosexual by default, individualistic and competitive and 
governed by reason rather than emotion, this sovereign subject remains steeped in a 
mind-body dualism that disavows its own material foundations (Agamben 2004). The 
human-nonhuman distinction lies at the heart of this operation of power; as Wolfe 
argues, the animal’s “”specificity as the object of both discursive and institutional 
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practices … gives it particular power and durability in relation to other discourses of 
otherness” (2003, 6). The figure of the animal, according to Wolfe, “has always been 
especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait at the very heart of the constitutive 
disavowals and self-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called “the 
human” (Wolfe 2003, 6). Animals, then, “are embedded as and at the core of 
subjectivity,”  a figure of “alterity that underwrites the formation of the subject as its 
disavowed point of origin and unassimilable trace” (Glenny Boggs 2012, 38, 5).
Understanding “animal” as the definitional opposite of “human” rather than its larger 
context, the anthropological machine delineates those who matter from that which does 
not through an immunity paradigm of separation and disavowal that seeks to inoculate 
the (human) self from the (less-than-human) other (Esposito 2008; Stanescu 2013, 139; 
Haraway 1991, 204). This logic of immunization justifies violence against those 
relegated to a position outside the “munus” of the social body (Esposito 2008, 44), 
underscoring the non-subjectivity of supposedly “bare” animal life. The always-already 
specied division between subject and object is centrally implicated in the caesura 
between inedible and edible bodies—bodies that matter on the one hand (Butler 1993; 
2004) and bodies that are “killable” (in Haraway’s [2008] words) and thus subject to a 
“non-criminal putting to death” (as Derrida [1991a] puts it) on the other. Put another way, 
“the human-animal distinction constitutes an arena in which relations of power operate 
in their exemplary purity (that is, operate with the fewest moral or material 
obstacles)” (Pick 2011, 1). 
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However, this biopolitical production of species difference at the heart of sovereign 
subject formation is ambivalent rather than absolute, “allowing for the contradictory 
power to both dissolve and reinscribe borders between humans and animals” (Shukin 
2009, 11). Humans may be animalized through racist and sexist ideologies, animals 
may be humanized through practices of pet-keeping or animal rights discourses and the 
material substance of human and nonhuman bodies may be recombined in novel ways 
in service of profit (Wolfe 2012). Human subjectivity is thus produced via the 
interpenetration of human and nonhuman, a strategic instability that lies at the heart of 
biopolitical discourse. Subjectivity—both “the battleground and the byproduct of 
biopolitics”—“emerges in and remains unhinged by cross-species encounters” (Glenny 
Boggs 2013, 187, 24). This core instability renders resistance to biopolitical 
subjectification possible—the site of ideology’s acting upon the body is also a potential 
site for alternative subject and discourse formations, including configurations of 
subjectivity not predicated on human exclusivity (Vint 2007, 19; 2010a; Glenny-Boggs 
2013, 62). Openness to nonhuman subjectivities is crucial; after all, as Barad argues, 
“we would be remiss if the acknowledgment of the differential constitution of the human 
in relation to the nonhuman only served to refocus our attention, once again, exclusively 
on the human” (Barad 2012, 31). Regan’s (1983) deontological argument for animal 
rights, for example, articulates subjectivity in a non-anthropocentric register, stipulating 
that 
individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires, perception, 
memory and a sense of future, including their own future; an emotional life 
together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare-interests; 
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the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical 
identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential 
life fares well or ill for them. (276)
However, while anti-anthropocentric in the sense of being explicitly constructed to 
encompass (some) other animals, Regan’s definition of subjectivity elsewhere installs a 
problematic distinction between “those individuals who are conscious and sentient” vs. 
those “who are conscious, sentient and possess…other cognitive and volitional abilities” 
(153), a division that in some ways hierarchizes moral worth based on a criterion of 
similitude to allegedly ‘human’ capacities. As Wadiwel (2015) argues, it is unclear as to 
whether Regan’s bifurcation of subjectivity into ‘moral agents’ and ‘moral patients’ is “a 
factual claim made on the basis of an external truth, or a political claim that reflects a 
hierarchy of differences that has placed a socially and discursively constructed ‘rational 
able bodied’ human at the top of the ‘cognitive’ heap” (40). 
(Eco-)feminist articulations of the subject have fared better at avoiding this lingering 
hierarchization of difference and the concurrent installation of similitude to the alleged 
‘human’ norm as the basis of ethical subjectivity (Plumwood, 2002). For decades 
feminists have theorized at the forefront of anti-anthropocentric modes of subject-
formation by insisting on the fundamentals of creaturely embodiment while taking 
“affirmative and critical account of emergent, differentiating, self-representing, 
contradictory social subjectivities” (Haraway 1991, 147). Subjectivity, as Grosz argues, 
“can be thought of in terms quite other than those implied by various dualisms” (1994, 
vii). Barad (2007) and Haraway (2008. 2016) argue that subjectivities and other 
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phenomena be understood as performative enactments rather than preexisting entities, 
materializing via the intra-action of various material-discursive apparatuses that include 
(but are not limited to) “industrially produced meats, international veterinary practices, 
biosecurity practices, international trade agreements [and] transport networks” (Barad in 
van der Tuin 2012, 56). As Barad argues,
the very practices of differentiating the “human” from the “nonhuman," the 
“animate” from the “inanimate," and the “cultural” from the “natural” produce 
crucial materializing effects that are unaccounted for by starting an analysis 
after these boundaries are in place. (Barad 2012a, 31)
In this account “there is no single causal factor determining the subject; the elements of 
subjectivity intra-act in a complex web” (Hekman 2010, 101). What is needed and what 
this dissertation strives to articulate through close readings of SF, is “a subject that 
works across differences and is also internally differentiated, but still grounded and 
accountable” (Braidotti 2013, 49).
Braidotti’s articulation of subjectivity as a configuration to which to be held accountable 
is crucial; Donovan (2016) makes a similar argument in a different register when she 
suggests 
we define subjects as entities who communicate their wishes—wishes that we 
humans can understand, because we belong to the same communicative 
medium. Subjects are creatures, in other words, who have a point of view, or a 
standpoint. (2016, 266, original italics)
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This understanding of subjectivity acknowledges both the alterity of the other’s 
standpoint and the continuities between self and other though which subjectivities 
become legible—it enfolds (some) other-than-human-animals into what is otherwise a 
distinctly Levinasan ethic that understands “responsibility as the essential, primary and 
fundamental mode of subjectivity” (1985, 7). Ethics, for Levinas, “does not supplement a 
preceding existential base; the very node of the subjective is knotted in ethics 
understood as responsibility” (ibid.):  for Calarco (2016) this Levinisan configuration of 3
subjectivity constitutes an ethics of indistinction, while Barad (2007, 2011) and Haraway 
(2008, 2016) have articulated their own notions of response-ability under the rubric of 
an ethics of entanglement. Whatever the nomenclature, key here is that subjectivities 
emerge within differential modes of response-ability—the subject emerges through the 
self-other encounter, through the recognition of the other as a “thou” in relation to the “I” 
of the self (Buber, 1923). Response-ability is about agency (Barad, 2012a, 55)—the 
capacity to effect change, to act, regardless of how that actant (Latour 2005) is 
interpellated into extant subject-forms (Bennet 2010; Cudworth & Hobden, 2015). 
Agency is enacted through the ongoing, differentially materializing relations of bodies, 
selves and worlds: it is
about response-ability, about the possibilities of mutual response, which is not to 
deny, but to attend to power imbalances. Agency is about possibilities for worldly 
reconfigurations. (Barad 2012a, 55)
 While animal studies theorists have found his work compelling, Levinas himself denied that animals 3
could experience themselves as a responsible subject to an Other’s ethical demand or that they could 
provoke this kind of ethical response in humans (although in interviews he equivocated somewhat on 
these points e.g. “One cannot entirely refuse the face of the animal” [1988, 172]). Calarco has argued that 
the internal logic of Levinas’ ethical account does not necessarily justify these exclusions (2008, 55-78)
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Agency is not confined to the human realm; "we do not simply have agency, we are in 
and contribute to networks of agencies” (Iovino 2015, 85) that exceed categories like 
“subject," “human” and even “animate” (Bennet 2010, 6; see also Iovino 2015; Barad 
2007; Latour 2005; Opperman & Iovino, 2014; TallBear 2011). Taking agency seriously 
as “a pervasive and inbuilt property of matter, as part and parcel of its generative 
dynamism” (Opperman & Iovino 2014, 3) means approaching matter itself as “a doing, a 
congealing of agency” (Barad 2007, 151), not the inert and passive stage upon which 
variously positioned actors perform. The stage and the actor are mutually constitutive—
agency is an emergent property of temporally, spatially and relationally dynamic 
material assemblages of actants-in-relata (Latour 2005; Bennett 2010).
Adopting a stance of openness to the agency of the more-than-human world is 
especially crucial in our current historical moment (Plumwood 2002), in which unruly 
agential assemblages of industrial externalities and climatic planetary forces have 
begun to flex their muscles. The problematic moniker ‘the anthropocene’  highlights this 4
 Of course, “an unexamined anthropos is too large and slippery a concept to be at the heart” of 4
Anthropocene discourse (Head 2013, 122); it is somewhat ironic that the term “Anthropocene” has gained 
prominence just as the dominant Western construction of an unmarked human subject has begun to 
collapse (Derrida 1991a). As Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009) points out, why lay the blame at the feet of 
“humankind” as a whole, when it is the Global North—historically White and still overwhelming so—whose 
ecocidal consumptive tendencies have forced the entire planet into a position of ecological 
precariousness? Furthermore, although Anthropocene discourse tends to emphasize mutual connectivity 
and ecological interdependence, the term itself is meaningless outside of a dualistic conception of human 
as categorically separate from ‘Nature’ (Dibley 2012a; Crist 2013; Colebrook 2012). Indeed, one of the 
most oft-repeated quotes in the scholarly and popular discourse on the Anthropocene is that human 
activities now “rival the great forces of Nature” (see Steffen, Crutzen & McNeill 2007). The Anthropocene 
risks reifying the very anthropocentrism it seeks to temper; this is most evident in (excessively) optimistic 
‘ecomodern’ strains of Anthropocenic discourse that predict the inevitable triumph of human technological 
ingenuity over any obstacles that the fickle (yet somehow passive) figure of ‘Nature’ might throw at us. 
Seen in this light, scholarly ambivalence towards term “Anthropocene” seems only prudent. Following 
biologist E.O. Wilson, perhaps we should dub Earth’s new era of history not the “cheerful” Anthropocene, 
but instead the Eremocene, the Age of Loneliness (Wilson 2013, no pagination).
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dawning awareness of the breadth and depth of entanglement between human and 
nonhuman agencies, materialities and scales.  In the anthropocene, the appetites of 5
late capitalism have precipitated a “metabolic rift” in planetary physical, chemical and 
biological continuity (Wark 2015); so-called ‘human’ actions are widely recognized to 
manifest on simultaneously a molecular and global scale (Zalasiewicz et al. 2011). 
Capitalism—an apparatus of wealth accumulation that alienates subjects and things by 
removing them from their lifeworlds and exchanging them “with other assets from other 
lifeworlds, elsewhere”—is an apparatus that obviates entanglement, one that is 
ultimately hostile to multispecies planetary life (Tsing 2015, 5). Surviving late capitalism 
on a damaged planet means abandoning “the naive belief that many still have in a de-
animated world of mere stuff” (Latour 2014, 8) and reconfiguring hegemonic 
constructions of reality as an orderly field of subjects and objects into something more 
labile. The root cause of any effect is not any isolated subject-form, but a material-
semiotic assemblage of human and nonhuman agencies, including the agencies of the 
other-than-animal world (Haraway 2008b). Agency does not reside in bounded bodies, 
but arises from “the ongoing encounter, the contact, the tension and entwinement 
between each body and the breathing world that surrounds it” (Abrams 2010, 126; see 
also Von Uexküll 1940; Fawcett 2012, 63). This “ongoing encounter” with worldly alterity 
happens even within what is commonly thought of as the individual organism: perhaps 
the best known example is lichen, which is actually a composite creature of algae and 
fungi (Hird 2009, 59; Griffith 2015). The human organism is similarly multiple, a 
 I am here referring to the Western academe’s “dawning awareness” of the agency of the more-than-5
human world; as Indigenous scholars point out, many Indigenous cosmologies have long understood the 
more-than-human world to be agential (TallBear 2011; Todd, 2014).
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microbiome of viral, bacterial and other “messmates” (Haraway 2009), myriad even on a 
genetic level—an intimate entanglement of human and other-than-human affects and 
materialities all the way down. In this sense, as Smith argues, the state of being a 
“subject” might be “best conceived of in something akin to a temporal aspect—the 
‘subject’ as only a moment in a lived life” (Smith 1988, 37). The subject emerges as as a 
coherent entity via the intra-activity of material-discursive apparatuses and the inherent 
dynamism of matter itself. Subjects do not exist in isolation, but are emergent entities-in-
flux (Braidotti, 2013) that provoke specific modes of response-abilities (Haraway, 2008) 
in relation to other differentially materialized yet nevertheless entangled actants (Barad 
2007, 2011).
Transcorporeality
If subjectivities emerge differentially within various flows and congealments of always-
already agential matter, then the act of eating is one of the most literal sites of 
‘transcorporeality,' a term coined by Alaimo (2008; 2010, 2) to emphasize the 
permeability of embodied life. As Iovino glosses it, transcorporeality “express[es] the 
tangles of organism and discourses,” foregrounding the “unsolvable bond connecting 
life forms and life conditions” (2015, 72). Trancorporeality stresses that what we think of 
as discrete “organisms” are really temporally and spatially contingent coagulations of 
lively matter, “not static organized unities, but porous bodies that assemble into 
compositions through a variety of relations” (Buchanan 2008, 174). This confluence of 
various material agencies intra-actively reconfigure subjectivity a material-discursive 
performance, or even “dissolve the outline of the subject” altogether (Alaimo 2014, 187; 
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Iovino and Opperman 2014, 5). Eating is an excellent example of transcorporeality in 
action. Against the dualistic “conquest model” of eating that “presents nonhuman matter 
as … the means to human action” by characterizing food as fuel to be assimilated to the 
substance of the self (Bennet 2007, 133), transcorporeal accounts understand “eating 
as a series of mutual transformations in which the border between inside and outside 
becomes blurred” (Bennet 2007, 134). Eating highlights our dependence on both natural 
ecological systems and cultural technological forms; it bridges the living and the dead 
(Retzinger 2008) “in a complex rhythm of ingesting, digesting and expelling” (Slusser 
1996, 4). The transcorporeal relation of eater and eaten requires each to be mutually 
mutable, “to have always been a materiality that is hustle and flow as well as 
sedimentation and substance” (Bennet 2007, 134-5); in this way, food “reveals 
materiality’s instability, vagrancy, activeness” (136). The burgeoning field of nutritional 
epigenetics only reinforces this transcorporeality of matter, approaching food not as raw 
material but “as a miasma of biologically active molecules in which genomes are 
immersed” and expressed (Landecker 2011, 169)—“‘the environment’ is not (just) ‘out 
there’ but is always the very substance of ourselves” (Alaimo 2010, 4).  
Meat
‘Nature,' according to Raymond Williams, is the most complicated word in the human 
language (1983, 219); this dissertation continues in the broad tradition of ecocritical 
inquiry into literary ‘natures’ by examining SF stories dealing with the ontologization of 
other animals (‘nature’s’ most enduring synecdoche) as food. Limiting my analysis to 
edible animal tissue within one particular mode of storytelling pares down the vast 
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corpus of literary food to a more manageable serving size and allows for a deeper and 
more sustained engagement with the material-discursive genealogies of comestible 
bodies and their biopolitical interpellation into various (non)subject-positions. My choice 
of the term "meat" to describe creaturely biomatter consumed as food is strategic. 
Unlike the Spanish, Portuguese and Italian ‘carne’ (which references animals’ flesh) or 
the French ‘viande' (which references “the[ir] bygone life”), in English ‘meat’ is 
etymologically related to not to animals but simply to ‘meal’ (Marder 2016, 101). At the 
time of the King James Version of the Bible (seventeenth century), ‘meat’ meant any 
substantial food, a usage still evident in phrases like ‘the meat of the argument’ (Adams 
2010, 53). The term has only in the last few centuries mapped neatly onto animal flesh-
as-food.
Plumwood (2002) understands ‘meat’’ to refer only to the commodified flesh of animals 
incarcerated in the modern animal industrial complex, arguing that it is inaccurate to use 
the term to describe pre-modern Western animal-derived food or contemporary 
subsistence hunters’ consumption of animals’ flesh. Plumwood’s reluctance to label 
non-capitalist flesh-as-food as ‘meat’ stems from her staunch support of ecologically 
embedded and Indigenous life-ways and her insistence that human predation on other 
animals not be demonized, a position I wholly support. To be perfectly clear—I am not 
mounting a universalist argument against all human practices of zoophagy across all 
cultures and histories—such a move would be wholly incompatible with my ecofeminist 
orientation. Any critique of carnism must be carefully contextualized within the specific 
loci-of-relations of production and consumption that underpin it—meat is an emergent 
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phenomenon, not an ontic entity or a static substance. However, for reasons of 
readability, I have chosen throughout to use the term “meat” as it is commonly 
understood to refer simply to flesh-as-food. I do this partly because the SF authors I 
engage are all Anglophone writers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries who use 
the term “meat” in this sense, even within loci-of-relations that would not meet 
Plumwood’s strict criteria. More substantially, I disagree with Plumwood that we need to 
understand the term ‘meat’ as a category of negation born of instrumentalization, 
applicable only to the very most abusive and industrial of flesh production practices. 
Instead, I approach 'meat' as a term that simply acknowledges from the outset that 
animals are indeed edible, humans included and that all corporeal bodies ultimately 
nourish others. All bodies can be understood as meat, human, animal and otherwise; 
however, the undeniable fact that many fleshy bodies are, ontologically, mutually edible 
(‘meat’) does not mean that we should all be ontologized as available for consumption 
(‘food’), as Taylor and Struthers-Montford (2018) argue. 
Although I use the term “meat" in a fashion that she would likely find too broad, I stand 
firmly with Plumwood in eschewing ahistorical universalist condemnations of human 
meat-eating—I am not concerned with critiquing global practices of meat consumption 
that operate outside of dualistic configurations of subjectivity, even those that 
nevertheless proceed via capitalist economic frameworks. Rather, I contextualize my 
critique of carnism (when it arises) within the “metabolic rift” (Wark 2015) of our current 
ecological crisis and the dualistically-configured material-discursive apparatuses of 
domination that drive it—including, prominently, the ecologically disastrous animal 
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industrial complex, itself intimately implicated in settler colonialism and the seizure of 
Indigenous lands (Struthers-Montford 2017; DeJohn Anderson 2004).  As McHugh 
points out,
the mind-boggling ways and numbers in which [domesticated] animals are killed 
in our time are unprecedented, as are the mechanisms of rendering these 
processes invisible. Although these conditions may have been developed to 
serve expansions of capitalism and empire, they also create new opportunities 
for dismantling these structures. (McHugh 2010 15)
Meat-animal narratives, McHugh argues, “offer ways of beginning to rethink not simply 
how meat histories are shared but, more, complexly, are involved in co-constituted 
futures that exceed the reference points once stabilizing and now dissolving 
species” (2010, 209). Attentive to entanglements in their specificity and accountable to 
their differentially materialized exclusions, this dissertation eschews the imposition of 
meat-avoidance as a universal moral doxa and instead engages “the incomplete, ill-
formed stories of meat” (ibid.) as vital resources not only for reimagining sustainable 
living arrangements but also for critical thinking more broadly, prompting “the difficult 
and necessary work of framing ever more possible answers” to the question of who (or 
what) can be a subject and how to respond to such a configuration (ibid.).
Science Fiction
If, as Braidotti insists, the complexities of our times require “a form of estrangement and 
a radical repositioning on the part of the subject” best accomplished through “a strategy 
of defamiliarization” from dominant visions of subjectivity (Braidotti 2013, 88), science 
 20
fiction (SF) is superbly suited to the task. The genre has long defied definition (Knight, 
1967). Following Bould and Vint (2011), I take it as a given that “[t]here is no such thing 
as a ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ definition of the genre because the very features of what is 
named as SF emerge in the process of pointing and naming” (Bould & Vint 2011, 5).The 
genre has been influentially described by Suvin as “the literature of cognitive 
estrangement” (Suvin 1979, 13), a formulation geared towards (re)defining science 
fiction as serious literature worthy of serious critical engagement. Suvin rejects the 
notion that science fiction must be scientifically accurate, seeing the genre as an agent 
of “social critique and political transformation rather than a source of patent 
applications” (Bould & Vint 2011, 18). Nevertheless his formulation of SF as a genre 
whose features are “not impossible” (1979, viii) “has tended to reinforce a distinction 
between SF and fantasy that is not necessarily clear when one examines many texts 
widely regarded as ‘SF’”  (Bould & Vint 2011, 19). As Mieville points out, warp engines 
are no less “fantastical” than dragons (2009); Delany (1984a) and Jones (1999, 16) 
have likewise noted that SF proceeds by manipulating language to create the illusion of 
scientific expertise. SF is not about scientific accuracy, nor is it strictly extrapolative; it is 
heavily indebted to myth and to the Gothic romance, bleeding into horror, fantasy, 
Westerns and magical realism (Delany 1984a; Aldiss & Wingrove 1973; Bould & Vint 
2011, 20). “What sets it apart from other forms of fiction,” according to Le Guin (1976), 
seems to be its use of new metaphors, drawn from certain great dominants of 
our contemporary life—science, all the sciences and technology and the 
relativistic and historical outlook, among them. Space travel is one of these 
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metaphors; so is an alternative society, an alternative biology; the future is 
another. (vi) 
Bould and Vint (2011) argue for understanding SF “as an ongoing process rather than a 
fixed entity” that preexists its denomination (1), a negotiated and shifting “network of 
linked texts, motifs, themes and images” (Vint 2014: 14). It is itself an assemblage of 
entangled actants—critics, fans, media, markets, materialities and more—
encompassing vast asymmetries of influence and sometimes conflicting interests (Bould 
& Vint 2011, 19). No wonder Haraway declines to limit the initials “SF” to just "science 
fiction," understanding SF as a “potent material-semiotic sign for the riches of 
speculative fabulation, speculative feminism, science fiction, speculative fiction, science 
fact [and] science fantasy” (Haraway 2015, no pagination, para. 8). However defined or 
abbreviated, science fiction/SF “exists as a fuzzily-edged, multidimensional and 
constantly shifting discursive object” within which thematic patterns emerge and are 
reabsorbed (Bould & Vint 2011, 5).
Among the most persistent of these patterns is SF’s perspective of estrangement 
(cognitive, speculative, affective or otherwise). Texts in the genre articulate a “point of 
difference” (Roberts 2006, 145) from which to construct worlds in (often critical) dialogue 
with the world in which they are read (Delany 1984a, 117). In this way, SF can be 
approached as a “privileged site” for probing the limits of subjectivity and 
interdependency (Vint 2009, 11), an “undomesticated” literary mode able to raise “a 
range and variety of questions all but banned from the civilized tables of ‘mainstream’ 
fiction” (Slusser 1996, 2). While there is certainly “no necessary, fixed or consensus 
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relationship between SF and science” (Bould 2012, 6), as a genre that arguably 
emerged in its modern form over the course of a period of rapidly intensifying 
industrialization, technological elaboration and social upheaval, SF may be uniquely 
positioned to explore and interrogate the technoscientific cultures of capitalism 
(Candelaria 2005,vii; Aldiss & Wingrove 1973, 151; Vint 2014, 4); as Haraway declares 
in her famous ‘Cyborg Manifesto’ (1991), “[t]he boundary between science fiction and 
social reality is an optical illusion” (149). SF is “a territory of contested cultural 
reproduction in high-technology worlds” (Haraway 1989, 5), a literature of alterity (Vint, 
2009) centrally concerned with “the interpenetration of boundaries of problematic selves 
and unexpected others” (Haraway 1991, 300). In these ways, the genre is invaluable in 
exploring questions of more-than-human agency and subjectivity and the messy, 
emotional and rigorous ethics of response-ability that such intersubjective encounters 
demand (Haraway 2011, 102; Vint 2009; Clement 2015):
Natural or not, good or not, safe or not, the critters of technoculture make a 
body- and soul-changing claim on their ‘creators’ that is rooted in the 
generational obligation of and capacity for responsive attentiveness. … To care 
is wet, emotional, messy and demanding of the best thinking one has ever 
done. That is one reason we need speculative fabulation. (Haraway 2011, 102)
For Haraway, SF offers unique perspectives for thinking about the material-semiotic 
entanglements of human, animal and machine. If narrative forms are also “modes of 
subjectivity and identification,” discursive templates through which we actualize 
ourselves (Currie 1998, 130), then SF, as a non-mimetic genre, is uniquely positioned to 
“use narrative strategies impossible within the confines of realistic 
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representation” (Gomel 2012, 79). In the SF examined in this dissertation alone, such 
impossible strategies include species hierarchy-reversals, technopolitical conflicts 
around multispecies pluralism, semi-living coalitions of corporeal agencies and the 
ambivalent reconfigurations of subjectivity effected by interspecies metamorphoses.
While my focus on flesh-as-food in science fiction may seem niche, the genre has 
demonstrably been fascinated with questions of subjectivity, meat-eating and the more-
than-human world for fully two centuries. While there can be no single definition of what 
counts as SF or when it can be said to have been born—various critics have located the 
roots of the genre as far back as the epic of Gilgamesh (del Rey 1980) or as recently as 
the pulps of the twentieth century (Delany 1984)—Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) is 
a popular candidate for the honour first science fiction novel (Aof ldiss & Wingrove 
1973) that can also be approached as a key text for the study of vegan literature (Quinn 
2018). Drawing upon Romantic ideas of Prelapsarian vegetarianism and ‘man’s’ 
subsequent carnivorous fall from grace (Quinn 2018, 154-5; Adams 1990, 148, 152; 
Belasco 2006), in Frankenstein Shelley constructs a vegetarian-feminist parable of a 
meat-eschewing creature assembled from slaughterhouse by-products “who, like the 
animals eaten for meat, finds itself excluded from the moral circle of humanity” (Adams 
2010,158). Another popular early SF novel, H. G. Wells’ The Time Machine (1894), also 
foregrounds meat-eating and subjectivities (human and otherwise). The novel combines 
contemporary fears of human devolution with social anxieties regarding Darwinism’s 
paradigm-shattering insistence on human-animal continuity, the latter which raised the 
uncomfortable “possibility that those animals consumed as meat were not essentially 
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different from the "we" who ate them.” (Lee 2010, 251). The result is a narrative that 
“keeps returning to food and, in the end, turns out to be a story very much about 
eating” (Lee 2010, 254)—in Well’s eschatological scientific romance, the effete, 
frugivorous Eloi live a life of leisure in a beautiful garden world and are preyed upon by 
the cannibalistic, working-class Morlocks, who live underground and whose unseen 
labour makes possible the idyllic pastoral paradise enjoyed by the scatterbrained 
surface dwellers. In a very literal sense, the Eloi themselves are a surface crop being 
cultivated by the Morlocks (Retzinger 2008, 382). The genre has continued to 
interrogate the relations between (meat-)eating and configurations of more-than-human 
subjectivity throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and into the twenty-first. 
SF is a contested and mutable “network in which it is always possible to make new and 
novel connections among existing nodes and always possible to link previously 
unconnected material” (Vint 2014, 14). Consequently, the texts engaged here are an 
eclectic bunch, thematically rather than chronologically approached. Some are winners 
of the genre’s highest awards (Butler’s Xenogenesis trilogy, 1988-1989; Pohl and 
Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants, 1953) while others are overlooked minor works from 
major players in the history of the field (Simak’s “Drop Dead,” 1956; DeFord’s “Season 
of the Babies,” 1959; Tiptree’s “Morality Meat,” 1985). Some are popular contemporary 
mass-market paperbacks (Traviss’ Wess’har Wars series, 2004-2008) and others are 
relatively unknown independent press publications (O’Guilin’s Bone World trilogy, 
2007-2014; D’Lacey’s Meat, 2008; LePan’s Animals, 2009). One is a speculative 
cookbook (Mensvoort & Grievink’s The In Vitro Meat Cookbook, 2014) and another 
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rejects the label of “science fiction” altogether (Atwood’s Oryx and Crake, 2003). 
Despite having long been a vibrant, multilingual genre, my analysis here is linguistically 
and geographically restricted to English-language, Anglo-American printed SF, omitting 
for reasons of space and difficulties of translation what is certainly a wealth of SF in 
other languages and media. Temporally, I focus on SF published during and after the 
second half of the twentieth century, a period of increasing awareness of the scope and 
severity of the anthropogenic ecological crisis. The common thread running through 
these varied texts is that they link, in differential trajectories and intensities, questions of 
subjectivity and agency to questions of meat production and/or consumption.
Systematic Methodological Framing
My analysis proceeds via the kind of performative posthumanist analysis outlined by 
Barad (2003), a methodology explicitly oriented to the more-than-human and one that 
“opens up many fascinating possibilities for studying the thought experiments of science 
fiction” (Vint 2008, 317). Posthumanism broadly speaking opposes overdetermined 
notions of human autonomy and disembodied subjectivity (Wolfe, 2003); as an 
interdisciplinary protocol of thought it “has brought about a profound epistemic shift with 
new configurations of intertwined physical and social and material and discursive 
understandings of the relations between the human and the more-than-human 
world” (Gaard 2011, 25). Posthumanism seeks to destabilize the human/animal 
distinction, move beyond anthropocentric ethical frameworks and challenge the 
epistemological configuration of the individual “knowing theorist” (Wolfe 2010, 125), thus 
problematizing the idea of the “Man of Reason” as “the allegedly universal measure of 
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all things” (Braidotti 2017, 18). A central task of posthumanism has been to flesh out the 
associations between binary structures of thought and configurations of subjectivity 
(Braidotti 2013, 76; Hayles 1999); Barad’s performative posthumanist methodology 
continues this task of fleshing out connections and denaturalizing binaries. For Barad, 
“the primary semantic units are not “words” but material-discursive practices through 
which boundaries are constituted” (Barad 2003, 818). Against representationalist 
methodologies that posit an ontological distinction between representations and the 
entities they purport to represent, Barad deploys the concept of diffraction as a “mutated 
critical tool of analysis” to discern and respond to patterns of difference (Barad 2003, 
803). A term borrowed from physical optics and originally articulated in a feminist 
context by Haraway (1997, 34), “diffraction” means to “break apart in different 
directions” (Barad 2007, 168). A diffractive approach to textual analysis eschews binary 
or hierarchical constructions of difference to emphasize the necessity of “attentively and 
carefully reading for differences that matter in their fine details” (in Van Der Tuin 2012, 
50). This strategy of “envisioning difference differently” (Thiele 2014, 203) “take[s] 
account of the boundary making practices by which the differential constitution of 
‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’ are enacted” without presuming that “the terms on either 
side of equivalence relations are given” (Barad 2003, 818; 808). By “directly tak[ing] up 
the matter of the cuts that produce distinctions between ‘human’ and 
‘nonhumans’” (Barad 2003, 808), this kind of performative posthumanist analysis enacts 
an ethics predicated not on an some ‘unbiased’ external viewpoint but rather from a 
position of entanglement, an ethics that “insists on on understanding thinking, observing 
and theorizing as practices of engagement with and as part of, the world in which we 
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have our being” (Barad, 2003, 133; Barad, in van der Tuin 2012, 50). A feminist ethics of 
entanglement does not dichotomize or background exclusion, remaining attentive to 
“the obligations that are created when things are cut in a particular way at the expense 
of other ways of being” (Hollin, Forsyth, Giraud & Potts 2017, 22) and curious about the 
“alternative worlds lost at the moment of emergence” of any particular entanglement 
(24). Particular agential apparatuses materially and discursively enact particular 
exclusionary boundaries (Barad, 2003, 816, 203); these sometimes violent exclusions 
press home  “our responsibility in making the future through our choices and actions in 
the moment, each intra-action shaping the future that might be” (Vint 2008, 317; Hollin, 
Forsyth, Giraud & Potts 2017). In attending to such possibilities and their foreclosures I 
draw upon: ecofeminist techniques of attentive listening, anti-dualism and 
intersectionality; critical animal studies’ emphasis on the resistant agency and alterity of 
the animal; and material ecocritical approaches to the agential entanglement of 
discourse and matter, theoretical orientations I outline below.
Ecofeminism(s)
Ecofeminism offers important ways to think about subjectivities and SF; like the genre 
itself, ecofeminism is all about imagining otherwise. “The very essence” of the field, 
according to Gaard, “is its challenge to the presumed necessity of power 
relationships” (1993, 19): ecofeminism is a set of theories and political practices that 
interrogate how the structures of power that authorize intra-human oppressions 
intersect and authorize the domination of nonhuman ‘nature’ (Sturgeon 2009, 9; Gaard 
1993, 1; 2017; Adams & Gruen 2014; Warren 1994, 1). Though often unacknowledged, 
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ecofeminist thinkers anticipated many of the critiques made under the rubric of animal 
studies (eg. Wolfe, 2003) and ecocriticism (eg. Garrard, 2004), notably by interrogating 
“rights” paradigms that remain dependent on the conceptual scaffolding of hierarchical 
dualism (Fraiman 2012; Gaard 2010; Plumwood 1997, 2002). ‘New’ materialist or 
material feminist innovations likewise owe a great deal to ecofeminist thinkers, 
particularly regarding the critique of the life-nonlife boundary and the recognition of the 
agency of the nonhuman (including nonanimal) world. Ecofeminists have long argued 
for the ethical urgency of actively supporting social and political movements addressing 
differential forms of oppression between variously positioned human groups and Earth 
others; O’Laughlin (1993), for example, argues that ecofeminists must stand in solidarity 
with political struggles against racism and classism (her example is the United Fruit 
Workers grape boycott of the 1990s) in recognition of the fact that “ecological and 
health concerns can link consumers and laborers originally separated by class, color 
and culture” (Gaard 1993, 8; O’Laughlin 1993).  A diverse and at times conflicted body 
of thought that might better be described in the plural (Sturgeon 1997, 168), 
ecofeminisms share a focus on gender/sexuality as a central category of critical inquiry, 
“not because gender oppression is more important than other forms of oppression; it is 
not. It is because a focus on ‘women’ reveals important features of interconnected 
systems of human domination” (Warren 2000, 2). Ecofeminist literary criticism brings 
this intersectional  analysis of power relations to ‘mainstream’ posthumanist and 6
ecocritical literary analysis, attending to the heterogeneous ways in which systems of 
 The term ‘intersectionality’ was coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989 to highlight the inadequacies of 6
single-issue activism and theory to intervene in the intersecting oppressions endured by multiply-
positioned subjects, such as Black women.  
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oppression interlock with and constitute one another (Campbell 2008, ix; Gaard & 
Murphy 1998; Opperman 2013). Building on feminist attention to the ‘other,' ecofeminist 
literary criticism rejects binary notions of categorical difference or totalizing similitude (in 
Plumwood’s terms, “the ocean of continuity vs. the desert of difference” [1993, 3]), 
instead understanding the self/other distinction as one of relative rather than absolute 
difference, heterarchically rather than hierarchically aligned (Gaard & Murphy 1998, 6; 
Armbruster 1998). Going well beyond “simply looking for literature that emphasizes 
women’s or other marginalized people’s sense of connection with nature” (Armbruster 
1998, 106), ecofeminist literary criticism strives to create a space in which the voices of 
the subaltern can be heard on their own terms (Gaard 2017, xvi; Campbell 2008), 
advocating a praxis of “attentive listening” to attend to the subject (human or otherwise) 
and its idiolect as expressed through the “sensuous contact” of narrative (Donovan 
1998, 74-96). Against anthroponormative theories of morality that install so-called 
human characteristics as the ethical yardstick par excellence against which to 
categorize and rank the more-than-human world, ecofeminist ethicists advocate a 
contextual and relational approach to ethics emphasizing care rather than duty; 
narrative form is not only useful, but perhaps even “native” to this ethic of care, because 
“an ethics of care must have the resources to receive, evaluate—even create—narrative 
elements” (Paulsen 2011, 29, 39-40; Donovon & Adams 2007; Davis 2017). Ecofeminist 
theory thus participates in the ongoing evaluation and creation of narrative forms as a 
means of activist praxis aimed at actualizing more just and sustainable relations 
between variously positioned Earthly actants. Ecofeminist thinkers have long found SF 
an invaluable medium for imagining new possibilities for ethical entanglements 
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(Haraway, 1989); the genre’s estranging perspective enriches and thickens ecofeminist 
theorizing. Like SF, ecofeminism is not just about critique, but “building alternative 
ontologies, specifically via the use of the imaginative" (Haraway & Goodeve 2000, 120, 
original italics). Both modes are compelled “to encourage first contact, alien encounters 
and contact zones” in the ongoing quest for the articulation of “more worldly and 
survivable stories” (Greibowicz & Merrick 2013, 113-4).
Animal-attentive ecofeminism, a subfield that stakes out its normative commitments with 
its alternative appellation ‘vegetarian ecofeminism’ (Gaard 2011, 27), takes seriously the 
analysis of species as a hierarchically-dualistic category of difference-as-pejoration. 
Well aware that “in most human cultures both female human and nonhuman bodies 
have been historically used either to provide food, or to cook and serve it” (Torrijos 
2013, 32), animal-attentive ecofeminists interrogate the ways in which the 
subordinately-positioned categories of women and animals reinforce one another in 
producing historically dominant configurations of white, male, human subjectivity 
(Adams 1990[2010]; Fraiman 2012). In these ways, animal studies and posthumanist 
theoretical orientations owe a debt to ecofeminism that is not always adequately 
acknowledged; ecofeminist activism and theory has been backgrounded within some 
posthumanist strands of animal studies (eg. Wolfe 2003) that “distinguish their project 
not only from animal advocacy but also from gender studies and other areas animated 
by specific political commitments” (Fraiman 2012, 92). My own commitment to 
remembering the groundwork laid by vegetarian ecofeminists in the animal studies field 
(Gaard, 2010, 3) has profoundly informed my approach to questions of subjectivities, 
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which I engage as configurations of agency enmeshed in a diverse network of intra-
acting Earth others which may exceed the subject-form but nevertheless provoke 
agential response-abilities. Critical animal studies approaches (as I outline below) tend 
to foreground other animals as oppressed subjects; some strains of CAS scholarship 
express little inclination to ruminate on ethical entanglements and response-abilities 
towards non-animal nonhumans, such as plants, fungi, bacteria or cells (Weisberg, 
2014; for a counter-example of CAS engaging with vegetal ethics, see Houle 2012). I 
find this exclusionary, boundary-enacting foreclosure incompatible with an ecofeminist 
stance of intentional recognition of the agency of the more-than-human (and more-than-
animal) world (Plumwood, 2002). Therefore, while my intersectional analysis 
foregrounds other animals, it does so in ways congruent with the open, entangled, 
ecologically embodied ethics of ecofeminist theory (Gaard 2010, 2011, 2016).
Critical Animal Studies
The radical breakdown of the human/animal distinction in scholarly scientific discourse 
is one of the “defining characteristics” of our age (Calarco 2017, 6; Pick 2011, 1); 
certainly by the late twentieth century, as Haraway points out, “[t]he boundary between 
human and animal [has been] thoroughly breached” (1991, 151; Noske, 1997). The 
2012 “Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in Non-Human Animals,” in which an 
international group of prominent scientists declared the evidence for conscious 
awareness in many other species incontrovertible, further demonstrates the pressing 
need to incorporate updated ontologies of human-animal (in)distinction in critical theory 
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and beyond; critical animal studies (CAS) is just such an endeavour.  An 7
interdisciplinary field spanning and questioning the humanities and the social and 
natural sciences (Taylor & Twine, 2014, 2), CAS unapologetically focuses on the 
circumstances and treatment of other animals; in Pedersen and Stanescu’s terms, CAS 
is concerned not only with the ‘question of the animal’ but also with the condition of real 
animals, seeking “to liberate the animal from the circumstances that seek to enslave 
her” (Pedersen & Stanescu, 2012, xi; 2014, 262). CAS knowledge production “must be 
accountable to its nonhuman animal subjects by striving to contribute to the 
improvement of the situation of animals and by considering the broader political 
consequences of our research” (Pedersen & Stanescu 2014, 264), a task that 
necessitates “conceptual renewal, methodological innovation, [and] theory that that is 
relevant and engaged” (Taylor & Twine 2014, 2). Literary approaches to CAS explore 
material-discursive engagements with animal others by approaching literary animals as 
resistant participants in the production of social meaning rather than merely passive 
screens upon which human exigencies are projected (MchHugh 2011; Armstrong 2008). 
SF, as a literature of alterity centrally concerned with imagining otherwise and one with 
a long history of more-than-human encounters, has much in common with and much to 
offer critical literary animal studies (Vint, 2009).
  The Cambridge Declaration can be accessed online: http://fcmconference.org/img/7
CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf. While she hails the Declaration as “an impressive 
proclamation,” Midgley (2014) goes on to ask: “How can it possibly be necessary to say this today? The 
admission certainly comes better late than never, but why has it taken scientists three hundred years to 
get rid of an error that a little attention to their own domestic animals could quickly have cured? As we are 
beginning to realize, the explanation of this slowness does not lie in any scientific counter-evidence but in 
a background myth, a set of assumptions” regarding human exceptionalism (94)
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Like the ecofeminism that precedes and informs it, CAS is a resolutely intersectional 
body of thought committed to grappling with interlocking oppressions within and beyond 
the human sphere (Nocella et al 2013, xx). Animal studies, critical and otherwise, is not 
monolithic; various scholars working within the field take various approaches to 
questions of agency and ethics beyond the human. Wolfe (2003, 2010), for example, 
aligns his own continentally-inflected version of animal studies with posthumanism and 
contrasts this approach to the activist focus of more explicitly “critical” animal theory 
preoccupied with including (some) animals within dominant schemata of subjectivity. In 
Wolfe’s estimation, CAS’s strategy of attempting to shift the boundaries of subjectivity 
while capitulating to extant configurations of the subject render the field mere “humanist 
posthumanism,” as opposed to Wolfe’s own more sophisticated “posthumanist 
posthumanism” which problematizes the very form of the knowing subject itself (2010, 
125). As I have stressed from the outset, my own position rejects such a bifurcation of 
critical engagements with subjectivity into extensionist and reconstructive registers; I 
follow Braidotti (2017) and Pedersen (2011) in arguing for critical urgency of both 
expanding and reconfiguring subjectivity in anti-anthropocentric and anti-hierarchical 
ways. While it is important to clarify CAS’s normative commitment to animal flourishing 
and to re-member the groundwork laid by vegetarian ecofeminists in the field (Gaard, 
2010, 3), I recognize that “transformative potential regarding animal issues can be found 
in various approaches to animal studies and even in discourses that are not explicitly 
radical” (Calarco 2017, 2), including Wolfe’s own work (2003, 2013), which draws upon 
Derrida (1991a, 1991b), Deleuze and Guattari (1980), Foucault (1976) and Haraway 
(2008) to articulate an ethics of openness and indeterminacy with significant overlap to 
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ecofeminist and material feminist ethics of entanglement and ecological embodiment 
(Fraiman, 2012; Gaard, 2011, 2010). I do not wish to belabour the distinction between 
critical, mainstream and ecofeminist approaches to animal studies, instead following 
Calarco (2017, 2) in suggesting that “the interdisciplinary and intersectional nature of 
much of the work done in critical animal studies” necessitates engagement “with a wide 
array of traditions, texts and strategies that go well beyond the particular theoretical 
traditions that are sometimes thought exclusively the undergird the field” (eg. Best et al 
2007). Ultimately, I understand CAS as a diverse body of thought that at its most 
fundamental level seeks to dismantle the  material-discursive apparatuses limiting 
animal potentiality in order to create other ways of life conducive to multi-species 
flourishing—aims wholly compatible with both ecofeminist and new materialist theories’ 
normative commitments (Calarco 2017, 5; Gaard 2010, 2011, 2016).
Material Ecocriticism
Another field heavily informed by ecofeminism, ecocriticism is an affective and analytic 
strategy of reading (Huggan & Tiffin 2010) fundamentally concerned with a given text’s 
orientation to constructions of “Nature” and the natural (Gaard 2004). While some 
strands of ecocritical theory are notoriously hostile to feminist theory (see Garrard 
2004), I follow Estok (2001) in arguing that ecocriticism that fails to consider how sex/
gender is implicated in the discursive construction and domination of the more-than-
human world has failed in its intersectional mandate and “is quite simply not 
ecocriticism” (228). Queer ecocriticism continues this project of attending to the 
intersectionality  of configurations of sex and nature by illuminating and challenging the 
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heteronormative biases that have long underpinned influential discourses of ecology, 
ethology and environmental politics (Mortimer-Sandilands & Erikson 2010, 5). Attentive 
to the dialogic interplay between text and context, (queer, feminist) ecocriticism 
examines the linguistic permutations involved in the discursive constitution of nature 
(Opperman 2006, 117) while simultaneously taking seriously the constraints and ethical 
response-abilities imposed by the real material environment (Heise 2006, 512). Material 
ecocriticism, the strand of ecocritical discourse I find most compelling and generative for 
the purposes of this dissertation, combines the insights of ‘new’ materialism  with 8
‘traditional’ ecocriticism’s environmental activism, interweaving postmodern and 
ecological voices to approach matter not only in texts, but as text, “as a site of narrativity 
… a corporeal palimpsest in which stories are inscribed” (Iovino 2012, 451). Material 
ecocriticism draws upon Haraway’s “naturecultures” (2008) and Barad’s “agential 
realism” (2003; 2007), concepts that stress that nature and culture, matter and 
discourse are are co-constituting, interdependent phenomena, not separate pre-existing 
realms. Matter is not a passive substrate that is inscribed with stories, but a medium for 
the exchange of stories that itself acts or does work. The basic premises of material 
ecocriticism, according to Opperman and Iovino, are that of 
a distributive vision of agency, the emergent nature of the world’s phenomena, 
the awareness that we inhabit a dimension crisscrossed by vibrant forces that 
hybridize human and nonhuman matters and finally the persuasion that matter 
and meaning constitute the fabric of our storied world. (2014, 5)
 See Cudworth and Hobden (2015) and Parikka (interview with Deiter, 2012) for a succinct historicization 8
of the various threads of philosophical thought that contribute to what has lately emerged as the 
supposedly ‘new’ materialism.
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Material ecocriticism emphasizes the narrative dimension of matter, paying close 
attention to “configurations of meanings and discourses that we can interpret as stories" 
(7).  What material ecocriticism stresses in “say[ing] that such articulations are 
‘storied’ […is] the fact that matter’s dynamism is “sedimented” in a temporal dimension 
and can be known accordingly” (Iovino 2014, 75), telling “stories of coexistence, 
interdependence, adaptation and hybridization, extinctions and survivals” (Iovino & 
Opperman, 2014, 7). Matter does not speak only to the human interpreter; as eco-
semioticians emphasise, all things and beings “have the ability to communicate 
something of themselves to other beings," catalyzing a sensibility that finds a dynamic 
and agential world replete with meanings and interpretations (Abrams 2010, 172; 
Wheeler 2017). As Iovino and Opperman argue, “framing this interplay in a narrative 
dimension is essential in the economy of ecological discourse” (2014, 8), reinforcing 
Plumwood’s argument for the pressing need to adopt a stance of openness to the 
intentionality and mindedness of the more-than-human world (2002, 182). Through the 
practice of ‘reading,' material ecocritics “intra-actively” participate in the world’s 
“differential becoming” or “embodied understanding” (Barad 2007; Iovino & Opperman 
2014, 4). “Intra-action," a neologism coined by Barad, complicates “interaction’s” 
presumption of the prior existence of independent entities, emphasizing instead that 
phenomena emerge and become determinate only through the process of relating; 
bodies are meaning-generating “material semiotic” actants the boundaries of which 
“materialize in social interactions” (Haraway 1988, 595; Barad 2003, 815; 2007, 429). 
The interpreter and the interpreted emerge together in the intra-active encounter of 
“doing” material ecocriticism, in the process “bringing forth the world in its specificity, 
 37
including ourselves” (Barad 2007, 353, in Iovino 2014, 83-4). SF and material 
ecocriticism share crucial commitments, including the commitment to reading differently, 
to developing reading protocols that invite the construction of “different worlds and 
possibilities from previously fixed words, metaphors and concepts” (Greibowicz & 
Merrick 2013, 128; Delany, 1977, 78) in an ongoing process of critical and creative 
(re)worlding. 
 
Research Questions and Chapter Overviews
Deploying the insights of ecofeminism, critical animal studies and material ecocriticism 
in intra-action with SF strategies of storying within a framework of agential entanglement 
attentive to differential modes of multispecies worlding, my analysis foregrounds the 
following questions:
1. How does the text approach human relations with the nonhuman world, including 
other animals/nature? Is the ethical framework universalist or contextual, individualist 
or relational?
2. How does the text construct ethico-political subjectivity—who can be a subject, at 
which times, how and why? How do dualisms like human-animal, subject-object and 
“food”/“not food" factor into this subjectification?
3. Who and what has the capacity to act? How is agency construed? 
4. How does the text stand up to intersectional critique? I focus primarily on species, sex 
and gender, but class, race and disability are also crucial factors—how are these 
axes of oppression entangled in the narrative? What are the shortcomings and gaps? 
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Where are the blindspots and what do they reveal about the text’s understanding of 
the relation between animals/animality and intra-human forms of oppression?
I intend each chapter to complicate the preceding, becoming successively more 
molecular with each section. Chapter two’s human cattle dystopias decry the exclusivity 
of moral and political subjectivity as solely the provence of (some) humans by 
subjecting humans to systems of meat production; chapter three engages the alterity of 
the alien to complicate subject-object dualism in food discourses; chapter four 
deconstructs the subject through the semi-living agency of in vitro meat; and chapter 
five employs SF narratives of me(a)tamorphosis to articulate the transcorporeality of 
subjectivity and the agency of the eaten. This strategy of cascading complexification 
does not suggest the primacy of molecular over molar, agency over subjectivity, or ‘new’ 
materialism over vegetarian ecofeminism. Rather, in deploying a performative 
posthumanist method to diffract the riches of material ecocriticism through the 
theoretical grating of ecofeminism and animal studies, then subsequently re-diffracting 
the resulting interference patterns through the narrative scaffolding of science fiction, I 
aim to both observe and respond to the always-already ethically-consequential patterns 
of difference that emerge from such agential entanglements. In doing so, I suggest that 
the material turn’s exuberant insistence on the co-constitutive entanglements of living 
forms is complementary, not contradictory, to CAS’s mandate to dismantle the material-
discursive apparatuses of domination that incarcerate and instrumentalize myriad 
billions of animals (human and otherwise) in the name of anthropocentric sovereignty 
(Wadiwel 2015). In order to effectively nourish an entangled ethics of multispecies 
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flourishing, critical theory simply cannot afford to neglect “the manifest and extraordinary 
forms of violence that institutionally rearticulate the differentiation between human and 
animal” (Wadiwel 2015, 26). In differential and uneven ways, extant onto-epistemologies 
of hierarchical dualism and anthropocentric rationalism materialize global 
concatenations of capital and violence that entrap, (re)produce and annihilate other 
animals in historically unprecedented scales and intensities. By doing difference 
differently, an anti-anthropocentric performative posthumanist methodology is well-
equipped to discern—and dismantle—these agential boundary-making practices that 
materialize subjectivity via a process of radical exclusion, clearing a space to enact an 
ethico-onto-epistemology of response-ability that is open, flexible, participatory, 
contingent and pluralistic, grounded in humble and careful attention to specific 
differences that matter.
The second chapter, ‘Human(e) meat, dualism and the human cattle dystopia,' 
considers SF’s predilection for anthropophagic narratives within an explicitly  
ecofeminist/CAS frame that foregrounds ethical concerns regarding the treatment of 
other animals within food production regimes. Engaging biopolitical theory to embed 
discourses of subject-formation within material relations of animal capital, I argue that 
the hierarchical dualism of subject/object buttresses the production of the human/animal 
species binary and permits the ‘non-criminal putting to death’ of those outside the 
agreed-upon scope of subjectivity. By representing human bodies as edible flesh in 
much the same manner as nonhuman bodies are considered consumable within 
dominant discourses, narrative SF is able to problematize the relegation of other 
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animals to the position of non-subjects outside the realm of moral concern (Vints 2009, 
26), a strategy only possibly within a conception of the human as both radically distinct 
from and dangerously close to, other animals. The bulk of the chapter analyzes two 
millennial SF texts that bring nonhuman meat production and consumption explicitly to 
the fore: Joseph DeLacey’s body-horror book Meat (2008) and Don LePan’s heavily 
footnoted thought-experiment Animals (2009). Both of these novels provoke critical 
consideration of contemporary Western cultures of carnism through subjecting human 
characters to the privations of nonhuman animal farming, presenting near future 
societies wherein the extinction of large nonhuman mammals has resulted in the 
designation of certain groups of humans as “animal," and thus consumable as dead 
flesh. While interrogating the human exclusivity of dominant forms of political and moral 
subjectivity is a vital project, human cattle stories do little to problematize the underlying 
structure of dualisms that make such exclusions possible. In fact, both novels reinscribe 
dualistic hierarchies of reason/emotion and male/female in differential but problematic 
ways. Their shared villainization of mothers as overly emotional, bloodthirsty harridans 
hellbent on maintaining the carno-cannibal status quo is particularly egregious—this, of 
course, despite the fact that women constitute the majority of the animal advocacy 
movement’s activists (Gaarder 2011). Similarly, their insistence on similitude between 
humans and other animals as the yardstick of ethical relevancy both reinscribes 
anthroponormative standards of subjectivity and fails to challenge the underlying 
division of life into subjects and objects that makes certain lives killable in the first place. 
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The third chapter, ‘Kin and carrion, appetite, ethics and alien encounters,' directly 
tackles the problematics of subject/object dualism that loom large but unexamined over 
the previous chapter’s insistence that other animals, like humans, deserve membership 
in the former category. Diffractively reading two millennial SF series—Karen Traviss’ 
Wess’har Wars hexology and Peadar O’Guilín’s Bone World trilogy—through a 
Plumwoodian critical ecofeminist lens that takes the ontological edibility of corporeal 
bodies as a given, I interrogate subject-object dualism’s assumption of similitude rather 
than difference as the morally salient characteristic qua excellence and the related 
insistence that only objects and never subjects may ever be available for use. 
In Traviss’s sprawling space opera, a militantly vegan alien superpower sets their sight 
on Earth, promising to forcibly convert the entire planet to sustainable vegan 
subsistence strategies in order to maximize the flourishing of all earthly beings, human 
and otherwise. I argue that the philosophically literate narrative both problematizes and 
partakes in the denial of difference so endemic to modern ecosalvational discourses like 
deep ecology, downplaying the role of intra-human hierarchy and insisting that all 
knowers are fundamentally the same. In O’Guilin’s young adult series, by contrast, 
hard-and-fast divisions between kin and food are obliterated on a planet where edible 
plants are banned and various alien species—humans included—must hunt and trade 
to procure the flesh needed for survival; the trilogy insists upon a relational ethics 
arising from the encounter with alterity, rather than an ethics of calculation based on 
perceived similarity to established moral agents. Both Traviss and O’Guilín’s narratives 
identify and problematize the dichotomy between between ‘respect’ and ‘use’ that 
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follows from subject-object dualism’s insistence that only objects and never subjects are 
available for use. Since relations of use are ecologically inevitable, this respect-use 
dualism has the effect of de-subjectifiying any entities (animal or otherwise) that are 
used by humans for food, ultimately sanctioning human practices of unfettered 
domination and instrumentalization towards any creatures unlucky enough to find 
themselves relegated to the far side of the subject-object divide (Plumwood 1994; 
2002). 
‘Disembodied meat, storying semi-living subjectivities,' the fourth chapter of the 
dissertation, engages SF representations of in vitro meat (IVM) to challenge and 
complicate dominant configurations of subjectivity. A discourse saturated in the 
language of salvation and sacrifice, in vitro meat—ostensibly procured without killing—
complicates what Derrida and Adams have identified as the carnophallogocentric 
disposition of the modern Western subject, in which ‘real’ meat is a product of slaughter 
and properly human subjectivity emerges through this metonymic ingestion of animal 
carnage. Is meat ‘real’ without the sacrifice of animal life, or might cell death ‘count’ 
towards this sacrifice? How might a material ecocritical understanding of agency as 
decentred and multiform—with intentionality being discernible even at a cellular level 
(Fitch 2008)—complicate the idea of in vitro meat as an ethical “magic bullet” or 
technological fix for the ravages of modern animal farming (Stephens 2013)? Even 
more radically, how might semi-living cellular assemblages like IVM deconstruct binaries 
of subject/object and gesture towards a profound ontological indistinction between 
vitality and inertness?
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Chapter four attempts to think through these questions in relation to three divergent SF 
texts. The In Vitro Meat Cookbook (van Mensvoort & Grievink 2014), a “speculative 
cookbook”/art project published by a Dutch art collective, argues for the technology’s 
potential to “liberate” meat from its corporeal form, presenting a glowing vision of future 
carnism in which animal suffering is eliminated and culinary creativity soars to 
heretofore impossible heights. By contrast, the IVM ‘meat tubers’ of Margaret Atwood’s 
Oryx and Crake (2003) represent the debasement of culinary culture and the obscenity 
of biotechnological manipulation of life, with the novel’s abject and insensate 
Chickienobs functioning as a stand in for corporate greed run amok. Frederick Pohl and 
Cyril Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants (1953), however, refuses to foreclose the 
agency of its own meat-producing organism ‘Chicken Little,' gesturing towards what 
McHugh has articulated as the “potentials for coordinating mutually sustainable 
cooperation with semi-living agency forms” (2010, 197) and cautioning against “naively 
retrofitting such complex entities into the terms of human subjects and nonhuman 
objects (the familiar foundations of discourse)” (McHugh 2011, 183).
Chapter five, ‘Me(a)tamorphoses, indigestion, infection and symbiogenesis,’ explores 
the truism that it is impossible to eat and remain unchanged by bringing the evolutionary 
theory of symbiogenesis and the tools of ecofeminist literary criticism and material 
ecocriticism into dialogue with two disparate SF narratives of becoming-meat. 
Symbiogenesis (Margulis 1967) posits ancient mergers between distinct bacterial 
entities as the origin of multi-cellular life, not only undermining heterocentric notions of 
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reproduction (Griffith 2015) but striking at the very heart of neo-Darwinian biological 
orthodoxy (Hird 2009, 65). Clifford. D. Simak’s short story ‘Drop Dead’ (1956) deploys 
symbiogenesis to critique then-dominant neo-Darwinist theories of biological and social 
evolution by describing an expedition of intrepid bioprospectors who encounter what is 
apparently ‘the perfect food’ in the form of an alien ‘critter’ composed of various different 
kinds of meat. The neo-Darwinist scientist-economists’ discovery that these “critters” are 
chimeras of ancient bacterial symbionts evokes a kind of existential despair that can 
only be mitigated by the violent reassertion of humanity’s rightful place at the top of the 
food chain—a strategy that backfires when the unruly agential assemblage of bacteria 
and critters bite back and transform the human scientists into meat themselves. Octavia 
Butler’s Xenogenesis trilogy (1987-9) more proactively contests this fear of symbiosis 
and the narratives of human exceptionalism and organismal atomism that inform and 
enable it. The series recounts the encounter between humans and an alien species of 
consummate symbiotes whose evolutionary trajectory is predicated upon the merger 
and acquisition of new ‘partner’ species. Butler’s Oankali aliens nonviolently but less-
than-consensually consume human tissue in a project of interspecies miscegenation in 
which both species are irrevocably changed. 
Both Butler and Simak centrally engage themes of symbiogenesis and subjectivity: for 
Simak, the notion of subjectivity as an emergent multispecies assemblage is horrific and 
debasing, dissolving the outline of the subject and reducing the human to the abject 
status of ‘meat.' Butler’s more ambivalent response to the symbiogenic subject makes 
clear that “the perfection of the fully defended, ‘victorious’ self is a chilling 
 45
fantasy” (Haraway 1991, 224) and explores the pleasures and possibilities of 
deconstructing boundaries between subjects (Vint 2007, 66). However, Butler’s 
narrative refuses to either efface the subject as an ethico-political entity or romanticize 
symbiogenesis as a synonym for the good, concretizing instead Haraway’s argument 
that symbiogenesis and subjectivities alike are about “becoming with each other in 
response-ability” (Haraway 2016, 145).
The concluding chapter of the dissertation reiterates my call to both include animals in 
ethical-political notions of the subject and reconfigure subjectivity as an emergent 
property of agential material creativity (Glenny Boggs 2012, 3). Rejecting subject-object 
dualism as an unlivable ontoepistemological paradigm while affirming the strategic 
valence of the subject-form as a point of intervention against the sociohistorically 
specific abuses of the animal industrial complex (Noske 1989), I return to the human 
cattle dystopias of chapter two to think through Haraway and Plumwood’s perceptive 
admonitions that no consumption practice can pretend innocence of killing or 
transcendence of ecological embodiment. I argue that DeLacey’s Meat epitomizes 
Haraway and Plumwood’s overlapping critique of purity-driven, somatophobic and anti-
ecological food discourses, including ones that install meat-avoidance as a moral doxa. 
However, this is but one of many possible configurations of vegan subjectivity, as 
LePan’s Animals demonstrates. The novel relentlessly historicizes the contexts in which 
industrial meat-eating operates, deploying a bifurcated narrative structure in 
respectively emotional and rationalist registers to advocate a form of contextual 
veganism while refusing to fully condemn or condone any dietary praxis. Following a 
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plethora of CAS and ecofeminist theorists, I approach veganism as an always-
insufficient but nevertheless transformative everyday ethics of anti-anthropocentric 
attentiveness that attempts to minimize harm within presently capitalistic and 
consumerist modes and means of production and consumption (Quinn & Westwood 
2018; Twine 2013; Giraud 2013a, 2013b; Pedersen 2011;  Struthers 2018; Pick 2012; 
Kheel 2009; Adams, forthcoming; Harper 2010). Intersectional veganism has the 
potential to unsettle the oft-unexamined legitimacy of social and cultural structures upon 
which meat-eating rests, in the process challenging the validity of the sociohistorically 
contingent norm of the carnophallogocentric subject and suggesting alternative 
configurations of multispecies subjectivities as relational, contingent, insufficient, 
ongoing, open-ended and inclusive. 
Conclusion: Narrative and world-making
Scholarship is never disengaged: “we are required to make a stand for some possible 
worlds and not others, we are required to begin to take responsibility for the ways in 
which we help to tie and retie our knotted multispecies worlds” (van Dooren 2014, 
60-61; Barad 2007, 353-96). In these closing remarks, I want to return to the narrative 
form as a potent medium for imagining other ways to retie the knots of multispecies 
encounters and bring forth other possible worlds. Narratives of human subjectivity have 
a particular resonance with stories about meat; as Slusser points out, “it is common to 
tell the history of mankind [sic] in terms of food and eating” (1996, 2). The teleological 
‘progression’ from foliage-munching ape, to savage-and-virile ‘Man the Hunter,' to 
civilized and fully human ‘Man the Agriculturalist’ is foundational to the twentieth century 
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historical-anthropological imagination (Slusser 1996, 2; see also Haraway 1989; Noske 
1989)—just one example of the now-commonplace assertion that “our subjectivities are 
shaped by the stories we tell about ourselves” (Gomel 2012, 178). Alternatives to 
hegemonic subjectivities likewise emerge and proliferate through narrative form: “One 
gives up nothing, except the illusion of epistemological transcendence, by attending 
closely to stories” declares Haraway (1997, 64). For Haraway, stories of all kinds—
explicitly fictional or not—are world-building and deserving of serious scholarly attention.  
DeWaal concurs, insisting that 
narrative has been an integral part of the structures and methods through which 
ethologists gain credit for breaking up the human monopoly on culture by the 
end of the twentieth century; in other words, […] story becomes a means of 
negotiating alternatives to nature/culture, animal/human and related hierarchic 
dualisms in thought itself.  (in McHugh 2010, 214)9
McHugh (2011) contends that stories do much more than “represent selves at the 
expense of others” (217)—ethical ways of living with and learning from other animals 
can “proceed from creative engagements with narrative forms” (217). As Vint argues, 
narrative “representations matter to subject formation and to efforts to connect with and 
change the cultural politics of the material world” (2009, 24); echoing Haraway’s 
declaration on the importance of stories to a critical and situated epistemology, McHugh 
argues that “the trick… is not to escape stories so much as to reckon with the ways in 
 Building upon developments in bio-, geo- and eco-semtiotics (Winfred, 1998; Scollon and Scollon, 9
2003), several authors have even framed the Anthropocene as a kind of nonhuman narrative, activist 
economist Naomi Klein, for instance, discerns in Anthropocene ecological disruptions “a powerful 
message – spoken in the language of fires, floods, droughts and extinctions” (Klein 2014, 25) , while 
literary scholar and ethicist Serenella Iovino likewise finds methodological valence in approaching matter 
“as a site of narrativity” (Iovino 2012, 451)
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which life continues only ever within them” (2011, 218). Perhaps King (2003) puts it 
best: “The truth about stories is that that’s all we are” (7,2).   Those of us concerned 10 11
with articulating an ecologically grounded ethics of transcorporeal interconnection, 
responsive attentiveness and mutual care (see Alaimo 2010; Fawcett 2000; Plumwood 
2002; Haraway 2008a) cannot afford to ignore literary narratives.
Inescapable, world-making and potentially world-changing technologies of 
communication, narrative is not merely a useful supplement to ethics, but is instead “as 
vital and important to the discipline as moral theory itself” (Chambers 2001, 40). Stories 
make local, specific, contingent, concrete; they de-abstract the objects and subjects of 
knowledge, encourage empathy and offer possibilities for new narratives, new ways of 
being in and becoming with the world (King 2003; McHugh 2010; Fawcett 2000; 
McKenzie, Russell, Fawcett and Timmerman, 2010). As de Laurentis argues, “the very 
work of narrativity is also the engagement of the subject in certain positionalities of 
meaning and desire (1984, 106); put another way, ”[s]tories make certain relationships 
possible, probable and ‘real.’ They actively make knowledge in our bodies and out there 
in the world, tangible” (Fawcett 2000, 144). We need “to stop telling ourselves the same 
old anthropocentric bedtime stories” (Shaviro in Barad 2003, 801) and start enacting 
 I am not arguing for the primacy of discourse over matter, word over world—instead, following Barad 10
(2007), Opperman and Iovino (2014) and Iovino (2012), I understand discourse and materiality to be 
intra-acting phenomena, not discrete domains.
 Although Indigenous oral storytelling practices are outside the scope of this dissertation, which is 11
concerned with Anglophone print SF, I acknowledge the crucial role stories play in the enactment of more-
than-human subjectivities in oral Indigenous cultures (Robinson, 2013; 2014) and take to heart King’s 
point that not only oral cultures but literate ones as well negotiate ethics through narrative (2003).
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new narratives that “challenge the notion that humans are in the story all by themselves” 
(Fawcett 2000, 145). 
The stories this dissertation engages are born of the anthropocene, a time in human 
history when the ecocidal legacy of Western capitalism can no longer be ignored 
(Weisberg 2009). No longer does humanity stand poised before an infinite universe of 
worlds and space to explore and colonize, manifest destiny writ large across the stars; 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century SF is “shadowed by the impending threat of 
even more animal extinctions and perhaps the collapse of our entire ecosystem” (Vint 
2009, 16). The cultural discourse turns inwards towards lifeboat Earth: “The dreams that 
could be nurtured at the time of the Holocene," Latour cautions, “cannot last in the time 
of the Anthropocene. We might say of those old dreams of space travel not, “Oh, that is 
so twentieth century,” but rather “Oh, that is so Holocene!” (2015a, 146). Rather than 
transcending or detaching from earthly connections, the discourse of the anthropocene 
emphasizes the necessity of fostering them, sidestepping themes of mastery or retreat 
and foregrounding concerns of attachment, dependency and responsibility (Dibley 
2012a). The subject known as ‘man,' as Foucault insists, is “a face drawn in sand at the 
edge of the sea”; ‘he’ seems unlikely to survive the rising waters of our climate-changing 
era, at least not unchanged (1971, 387). SF—a genre at the vanguard of literary 
engagements with the anthropocene (Canavan 2016a)—is a trove of riches for 
imagining and articulating more liveable configurations of subjectivity at once 
“materialist and relational, ‘naturecultural’ and self-organizing” (Braidotti 2013, 52). The 
stories examined here codify, complicate and subvert the taken-for-granted hierarchies 
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that determine who gets to be the eater and who (or what) is relegated to the status of 
the eaten; they play with dualisms of subject and object and grope towards alternative 
ways to understand the heterogeneous field of more-than-human agencies and 
assemblages in which human life is embedded and wholly dependent. Through these 
and other stories, perhaps we might be able to imagine and even enact alternative 
configurations of subjectivity more conducive to the crucial project of encouraging 
relations of sustainable multispecies flourishing for humans and Earth others. 
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2. Human(e) meat: Dualism and the Human Cattle 
Dystopia 
The figure of the cannibal looms large in Western discourses of the human subject 
(Sanborn 2001, 193). A “disturbing fiction of otherness” (Kilgour 1990, viii) sprung forth 
from the fevered imagination of Europe at the dawn of the age of modern exploration 
(Pollock 2010, 9) the figure of the cannibal has long been deployed within colonial 
regimes to delineate not only civilized from savage, but also haves from have-nots and 
humans from other animals. Postcolonial reevaluations of cannibal discourse as 
displacing and legitimizing the cultural cannibalism of colonialism suggest that the figure 
of the cannibal continues to play a crucial role in Western negotiations of subjectivity, 
“both construct[ing} and consum[ing] the very possibility of radical difference” (Kilgour 
1990, viii; Guest 2001, 1; Sanborn 2001, 193; Pollock 2010, 10). Perhaps this is why 
SF, a literary mode known for interrogating human, posthuman and nonhuman 
subjectivities (Vint 2009, 11; Haraway 2008a, 272), has long had a taste for human 
flesh. Any comprehensive catalogue of anthropophagy  in SF is beyond the scope of 12
The term ’anthropophagy,' literally ’people eating,' is broader than ’cannibalism’ in that it does not 12
specify that the eater of human flesh must also be human. The anthropological literature generally favours 
the term over the more loaded ‘cannibalism’; Pollock (2010) argues that “we must be attentive to the 
difference between ‘anthropophagy’ and ‘cannibalism’ and the conditions of possibility attached to 
each” (10). Historical and anthropological evidence for anthropophagic practices across human history is 
undeniable—this includes practices of ‘transumption,’ the ritual consumption of dead kin (Whitfield, Pako, 
Collinge & Alpers 2008).  ‘Cannibalism,’ however, is a term so fraught and loaded that it is best 
approached as product of the Western gaze and “the ‘cannibal’ proper belongs to the imagination of 
Europe entering the age of modern exploration” (Pollock 2010, 9). The term itself dates from the mid 16th 
appellation “Carib," the name given by Spanish invaders to the Karina, an indigenous West Indian culture 
inhabiting the islands that would eventually be called St. Vincent, Dominica, Guadeloupe and Trinidad 
(Adonis, in Schutt 2017: 114). The bastardization of ‘Carib’ to ‘Canib' and subsequently ‘cannibal’ may 
also reflect a colonial strategy of animalization: the invading Spanish told stories describing the locals as 
having canine faces (Rawson 1999).
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this (or any) chapter (Alkon 1996, 143).  Instead, I chart a genealogy of the figure of 13
the animal in cannibal SF, offering critical ecofeminist and animal studies readings of 
several texts that deploy cannibalism to evoke not (only) conflicting human 
subjectivities, but the subjectivity of the devoured nonhuman as well. Reading these SF 
narratives diffractively through ecofeminist and CAS theoretical frameworks, I argue that 
their shared ‘reduction’ of the human to the status of ‘meat’ works to trouble and 
destabilize the hyperseperated dualistic ontology of human over animal, highlighting 
how cannibalism and carnism “are bound together through economic categories of 
production and consumption” (Pollock 2010, 9), intra-actively enacted rather than 
preexisting as ontologically determined categories. This contextualization of human-
animal dualism as a emergent phenomenon of material-discursive apparatuses of 
power subsequently destabilizes and delegitimizes the carnist, human supremacist and 
ecocidal cultural regime of Western (post-)modernity.  While my analysis acknowledges 14
the crucial materializing effects of material-discursive apparatuses of domination and 
dualism, notably industrial meat production, I also seek to illustrate the shortcomings of 
 Donald Kingsbury’s acclaimed novel Courtship Rite (1982) is worth a mention here because it is a quite 13
unambiguously positive (and similarly rare) science fictional representation of cannibalism. The novel 
posits a distant planet, ‘Geta,' where most of the native flora and fauna are poisonous to human 
metabolism. Human colonists survive by eating “eight sacred plants” imported from distant Earth and 
augment their diet with human flesh, which is procured from those low in “kalothi," or survival fitness. 
Notable for its didactic libertarianism and social Darwinist themes (Clute, 1982), the novel features 
positive depictions not only of cannibalism, but also a eugenic caste system and child rape (Kingsbury, 
1982). Like Wells’ The Time Machine, Courtship Rite frames cannibalism within an evolutionary discourse 
of fitness and degeneracy; whereas Well’s cannibals spoke to contemporary fears of a cunning yet 
degraded proletariat overthrowing the weak bourgeoisie, Kingsbury presents the consumption of the unfit 
as a sensible corrective to the liberal excess that threatens the vitality of the species (or ‘Race,' to use 
Kingsbury’s loaded term). The cannibal planet Geta is a libertarian ‘meritocracy’ where the fittest thrive 
and those low in kalothi are quite rightly forced to make “their contribution to the Race” (Kingsbury, 1982, 
77) through ritual suicide and consumption.   
 Here, I use the term “post-modernity” as Franklin (1999) uses it, to describe the period in the West 14
from around the 1970s onward, after the breakdown of the postwar cultural consensus (57-61).
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similitude-based, extensionist approaches to ethics that seek to broaden ethical 
subjectivity to encompass actants based on their perceived similarities to already 
agreed-upon human subjects. Dualisms tend be left intact in such approaches; the line 
is simply redrawn, rather than questioning the expulsions enacted by the effects of 
drawing lines in the first place. 
Colonial cannibalisms
Perhaps the earliest SF narrative to feature human meat, in The Time Machine (Wells 
1894) the decadent descendants of the bourgeoisie are subject to “cannibalistic 
predation by the mutant descendants of the industrial working class who, through the 
struggle for existence, have proved themselves more fit” (Belasco 2006, 120). In a very 
literal sense the once-dominant Eloi have become the Morlocks’ cattle (Retzinger 2008, 
382), perhaps articulating Victorian unease over the Darwinian assault on human-
animal dualism and the subsequent implication that human practices of meat-eating 
might not be all that different from cannibalism (Lee 2010, 251). The novel concludes 
with the time traveller returning to turn of the century England and demanding a 
beefsteak to fortify him before he shares his incredible tale. Subsuming uncomfortable 
questions of animal subjectivity beneath fin de siecle anxieties of evolutionary and 
social degeneration, Wells positions the red meat-eating Western civilized male as the 
happy medium between the savage cannibal and “physically insipid” vegetarian—both 
highly racialized categories of deviance (Lee 2010, 254; Belasco 2006). The Time 
Machine draws upon a wealth of cultural narratives relating diet to a hierarchy of 
otherness; at the Chicago 1893 Columbian Exposition, for instance, visitors could 
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descend “the spiral of evolution” and encounter various tribes of alleged cannibals, 
“whose apparent deviancy reinforced the Ango-American predilection for beefsteak as 
the ‘moderate’ civilized ideal between savage cannibalism and [the] vegetarian ‘coolie 
rations’ supposedly endured by ‘rice-eating Hindoos’ and other Asian peoples” (Belasco 
2006, 158; Adams 2010[1990],54). Belasco (2006, 158) argues that these and other 
material-discursive apparatuses of colonial power consolidation function as  “culinary 
cognitive maps” in which human subjectivities are produced and contested. Since the 
so-called ‘Age of Discovery’ (1492-1797) cannibalism had dominated these dietary 
topographies, representing the epitome of the uncivilized, racialized “other” (Hulme 
1986, Huggan  2010, Belasco, 2006).  Through consuming the flesh of other humans 15
(or so the story went), cannibals proved themselves debased and brutish, well outside 
the accepted bounds of ‘civilized’ subjectivity and deserving of (at best) forcible 
conversion to civilized mores or (more commonly) complete annihilation.
Anthropological machinery, hierarchical dualisms
Although post-Colombian discourses of cannibalism tended to foreground racial 
difference rather than species difference, the figure of the animal lurks within any 
discourse of cannibalism, as The Time Machine demonstrates. Even in narratives 
ostensibly completely unconcerned with other animals, the taboo operates “by positing 
a difference between human and nonhuman, forbidding consumption of the former while 
permitting consumption of the latter” (Estok 2012, 3). While the term ostensibly 
endorses a binary opposition of animal and human, its insistence on the edible 
 The British were apparently so assured of their own civility that cases of domestic cannibalism 15
“appeared as regrettable eccentricities rather than representative sins” (Ritvo 1997, 212)
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fleshiness of the supposedly sacrosanct human subject simultaneously “create[s] the 
very proximity that it seeks to be done with” (ibid; Pollock 2010, 9). Cannibal tales shock 
and titillate because they ‘reduce’ the human subject to meat, to materiality, to animality 
(Lewis 1998, 155, in Estok 2012, 3). In the process, they remind us that this ‘reduction’ 
is as easy as the slice of a butcher’s knife. To dualistic configurations of ‘the human’ as 
radically separate from ‘the animal,’ such a shrinkage is an outrage; yet this slippage 
from human to animal is only possible because of our dangerous proximity to each 
other. Noting the persistent tendency in Western discourse to conceive of the human as 
suspended between the celestial and the bestial, Agamben calls the conflict between 
‘man’ [sic] and his [sic] supposed “beast within” (Midgley’s term, 1979, 36) “the decisive 
political conflict” in our culture (Agamben 2004, 20). This human-animal conflict lies at 
the heart of Agamben’s ‘anthropological machine,’ a material-discursive apparatus at 
once sovereign and biopolitical that defines and reproduces the category ‘human.’ 
Agamben argues that this “ironic apparatus” bifurcates the creaturely world into the two 
broad camps of bios (what is proper to human life, i.e. the civic life of the citizen) and 
zöe (the supposedly bare, biological existence of all other animals). Gifted with divine 
reason but mired in mortal flesh, ‘man’
can be human only to the degree that he transcends and transforms the 
anthropophorous  animal which supports him and only because, through the 16
action of negation, he is capable of mastering and, eventually, destroying his 
own animality. (12)  
 Agamben’s uses the term ‘anthropophorus’ (human + bearer) to denote “animals who bear humans, in 16
two senses: they help give birth to our idea of the human and they carry it like beasts of 
burden” (Armstrong, 2017, 2)
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The properly human subject, Agamben argues, does not exist a priori, but is produced 
by through exclusion and disavowal, out of and over the substrate of the beast within 
(Agamben 2004, 37; Midgley 1979, 36). Echoing Linnaeus, who inserted the maxim 
“know thyself” in lieu of any description of human characteristics in his Systema 
Naturae, Agamben argues that the human is only human insofar as ‘he’ [sic] can 
recognize, partition and excise the animal within—‘man’ [sic] is thus the creature that 
“must recognize itself as human to be human” (26). In this way, the anthropological 
machine undergirds the logic of cannibalism, in which the human must be recognized as 
such in order for any transgression to have taken place: “membership in the human 
species is a prerequisite for the eater of human flesh to be considered a 
cannibal” (Kilgour 1990, 88). Through consumption, the cannibal animalizes what 
‘civilized’ observers recognize as the human subject and is thus animalized in turn—
cannibalism materializes the operation of the anthropological machine by marking in 
blood “the limit that humanity requires in order to know itself as itself” (Sanborn 2001, 
194).
Agamben’s articulation of the most fully human of subjects as male is telling and speaks 
to the ubiquity of hierarchical dualisms within the Western imagination—even when that 
imagination aims to critique such apparatuses of subjectivity, as Agamben does. 
Arguing that the current ecological crisis is largely the result of the pernicious tendency 
throughout the history of Western thought towards hierarchically-stacked dualisms, such 
as man/woman, culture/nature, mind/body (or mind/matter), reason/emotion and, of 
course, human/animal, Plumwood demonstrates that the leading term in these 
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hyperseperated binaries is constructed through the denial and backgrounding of their 
oppositional subordinate (1993). A dualism, according to Plumwood,
results from a certain kind of denied dependency on a subordinated other. This 
relationship of denied dependency determines a certain kind of logical structure, 
in which the denial and the relation of domination/subordination shape the 
identity of both the relata. (41)
Interlocking and intra-acting, these hierarchical dualisms form a web or network of 
mutually reinforcing value-dichotomies that consolidate and maintain the power of those 
aligned with privileged sides of the web of pairs (1993). These dualisms “are not just 
free-floating systems of ideas; they are closely associated with domination and 
accumulation and are their major cultural expressions and justifications” (1993, 42). 
‘Human’ aligns with masculinity and reason on the upper side of this ‘Master Model’ of 
hierarchical dualism, while ‘animal’ is relegated to the underside of the coin along with 
femininity, emotion and/or the body (Plumwood 1993, 2002). Put another way, 
Assertions of the superiority of ‘humanity’ simultaneously function as assertions 
of the superiority of masculinity and scientific rationality, thus betraying the 
degree to which the very category human is premised on the exclusion of both 
animals and women from fully attaining this status. (Vint 2010b, 27)
Because the dominant schemata of subjectivity that Agamben and Plumwood identify 
understands the category ‘human’ to overlap with, but not fully encompass, biological 
membership in the species homo sapiens, there is always the attendant risk that some 
‘others’ (of whatever gender, race, or class) will fail to attain the status of bios and 
instead be relegated to the bare life of zöe (Agamben 2004, 29; Wolfe 2003). The logic 
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of hierarchical dualism creates a caesura between bodies that matter and bodies that 
do not (Butler 2004)—subjects whose lives fall within the sphere of moral concern and 
non-subjects expelled to the ‘outer darkness’ (Midgley 1983) of moral irrelevancy. Lives 
relegated to realm of zöe are thus backgrounded (Plumwood 1993), rendered 
“killable” (in Haraway’s words) and subject to a “non-criminal putting to death” (as 
Derrida puts it) because “their lives and deaths fall outside the scope of our ethical 
discourse” (Vint 2009, 20; Haraway 2008a; Derrida 1991a). The concept of cannibalism 
thus participates in this enduring logical structure of otherness and negation (Plumwood 
1993, 2) by cleaving the human from the animal and forbidding the reduction of the 
former to the status of nutritive biological matter. In this way, even cannibal tales 
ostensibly unconcerned with the figure of the animal are predicated upon the violent 
disavowal of the very same. 
Twentieth century cannibal SF: Tiptree and DeFord
The figure of the animal that haunts The Time Machine begins to rattle the chains more 
insistently in the cannibal science fiction of the twentieth century. James Tiptree Jr.’s 
‘Morality Meat’ (Sheldon 1985), for example, hinges more or less explicitly “on the shock 
produced by the realization that humans are being treated as animals” (rather than the 
repudiation of cannibal subjectivity as irredeemably ‘savage’ or degenerate) (Vint 
2010b, 35). The story posits a society where reproductive rights have been stripped 
back and abortion is outlawed. Overcrowded state-run adoption centres take in the 
unwanted babies that (primarily working-class Black and Brown) women have been 
forced to carry to term, but “the unthinking demand for blonde, blue-eyed babies” means 
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that the majority of these infants cannot be rehomed (Sheldon 1985, 221). Orphanages 
are overflowing, but animal protein has become scarce: “the droughts and grain 
diseases finished off most of the US’s meat production” years before the story begins 
(Sheldon 1985, 210). The solution to the glut of unwanted human infants and the 
concurrent shortage of animal flesh is, of course, to kill and butcher the unadoptables, 
transforming them into meat for wealthy (and primarily White) old boys’ clubs. Clearly 
riffing on satirist Jonathan Swift’s infamous infantophagy pamphlet ‘A Modest 
Proposal,'  which also literalizes the metaphorical consumption of the poor by the rich 17
(Alkon 1996, 148, Vint 2010b, 35), ‘Morality Meat’ highlights the violence of patriarchal 
systems that control the bodies of racialized women and children through its depiction of 
cannibals as “ageing oligarchs who consider it none of the public’s business what they 
choose to do or eat” (Sheldon 1985, 232). In doing so, the story overtly invokes the 
figure of the farmed and butchered nonhuman animal. “Frozen piglet carcasses,” 
concludes one unsuspecting (or willfully ignorant) character upon being confronted with 
a shelf stacked with butchered human infants; this “rack of cold slippery things," he 
concludes, must surely be “[m]eat. Only meat” (Sheldon 1985, 211, 212, 231). In a 
world without baby pigs, certain kinds of baby humans fill the vacancy, rendered killable 
through a logic of dualism that constructs ‘human’ out of and above ‘animal.' ‘Morality 
Meat,' as Vint puts it, “draws our attention to the way in which the human-animal 
   Well over a hundred years before Wells put pen to paper, popular satirist Jonathan Swift had mined 17
popular revulsion towards the savage anthropophage in his ‘A Modest Proposal,' a tract facetiously 
suggesting that the British eat Irish babies as a solution to eighteenth century food shortages. Like 
colonial tales of faraway cannibal tribes, Swift’s A Modest Proposal (1729[1996]) uses cannibalism as 
shorthand for unconscionable barbarism; unlike these earlier travellers’ tales, however, Swift’s pamphlet 
strategically deploys the figure of the cannibal not to justify colonial expansion, but to protest it. The 
brutality of the colonizing English towards the subjugated Irish is damned by pushing this dehumanization 
to an extreme so appalling that it simply cannot be stomached. 
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boundary is implicated in exploitative hierarchies of class and race," and suggests that 
“a metaphysics of subjectivity based on exclusion of the animal [is] part of the 
problem” (Vint 2009, 36, 44). 
“Unspeakable nonhuman flesh eaters!” 
Miriam Allen deFord’s infantophagy story is much more directly concerned with human 
consumption of other animals than Tiptree’s. Published over twenty years before 
‘Morality Meat,' ‘Season of the Babies’ (1959) describes the widespread consumption of 
“weak” babies in great seasonal feasts on a remote planet colonized long ago by 
humans. Ambassadors from distant Earth come to this somewhat technologically 
stunted colony planet to assess its suitability for membership in the “Outer Galactic 
Federation” (129). These ‘Earthian' (deFord’s term) ambassadors are quickly 
established to be arrogant, moralizing and sexually conservative; they scorn the 
colonists lack of any marriage tradition (“what are you, promiscuous?”) and sneer at 
their reproductive mores, which are organized into what the Earthians deride as a 
“rutting season” (132). They damn the local people’s social-sexual traditions as bestial, 
“like our lower animals," thereby demonstrating that their insular prudishness emerges 
within a hierarchical and binary conception of humans and other animals (ibid.). Their 
hosts try to be gracious and explain to the newcomers what for them is “the normal and 
universal way of life” (133): namely, that in winter all the babies are born, reared in vast 
communal nurseries and then a select few are “Chosen” to live while the others “are 
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disposed of, naturally — under the best possible circumstances, I assure you” (134).  18
The locals attempt to cater to their horrified guests’ “provincial” palates by serving them 
“delicate meat sliced in the kitchen and smothered in a complicated sauce, which quite 
spoiled the taste of the highly luxurious food for the natives” (137). This gesture of 
hospitality is thoroughly rebuked when the Earthians realize that they have been served 
and have eaten, the flesh of human babies. The locals attempt to explain:
When farmers have the remains of a crop left over, they plow it back into the 
ground to benefit the next crop. That is what we do—the Unchosen babies are 
part of the crop we turn back to those who made them…the babies are a part of 
us; they will go to make up next years babies too. (139)
The explanation falls on deaf ears, “Cannibals! savages!” cry the appalled and revolted 
Earth ambassadors (139). From the locals’ point of view, however, it is the eating of 
nonhuman flesh that is perverse and depraved: 
Ragnar could hardly speak. “You actually mean,” he said painfully, “that you, 
human beings like ourselves, take into your bodies, to become part of you and 
your children’s  substance, the flesh of vile, alien creatures? Our earliest 
ancestors, even before they became civilized, never fell so low as that!” (140)
Flipping the narrative of the savage cannibal by imagining a culture wherein eating other 
animals rather than other humans is considered depraved, DeFord draws attention to 
the “ultimate intimacy” of eating another creature (St Clair 1976, 1). The nutritive act is a 
 The Earthians react with horror, but to the natives, the Earthian practice of “do[ing] their Choosing 18
before conception instead of after birth” (ie. birth control) is just as barbaric: “Every human being has a 
right to be born, to take its chances on being “chosen” for survival!” (139). Like Tiptree’s, deFord’s 
infantophage story raises the issue of reproductive choice. While Tiptree’s is a cautionary tale of the 
social ills of forcing women to carry pregnancies to term, DeFord’s invokes abortion to demonstrate that 
the distant cannibal colonists are as shocked by our own practices and ideologies as we are theirs.
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(profoundly unequal) “mutual hybridization of bodily matters” (Iovino 2014, 102), 
rendering our organic bodies “nothing but temporary coagulations in these flows” of 
energy and materials (DeLanda 2000, 104, in Iovino 2015, 104).  I will explore the 19
implications of this transcorporeality (Alaimo 2010) in more depth in chapter five; here, it 
suffices to point out that eating renders any body (human or otherwise) permeable. 
Through eating, the outline of the subject is always threatened with dissolution (Alaimo 
2014, 187). While this of course applies to any digestible matter, not just that of animal 
origin, meat persists in retaining a symbolic currency that far outstrips its strictly nutritive 
value (Fiddes 1991). DeFord’s story articulates the border between human subjects and 
animal bodies as dangerously porous and speculates that a strong hierarchical dualism 
of human/animal might in fact mandate cannibalism rather than forbid it. To deFord’s 
colony of infantophages, the consumption of nonhuman animal matter is morally corrupt 
because it enfolds the inferior other into the very substance of the self in a debased, 
impure intimacy: humans who eat other animals are “unspeakable nonhuman flesh 
eaters!” (141). In this sense, deFord’s baby eating tale engages the figure of the animal 
quite explicitly. While Tiptree’s story uses meat to talk about sexism, racism, classism 
and reproductive rights, deFord’s uses meat not only to highlight the cultural 
contingency of savagery/civility, but also to talk about meat itself. The figure of the 
nonhuman that lurks, sometimes hidden, in any cannibal story begins to emerge in 
deFord’s tale, but only tentatively—human zoophagy is talked about in a broad, 
universal sense and the story does not focus on any particular culturally and historically 
situated instance of meat-eating other than that of its fictional planet of cannibals.   
 The German word for metabolism—Stoffwechegel—literally translates as “exchange of matter” (in 19
Iovino 2014,102)
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The latent figure of the animal comes centre stage in post-millennial human cattle 
stories Meat (D’Lacey 2008) and Animals (LePan 2009), novels that consciously 
participate in activist discourses to provoke critical consideration of contemporary 
Western cultures of carnism.  Very much of their time and place, these narratives 20
emerge alongside a notable millennial intensification of cultural unease regarding 
industrial meat production (Parry 2009, 2010; Pilgrim 2013).  Animals in particular 21
lends itself readily to an analysis foregrounding real-world meat anxieties. The novel 
explicitly connects its fictive world to the one we currently inhabit,  invoking various and 22
conflicting activist discourses to problematize industrial meat production and human-
animal dualism through the substitution of marginalized humans for farmed animals. 
The novel has received ample critical attention and has already been analyzed through 
the critical lenses of Derrida (Vint 2010b; Dunn 2015), Deleuze (Keen 2012) and 
disability studies (Shupe 2012). My own analysis foregrounds Plumwood’s work on 
hierarchical dualisms, particularly human/animal and reason/emotion (1997; 2002). I 
argue that the novel goes some way towards complicating the hyperseperated 
 Michel Faber’s novel Under the Skin (2000) deserves a mention here; however, being concerned with 20
aliens eating homo sapiens and having been amply covered by literary scholars already (Dillon, 2011; 
Vint 2015; Dunn, 2015; Drewett, 2016), I will omit the novel from further analysis. 
 The spiralling food scares of the last two decades of the twentieth century have prompted increasing 21
popular awareness of the environmental and ethical problems associated with industrial animal 
agriculture, somewhat undermining the high esteem in which animal flesh had long been held (Fiddes, 
1991; Parry, 2009, 2010). Counter-discourses consisting of carno-“gastro-philosophical 
treatises” (Bourette, 2008, 36) that present the transformation of animals into meat as humane and 
‘natural’—at least in the best cases—likewise multiplied over the first two decades of the new millennium 
(Parry, 2010; Gutjhar, 2013).
 For example, a character in the novel finds an “ancient” newspaper clipping from the days before the 22
great extinctions (a real article published in the Globe and Mail, entitled “Do You Know How Your Meal 
Died?” [Wente, 2006]) discussing the willful ignorance involved in eating factory farmed meat (44). 
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dichotomy of reason/emotion that buttresses the species binary and permits (or 
necessitates) the ‘non-criminal putting to death’ of those outside the agreed-upon scope 
of subjectivity. However, Animals’ shifting, multiple narrative perspectives allow a good 
deal of ambivalence in this regard and a reading of the novel as selectively re-
entrenching rather than dismantling the hierarchical dualism of reason/emotion is 
certainly plausible.
Animals and LePan’s Animals
Animals is set around the year 2070 (Vint 2010), by which time most of the 
domesticated nonhuman animals that Western society typically instrumentalizes  – pigs, 
chickens, cows, dogs and cats – have become extinct (in large part due to pandemics 
caused by factory farming and anthropogenic environmental degradation) (LePan 2009, 
58). The extinction of “meat” animals creates a supposed “protein deficit” that cannot 
satisfactorily be filled with vegetable proteins – the people want real meat and no 
substitute will do. Perhaps not so coincidentally, birth rates of humans with 
chromosomal and other developmental disorders have skyrocketed precisely as “farm” 
animal populations have dwindled.  In a ravaged world of crumbling capitalism and 23
resource scarcity, the membership of certain marginalized groups in the human species 
is revoked and the unfortunate children are dubbed “mongrels” (an animal epithet 
evocative of the existing ableist and racist slur ‘mongoloid’). Spurred on by the 
clamorous cries of meat-hungry gourmands and facilitated by a meat industry eager to 
avoid extinction itself, “a mongrel-centred solution to the nutrition problem” is enacted 
 The novel suggests that environmental pollution from unchecked industry has contributed to the 23
increased rate of chromosomal abnormalities, i.e.. ‘mongrel’ births (65).
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(LePan 2009, 66). Reconceptualized as nonhuman animals, disabled humans are 
subsequently subjected to the full range of techniques currently utilized by the animal-
industrial complex: intensive confinement systems, selective breeding, physical 
mutilation and genetic manipulation to ensure bigger, faster-maturing bodies and 
increased profits through the sale of euphemistically renamed “yurn” (‘mongrel’ meat).  24
The bulk of the narrative is presented as a manuscript supposedly written by novelist 
and vegan activist Naomi Okun, who was a child when her wealthy family adopted 
young ‘mongrel’ Sam as a housepet. But Sam does not suffer from any developmental 
disability—he is simply an unlucky deaf child from the wrong side of the tracks. As 
Naomi and Sam grow closer, Naomi begins to question not just Sam’s erroneous 
‘mongrel’ status, but the human/animal dualism that structures her society and justifies 
the violent exploitation of ‘mongrels’ and nonhuman animals alike. However, her mother 
Carrie is horrified by her daughter’s unhealthy fixation with the family ‘pet,' and promptly 
carts the deaf boy off to a chattel farm, where he is branded, castrated, confined, 
fattened and eventually slaughtered. This main ‘manuscript’ is interspersed with lengthy 
footnotes ostensibly written by Broderick Clark, a meat-eating “mongrel welfare 
advocate” and Sam’s biological elder brother. Naomi and Broderick’s dual narratives are 
bookended by an introductory “editor's note” to buttress the illusion of archival veracity 
and an “author’s afterword" in which LePan himself clarifies his own position on carnism 
and the meat industry.
  Enthusiastically describing the genetic alteration of ‘mongrels,' Broderick writes,24
Shorter lifecycles and harvest times; animals that could be perfectly bulked out in the 
weeks prior to harvesting; animals that could have removed from them the last vestiges 
of traits no longer needed in the species (most notably, speech and some of the other 
"higher" mental activities that a chattel had no need of)—all this could now be readily 
accomplished, through the wonders of genetic engineering' (81).
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As the brief outline above makes clear, Animals makes effective use of the frisson 
between Naomi’s youthful and idealistic adherence to an abolitionist notion of ‘rights,'  25
and the older Broderick’s more pragmatic endorsement of ‘welfare,' in which meat 
production continues, but in a kindlier fashion.  The novel presents Naomi as passionate 
and emotional in her exhortations that ‘mongrels’ (and other nonhuman animals 
besides) should not be violently instrumentalized.  Broderick, on the other hand, is cool 26
and rational, pointing out that many ‘mongrels’ wouldn’t even exist without the meat 
industry (having been bred for this specific purpose) and advocating a humane, organic 
and free-range system of ‘mongrel’ meat production. Naomi and Broderick’s 
incommensurate views echo contemporary debates around meat production and animal 
ethics and speak to the tenacity of hierarchical dualisms in Western discourse, 
Broderick is aligned with masculine reason, Naomi with womanish pity. The fact that 
most readers would probably find their position closer to Naomi’s, at least when it 
comes to human animals, complicates the conventional hierarchy—Broderick’s welfarist 
advocation of “responsible use” is problematized by its application to differently-abled 
humans. Animals thus encourages readers to reevaluate their ethical positioning 
 I am scare quoting ‘rights’ in this context because a deontological notion of inalienable rights is not a 25
prerequisite for rejecting any lethal instrumentalization of other animals. However, it is often referred to by 
this term, especially in the context of debates between ‘welfarist’ and ‘abolitionist’ positions within animal 
advocacy discourses. 
 As Vint points out,26
even before she recognises that Sam is deaf, Naomi had come to accept him as a full subject, 
regardless of the categorical distinctions that matter to her parents and her culture. She 
acknowledges the reciprocity of their relationship, that when they cuddle' she thought of it as 
holding him but really he was holding her too and loving her too' (75) and concludes 'oh yes, 
mongrels could feel all right, Naomi knew that right as rain and there were thoughts inside them 
too, thousands of thoughts, of course there were' (77). (Vint 2010b, 41)
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regarding the nonhumans they consume; LePan’s authorial afterword, in which he 
articulates his own position on as closer to Broderick’s than Naomi’s, adds even more 
ambiguity, confounding any expectations that Animals might offer easy answers to the 
thorny ethical questions raised by the figure of the nonhuman.
If readers find themselves on abolitionist Naomi’s side when it comes to farming 
humans, but welfarist Broderick’s side when it comes to farming other animals, the 
reason for this may be ‘speciesism’: giving preferential moral treatment to the interests 
members of one’s own species, over and above the interests of members other species. 
Animal ethicist Peter Singer (1975) argues that this is indefensible: the salient criteria 
for assessing moral worth is not species, but the various emotional, cognitive and 
physical capacities that enable a creature to experience suffering.  The theory of 27
speciesism underpins Singer’s powerful thought experiment, the “argument from 
marginal cases” (see Domrowski 1997), in which he argues that it is impossible to 
cleanly distinguish all humans from all other animals without simply falling back on 
species membership as a criteria. Any species-blind attempt to include all members of 
the human species within a sphere of moral concern must include many other animals 
as well; conversely, drawing a line that excludes all animals from moral relevance must 
  Other philosophers have problematized this assessment of speciesism as always morally indefensible. 27
Midgley (1983) argues that the concept has valence (as an intervention against the absolute moral 
dismissal of other animals, for example) but takes issue with the blanket condemnation of all forms of 
speciesism, as awareness of one’s particular species-needs must be taken into account to ensure 
adequate care, or even to communicate at all: “Overlooking someone’s sex or race is entirely sensible; 
overlooking someone’s species is a supercilious insult” (99). Calarco (2017) also rejects the term, but on 
different grounds, pointing out that “the dominant trends in our culture have never been toward respect for 
the species as a whole but rather for what is considered to be quintessentially human—and this privilege 
and subject-position have always been available only to a small subset of the human species,” (26). 
Consequently, i limit my use of the term “speciesism” to discussions around Singer and moral 
extensionism, preferring (like Calarco) the term “anthropocentrism” instead.
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exclude some humans, for example human babies and some human adults. Although 
influential in the animal advocacy movement—Regan also takes up a version of the 
argument (1983)—the argument from marginal cases is a dangerous gambit, because 
of its theoretical ambivalence. It can be invoked either to uplift animals into moral 
relevancy, or alternatively, downgrade marginalized humans out of the zone of ethical 
concern and into the outer darkness of moral dismissal in which animals are always-
already trapped (Midgley 1983). Animals is essentially a fictional exploration of the dark 
side of this argument from marginal cases, positing a world in which many differently-
abled humans are demoted from bios to zöe, from human being to animal body and are 
subsequently exploited ruthlessly for food and profit (Regan 2010; Shupe 2012; Vint 
2010b).
Animals and disability
Given that the discursive animalization of marginalized humans is fundamental to the 
power dynamics of oppression, LePan’s use of disabled humans as stand-ins for 
factory-farmed nonhuman animals is not unproblematic. While the names of the various 
syndromes that comprise the hybrid category ‘mongrel’ are fictionalized (‘Peake’s 
Syndrome’ instead of Down’s Syndrome, for instance) (Regan 2010), the novel’s 
positioning of disabled homo sapiens as less than fully human risks reinscribing the 
ableist and anthropocentric material-discursive apparatus it seeks to destablize. Shupe 
concludes her article ‘The Bioethics of Peter Singer and the Mongrelization of Disability 
in Don LePan’s Animals’ by arguing that 
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Although Animals can be praised for aspects of its ethical mandate regarding 
animal rights advocacy, it inadequately foresees the extent to which readers 
familiar with bioethics or disability studies will naturally find its instrumentalist 
use of the disabled as props for a revaluation of lower animals’ inherent value 
offensive and disturbing. (2012, 22)
Shupe’s unexamined conception of other animals as ‘lower’ than humans speaks to the 
ubiquity and stubbornness of hierarchical dualisms within the Western philosophical 
tradition (Plumwood1997). Her apparent understanding of ‘bioethics’ as ‘naturally’ 
excluding other-than-human animals, curious from a critical animal and ecofeminist 
perspective, neatly dovetails with dominant “business-as-usual” ethical discourses 
which bifurcate bioethics (for humans) and animal ethics (usually taken to mean farm 
animal welfare) (Twine 2010, 21). 
Against this naive anthropocentrism that pits intrinsic human dignity against the spectre 
of abject animality, critical intersectional approaches to disability and animals stress the 
codependency of these two subject positions (Richter 2014, 85). As Wolfe argues, both 
CAS and disability studies “pose fundamental challenges… to a model of subjectivity…
in which ethical standing and civic inclusion are predicated upon rationality, autonomy 
and agency” (Wolfe 2013, 91). “The very measuring apparatus of autonomy produces a 
conception of the individual that…is constituted by ableist norms” (Bramwell 2011, n. 
p.), revealing the ways in which “speciesism and ableism collude with capitalism and 
modernist rationalities” (Richter 2014, 86) to articulate a fascist epistemology in which 
bodies that deviate from the norm are disciplined and instrumentalized (Pedersen & 
 70
Stanescu 2014, 265). Theories of morality that seek to extend ethical relevancy to a 
previously excluded group based on their possession of some supposedly species-
neutral checklist of universally morally-relevant characteristics thus risk complicity in the 
material-discursive boundary-making of forms of subjectivity dependent upon their own 
constitutive exclusions—animal, disabled, irrational, Other. As Wadiwel argues, 
Both Singer and Regan treat people with disability as if they were actually 
‘inferior,’ rather than treating disability as a production of social and political 
processes. As such, they cooperate in the construction of ability and disability as 
apparently given and stable categories, enacting epistemic violence even as 
these philosophers are attempting to dismantle the arbitrary rationalities that 
construct “the animal.” (Wadiwel 2015, 51)
The relation between disability and animality is not that disabled humans are like 
animals in their lack certain quintessentially human capacities; the connection, as Taylor 
(2011; 2017) argues, “centre[s] on an oppressive value system that declares some 
bodies normal, some bodies broken and some bodies food (2011, 191). Extensionist 
theories of morality like Singer’s and Regan’s, even if avowedly anti-anthropocentric, 
nevertheless partake of a logic that categorizes, contains, essentializes and 
hierarchizes difference within and between vulnerable bodies (Davis 2017). Such a 
strategy of redrawing rather than dismantling exclusionary boundaries between morally 
considerable and morally inconsequential forms of life merely tweaks the calibration of 
the material-discursive apparatus of domination, leaving the machinery of hierarchical 
dualism intact and available for deployment against Others of any kind. 
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LePan is clearly aware of the shortcomings of these kinds of extensionist ethics; 
Animals does a good deal of legwork in showing how ideas about who counts as 
‘human’ are historically and socially situated and far from fixed, with not only disabled 
people but women, slaves, ‘barbarians,’ and people of colour having been denied fully 
human status at various historical junctures (2009, 68). Narrator Broderick’s repugnant 
assertion that disabled people “are simply not fully human” (36) demonstrates that a 
configuration of subjectivity that privileges cognitive criteria is an untenable 
epistemological framework not only for negotiating ethical relations with other animals, 
but with marginalized members of our own species as well. Emphasizing that material 
factors underlie oppressive ideologies (Nibert 2002), the novel recounts how an 
economic collapse borne of environmental degradation provided the impetus to 
legislatively redefine differently-abled homo sapiens as nonhuman and thus legitimately 
exploitable bodies ripe for consumption (LePan 2009, 37). The narrative thus directly 
engages the specific material-discursive performances through which exclusionary 
boundaries (such as ‘human’/‘animal’) are enacted (Barad, 2003, 816), revealing that 
the problem is not simply that (some) animals inherently possess morally-salient 
physical and mental capacities that render their exclusion from the moral and political 
community unfair. Rather, 
The problem is a series of ideas, practices and institutions that aim to protect 
the privilege of those deemed fully human over and against the nonhuman and 
it is through a complex and violent relation to animals, animality and 
‘nonhumans’ of various sorts that this system establishes and reproduces itself. 
(Calarco 2017, 26)
 72
Through clever manipulation of an epistemologically violent taxonomy of hierarchically-
ranked alterity, the inhabitants of LePan’s dystopia manage to avoid the troubling idea of 
farming humans by relabeling the humans they farm as ‘animal,’ dismissing their 
interests through a hierarchical dualism of humans (those who matter most) and 
nonhumans (those who matter less, or not at all). In this way, consumers are able to 
have their ‘yurn' and eat it too. The hyperseperation of human/‘mongrel’ or (and 
subsequently human/animal) is foundational to the subjectivity of the novel’s human 
characters. Questioning these dichotomies “makes everything unsteady, everything. If 
you start saying things like that, thinking things like that, pretty soon people will be 
saying there’s no line to be drawn,” Naomi’s mother Carrie worries (109). In this way, 
the ontological security of unquestioned human supremacy that the hyperseperation of 
human and animal supposedly guarantees is revealed to be a dangerously fragile 
performative construct rather than any straightforward expression of natural order.28
Gender and sentiment
The novel demonstrates an acute sensitivity to the entanglements of ideas about 
gender and about concern for animals.  Carrie accuses her vegetarian daughter Naomi 
of being “hysterical” in her concern for Sam and for other animals in general (120). 
Broderick’s castigation of Naomi’s abolitionist politics is similarly gendered—he labels 
 Human/animal dualism is also manifested and reinforced through the similar dualism of subject/object; 28
hence, the novel pays attention to the importance objectifying language in legitimizing violence. Naomi 
displays a sophisticated understanding of this process and when trying to convince her reluctant mother 
to let her keep Sam as a pet, polices her own language so that she doesn’t say “him” and thus give her 
mother the impression of an overly sentimental bond (55). After Carrie has taken Sam to the farm and is 
explaining her actions to her spouse, she too uses “it” instead of “him” as a distancing mechanism, “Why 
was she calling Sam it, Zayne suddenly wondered. She had hardly ever done that since the first days 
after them had taken him in” (118).
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her ‘sentimental’ in her empathy for other animals (148) and dismisses vegan activists in 
general as “being as unthinking as they are shrill” (105). These thoroughly gendered 
terms, often used to denigrate attitudes towards ‘livestock’ animals that are not based 
primarily on their utility to humans, continue to be highly feminized (Donovan 1990, 
350-2; Luke 2007, 210-13). As Luke (2007) argues,
A central Western patriarchal ideology is the elevation of the “rational/cultural” 
male over the “emotional/biological” female. Women’s rage (labelled “sentiment,” 
“hysteria,” etc.) is thus divested of political significance by interpreting any female 
reaction against the established order not as a moral challenge to that order, but 
as a biosexual phenomenon to be ignored or subdued. (211) 
Emotional concern for animals thus becomes labeled as mere ‘womanish sentiment,’ an 
irrational and inconsequential foible of the fairer sex. The ‘yurn’-eating (read: cannibal) 
characters in Animals continue in this tradition, trivializing emotional concern for 
‘mongrels’ (and nonhuman animals) as both feminine and infantile and sharply 
contrasting such ‘sentimentalism’ to the masculine, mature, ‘realistic’ attitude of 
instrumentalism espoused by farming ‘experts’ and meat-eating consumers.  29
While the novel seems to critique the bifurcation of morality into a hierarchy of reason/
emotion, the text remains somewhat ambiguous. Rationalist meat-eater Broderick’s 
gendered dismissal of Naomi’s vegan politics as hyperemotional could constitute either 
a critique or an endorsement of reason/emotion hierarchical dualism, depending on how 
 Writer and activist Brigid Brophy (1966) puts it best: “Whenever people say, 'We mustn't be 29
sentimental,' you can take it they are about to do something cruel. And if they add, 'We must 
be realistic,' they mean they are going to make money out of it” (21).
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persuasive the reader finds Broderick’s arguments for ‘mongrel’ (and subsequently all 
‘livestock’) welfare. Like Naomi, factory-farming apologist Carrie is also depicted as 
overemotional and in distinctly gendered ways. Mired in the biological and the familial, 
too emotionally volatile to take a step back and see the bigger picture, Carrie is blind to 
her daughter’s desperate attempts to make her see what is right in front of her nose—
that Sam is not intellectually impaired, simply unable to hear. Vint (2010) argues that the 
novel does not vilify Carrie, portraying her as a “complex character who tries to do the 
best as she sees it” (40). I agree that Carrie is a complex and ultimately sympathetic 
character, but I am not so sure that the novel refrains from vilifying her. Carrie serves as 
the mouthpiece of the most virulent anti-‘mongrel’ arguments in the novel and is the 
person most fully responsible for the murder of the deaf child Sam; although she 
eventually sees the error of her ways, it is much too little, much too late.  While 30
Animals situates its two female characters at opposite ends of the political spectrum, it 
is no less true that they are both impelled in large part by emotion (and not solely 
reason). If Carrie is the bitter, emotionally-scarred factory-farm apologist and Naomi is 
the sentimental vegan idealist, it is Broderick—the main male character—who is 
sophisticated enough to find a middle ground between these two ‘extremes’ in his 
opposition to factory farming and his support of small scale ‘happy meat’ (Parry 2011). 
 Carrie argues that eating ‘mongrel’ flesh is ‘natural,' and that there exists a similarly ‘natural’ hierarchy 30
of moral worth, with humans at the top and nonhumans languishing somewhere below, “I care for you, I 
care for us as a family, I care for people everywhere. In that order,” Carrie snaps. “And further down the 
list – quite a bit further down the list, I’ll admit – I care for animals” (83). (Just as in real life, an explanation 
of exactly how caring for humans precludes caring for other animals is not forthcoming). Carrie even 
invokes the potentiality argument from moral philosophy, a crude rebuttal against the argument from 
marginal cases that underpins so much of the book’s ideology. Carrie argues that while babies are not 
any more intelligent than the typical ‘mongrel,' babies have the potential to grow into something better, 
more fully human, a potential that ‘mongrels’ and other nonhumans lack (84). This laundry list of common, 
oft-unquestioned anti-animal arguments is problematized by applying them not to the usual targets of 
nonhuman animals, but to an oppressed group of animalized humans.
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While Carrie and Naomi are both motivated by unruly emotion (hatred and love, 
respectively), rationalist Broderick apparently moves beyond these womanly excesses. 
Whether his rationalism moves him to a place the reader would want to go is another 
matter entirely.  
As Acampora points out, calls for ethical carnism usually stop short of advocating 
“caring cannibalism” (2014,145) and one can certainly read Broderick’s rationalist 
argument for kinder meat production as satirical, applied as it is to homo sapiens. This 
is the perspective endorsed by Keen, who finds Broderick’s “hyper-rationalist” tone 
“chilling” (2012, 179, 156) and argues that what makes his “endlessly well intentioned” 
argument for ‘mongrel’ welfare “so unsettling may actually be its internal coherence — 
that is, if you grant him his starting assumptions” (166, 156). Broderick is a staunch 
supporter of ‘mongrel’ farming and yurn consumption, subscribing to the idea that 
“people ha[ve] to come first” and questioning how one could “justify lavishing attention 
[in the form of medical care and social support] on such creatures [‘mongrels’] when 
little enough attention was being paid to humans who needed help” (80). Broderick 
lauds “scientific breakthroughs” in intensive ‘mongrel’ production for “address[ing] the 
issue of social inequality from the perspective of food supply” (81), even as he touts the 
health benefits of more expensive “humane,” “organic,” “free-range,” and ultimately 
“great-tasting” ‘mongrel’ meat (104-5). Indeed, large swaths of Broderick’s narration 
seem to read as a satire of many of the arguments associated with so-called ‘new 
carnivore’ food writers (Parry 2009; 2010; 2011); for example, the character argues that
we should face squarely and be prepared to justify through honest argument our 
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willingness to eat the flesh of mongrels, just as in an earlier age people had an 
obligation to face squarely and to be prepared to justify their willingness to eat 
the flesh of a cow, a chicken, a horse, a lamb. (40)
Many readers no doubt find such arguments reasonable and even-handed when 
applied to other animals – however, applying these arguments to human rather than 
nonhuman animal slaughter makes the “compassionate carnivore’s” (Friend, 2006) 
preoccupation with ‘meeting your meat,' taking ‘responsibility,' and ‘squarely facing’ the 
facts of animal suffering and death seem grotesque. In a final twist demonstrating the 
trumping of aesthetics over ethics in carno-gastro-philosophical discourses, Broderick 
describes how “early yurn” (a clear allusion to veal) is regarded as “a delicacy, a truly 
unique flavour,” and pointedly refuses to condemn the practice (81). Here and 
throughout, LePan generatively exploits the cognitive dissonance between the 
conceptual categories ‘human’ and ‘animal’ to problematize and intervene in the 
treatment of the latter under industrial capitalism.
Unsurprisingly, Animals has been described by reviewers as “shocking” (see Stone, 
2010). Perhaps anticipating something of a backlash from indignant meat-eating 
readers (see reviews from Gueletina 2009; Turnham  2012), LePan’s concludes his 
author’s afterword in a somewhat conciliatory tone, insisting that he never intended to 
downplay the distinction between humans and other animals (179) and revealing that 
his own views on carnism are much more in line with the pragmatic ‘welfare activist’ 
Broderick than the ‘vegan extremist’ Naomi. Calling veganism a “dramatic step,” LePan 
feels that such a response, though “commendable,” is just not appropriate for him (at 
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least for now),
By the time I am seventy I may well be a vegan and a part of me would like to 
become one now, but I have to acknowledge that for me, slow stages seem to 
represent what is achievable. (178) 
That this final paragraph of Animals commends but does not endorse the veganism 
espoused by Naomi further demonstrates that the novel cannot be dismissed as a 
“morally didactic” tract “guilty of oversimplification” (see Schupe 2012, 20;  Gueletina 
2009; Burnham 2012). By bifurcating the narrative into two distinct registers, 
respectively rationalist/affective and ‘welfarist’/’abolitionist’—and yet refusing to 
definitively endorse or condemn any ‘side’ of each dualism—Animals combines a 
powerful appeal to empathy with a detailed political-economic address to the subject-as-
citizen Vint (2010, 37). Hanging suspended in tension between several conflicting 
ethical discourses, the novel resists easy political or philosophical 
compartmentalization, even as it “compels us to feel with the suffering of animals in the 
factory farm system and provides intellectual tools to undermine the cultural logic that 
has enabled us to rationalize this exploitation” (Vint 2010, 46). It is partly because of this 
core ambivalence that Animals remains such a generative text for thinking through 
contemporary popular discourses concerning meat consumption and human-animal 
relations more broadly. 
Dualism in D’Lacey’s Meat  
Like Animals, Joseph D’Lacey’s “eco-horror” novel Meat (Wilson, in Dunn 2015, 20) 
deploys the spectre of anthropophagy to problematize and disrupt contemporary carnist 
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technologies and discourses. Set in the township of Abyrne, a crumbling settlement in 
the middle of a post-apocalyptic desert wasteland, Meat explores the role of religion and 
economics in justifying, enabling and mandating the industrial-scale non-criminal putting 
to death (Derrida 1991) of those shunted below the all important human-animal line 
(Reyes 2014). Known as ‘the Chosen,’ a caste of humans supposedly divinely ordained 
to sacrifice their flesh to feed the townspeople, the human cattle of D’Lacey’s novel are 
mutilated at birth to hobble their manual dexterity and destroy their vocal capacities. The 
novel follows vegan subversive Richard Shanti, a well-respected slaughterhouse worker 
on the disassembly line of the powerful Magnus Meat Processing Company, as he 
teams up with a group of counter-religious anti-carnist rebels to challenge the cannibal 
hegemony maintained by the villainous meat magnate Rory Magnus and the corrupt 
and patriarchal religious institution known as ‘the Welfare.’ The novel ends with the 
revelation that Shanti was actually born as one of the Chosen, but was rescued by a 
grief-crazed slaughterhouse worker whose own babies had died and raised as one of 
the townsfolk. Shanti becomes a saviour figure for the Chosen, eventually freeing them 
from their bondage and leading them in exodus from the decaying town into the 
wasteland beyond, in hopes of a better life. 
Like Animals, Meat deploys the estranging perspective of SF to put homo sapiens 
through the ravages of industrial farming. In doing so, as Reyes argues (2014), the 
novel exposes the ontological lability of the categories bios and zoë, between the bare 
biological life of ‘meat on the hoof’ and the political life of the human citizen-subject 
(114). Life in Abyrne is structured by a strict hierarchical dualism of human/animal, 
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“enforced through a complex semiotic, sociological and religious process” (Reyes 2014, 
114) that keeps the citizens of the town on one side of the divide and the Chosen on the 
other. Cleverly foregrounding the cannibalistic undertones of Christian eucharistic ritual, 
the religion of Abyrne—enforced by a powerful socioreligious institution known only as 
“the Welfare”—mandates the literal consumption of God’s children, the Chosen. The 
Welfare’s foundational text, ‘The Book Of Giving,’ relates the origin myth of Abyrne: 
namely, that “[t]he Father sent his own children down to earth so that we, his townsfolk, 
might eat” (76). The taxonomic construction and capture of a class of homo sapiens 
designated ‘God’s children’ and teleologically ordained to be eaten is further reinforced 
through a sacrificial logic that understands consumption of the Chosen to be the path to 
transcendental salvation: “I sacrifice my children for each of you that none shall ever be 
hungry,” the Book of Giving reassures. “By eating the sacred flesh of my children, may 
all mankind [sic] be one day sacred themselves and join me at my table…My children 
are your cattle. Break their bodies as your daily bread, take their blood as your 
wine” (76-7). In addition to making effective and unsettling use of Christian tropes, 
D’Lacey makes explicit the interpenetration of religious discourse and economic praxis.  
Meat baron Rory Magnus is hardly a disinterested party in this regard, but there is no 
indication that he is mistaken in his assertion that “the religion of the Welfare is an aid to 
business. Business comes before anything else in the world” (124). Economic 
rationalism is buttressed by and in turn legitimizes, a patriarchal monotheism that 
mandates the violent domination of those deemed edible: doubts about the comestible 
status of the Chosen are, in the words of protagonist Richard Shanti, “bur[ied] under the 
words of the Book forever” (131). Meat details how the interlocking and co-constitutive 
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material-discursive apparatuses of capitalism, patriarchal monotheis and industrial meat 
production materialize a hierarchically dualistic configuration of subjectivity predicated 
on the sovereign power to differentially designate living bodies as either ‘citizen’ or 
‘meat’—an agential cut with profound and lethal consequences.
Although the status of ‘Chosen’ is ostensibly divinely ordained, the vagaries of capital 
demand more profane strategies for ensuring the smooth and profitable functioning of 
Abyrne’s cannibal regime. The materially and discursively produced line between eater 
and eaten fluctuates, with the townspeople of Abyrne always at risk of being stripped of 
their human status and reduced to food: as meat baron Magnus repeatedly stresses, ‘If 
you’re not townsfolk, you’re meat. It’s as simple as that’ (2009, 146). The relegation of 
the Chosen to the status of meat is accomplished in part through physical mutilation. In 
excising the Chosen’s vocal cords and clipping their thumbs, the ‘Magnus Meat 
Processing Company’ strips the abject homo sapiens of language and tool use, abilities 
often associated with the human bios (Dunn 2015, 44). Shanti, however, comes to 
understand that even without vocal speech, the Chosen remain communicative through 
a complex system of taps, clicks, hisses and sighs. Rather than language being 
something a priori that a creature either possesses or lacks, D’Lacey draws attention to 
“the way in which humans decide what ‘language’ constitutes, decide whether or not to 
deem ‘animals’ capable of ‘meaningful’ communication and decide whether or not to 
attempt to understand the language of the ‘other’” (ibid.). The well-documented 
anecdotal history of other animals resisting their own confinement and slaughter (Hribal 
2010; Wadiwel 2015; 2016) is ample evidence that, even within the most restrictive 
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systems of incarceration, other animals are capable of communicating something of 
their desires to the attentive human observer: as Donovan argues, “[i]f we listen, we can 
hear them” (1990, 375). By adopting a stance of openness to the subjectivity of the 
other and developing the skills of attentive listening instead of quarantining 
consciousness behind a firewall of human exceptionalism, Shanti is able to partake in 
the fundamental communicability of the nonhuman world (Plumwood 2002; Donovan 
2016), further underscoring Barad’s (2007) argument that subjectivity emerges via 
agential intra-action.
Meat and misogyny
Despite the novel’s suggestion that the voice of the brutalized Other can be heard and 
honoured through what might be described as a feminist ethic of care, Meat’s 
representations of gender and affect far exceed Animals’ in aligning unruly maternal 
femininity with a terribly misguided complicity in perpetual genocide. Maya, mother to 
twin girls and Richard Shanti’s wife, is similar to Carrie in her insistence that she is 
doing what is best for her offspring in actively supporting the cannibal status quo; her 
positioning as the emotionally volatile wife of a gentle, more measured husband also 
echoes Carrie’s marital dynamic. Although Carrie’s cannibal complicity easily trumps 
Maya’s (Carrie deposits a pleading deaf child at a slaughterhouse; Maya’s biggest 
transgression is trading blowjobs for steaks), it is Maya who is written with hostility, as 
an emasculating bloodthirsty harridan too invested in mundane domesticity to question 
the horrifically unjust system of institutionalized violence in which she unthinkingly 
participates. Whereas Animals gives Carrie a sympathetic and complicated backstory to 
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explain her actions, Meat is content to explain Maya’s as biologically determined:
The only thing a mother could give in the world was love and nourishment to her 
children and she wasn’t going to allow anything to prevent her. She loved them. 
They came before everything else. No matter what the cost. (114)
Shanti is ‘frightened’ by his wife’s single-mindedness, as she trades sexual favours to 
himself and other men in exchange for choice cuts of meat to feed to their daughters. 
“She was like a wild animal protecting her offspring, fighting for them, hunting for them, 
defending the lair" (99), Shanti muses, reiterating dualistic tropes of women “as passive, 
reproductive animals… immersed in the body and in the unreflective experiencing of 
life” (Plumwood 1993, 20). Shanti’s depiction of Maya as instinctually driven to 
maximize the fitness of her progeny similarly invokes the dubious authority of mid-
twentieth century human evolutionary hypotheses that posited a primordial ‘meat-sex 
trade’ in which hominid housewives traded “sexual access, reproductive opportunities 
and ownership of the female’s fecundity” to male hunters in exchange for meat (Noske 
1989 104). Meat thus entrenches Maya’s locus of agency firmly within a crude ‘survival 
of the fittest' paradigm that touts the adaptive benefits of certain aspects of supposedly 
biological substrates like animality, motherhood and femininity, even as it denigrates 
those very same attributes as bestial.
The biologically-ordained materiality of Maya’s meat-hunger stands in stark contrast to 
her husband’s high-minded vegan spirituality. Early in the novel, Maya confronts 
Richard about his refusal to bring home the meat that is his due as a well-respected 
slaughterhouse worker, citing fears that their twin daughters are malnourished. 
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Richard’s response—“I care about your spirits” (47, original emphasis)—serves to 
demonstrate his transcendence of such base materialities as nutrition. Pragmatic Maya 
dismisses such ephemeralities: “In this life, talk of the spirit is irrelevant. You have to 
care about our bodies," she entreats, invoking Richard’s paternal duties and repeating 
her conviction that the “family is starving” (ibid). Although Richard is at first impressed 
by the ferocity of his wife’s devotion to their children, he later comes to doubt her 
motives as the “dishonest” and “manipulat[ive]” machinations of a “tainted woman” (44, 
254): “All she worried about was getting enough meat and staying a cut above the other 
women in the town” (176). This assessment is echoed by Magnus, who sees Maya as 
“a woman who manipulated but without any real intelligence” (251). As the novel’s main 
antogonist, Magnus’ opinion can hardly be accepted uncritically; however, there is no 
indication within the novel that the meat baron is mistaken in his estimation of Maya’s 
motivations and capacities. When Magnus eventually rapes and murders Maya, it 
happens off-page, not out of any sense of propriety (D’Lacey does not shy away from 
other descriptions of sexual violence), but because at this point we are not really 
supposed to care about her anymore. Her death hardly even registers for Richard, who 
casually declines to see her grave: “That won’t be necessary," he shrugs (302). In this 
way, Meat hammers home the uncomfortable truth that concern for other animals can 
indeed exist alongside and even stem from, virulently sexist, cold and essentialist 
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ideologies.    31
Conclusion
SF’s longstanding penchant for human meat demonstrates the necessity of the figure of 
the cannibal not only to the constitution of the human(e) Western subject (Sanborn 
2001, 193), but to the configuration of other-than-human subjectivities as well. 
Emergent within material relations of colonial consumption and centrally preoccupied 
with the containment and construction of difference, cannibal discourse becomes legible 
primarily within a schemata of dualism wherein the human and the animal figure as self-
evident and pre-existing ontological categories.  However, the implicit animalization of 
the devoured human subject simultaneously collapses this dualism of subjectivity and 
edibility, “call[ing] into question the universality of binary structures that generate 
meaning” even as it attempts to reinforce them (Guest, 2001, 4). While the centrality of 
the animal to SF narratives of human meat varies from text to text, millennial human 
cattle dystopias have worked to foreground and problematize the hyperseperated 
 Piers Anthony’s ‘The Barn’ (1972) is an even more overt example of a human cattle story articulating 31
concern for other animals within a horrifically sexist and sexually violent narrative. In Anthony’s short 
story, the extinction of large nonhuman mammals in a parallel Earth has created a demand not only for 
human flesh, but for human milk as well. A man from our own Earth, sent through a time-space portal to 
investigate, poses as a farmhand and ends up not only milking the “cows”—mute, prodigiously breasted 
human women—but actually having intercourse with one (she reminds him of younger version of a 
woman back home who had rejected his advances). The “cow” our protagonist molests has “no brain, 
only a hungry pudendum”; so hungry, in fact, that his “weapon” grows flaccid in the “bitch’s” “dismayingly 
capacious vaginal tract” and he is reduced to jerking off while he watches a better endowed “bull” (a “giant 
of a man," with a “tremendous penis”) inseminate her instead (11). The contempt for women that 
permeates ‘The Barn’ almost defies belief and cannot easily be cordoned off as the perspective of the 
protagonist as opposed to that of the author. Anthony wraps up his pornographic little parable by rather 
heavy handedly musing on whether the ghastliness of farming human women is really any different, or 
any worse, than the widespread real-life practice of animal farming. Anthony apparently wants us to think 
about farmed animals; he does not seem to mind any discursive violence done to women along the way 
and indeed positively panders to the basest appetites of the heteromasculine gaze with his graphic and 
lurid descriptions of less-than-consensual sex with animalized, physically and intellectually disfigured, 
sexually objectified women. 
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human-animal dualism of Western (post-)modernity through subjecting homo sapiens to 
the gruesome travails of the carno-capitalist animal industrial complex (Noske 1989). 
These texts take as a given that human subjects should not be treated so and suggest 
that, in the absence of any morally salient distinction between humans and other 
animals, neither should subjects of other species. In this manner, cannibal SF 
problematizes the taken-for-granted notion that subjectivity is the exclusive domain of 
the human, arguing for the extension of moral consideration to subjects of the 
nonhuman variety and against using any morally considerable subject as a means to 
such a grisly end.  However, while these narratives effectively dismantle human-animal 
dualism by demonstrating substantial cognitive and affective similarities between 
(some) humans and (some) other animals, they risk tacitly supporting the kind of 
material-discursive boundary-making that equates moral considerability with a myopic 
cluster of capacities that fail to do justice to the heterogeneity within the human species, 
let alone beyond it.  The strategy of extending moral relevancy only to those 
nonhumans who meet whatever criteria deemed relevant for subject-status does little to 
problematize the underlying dualisms that designate certain bodies as legitimate targets 
of disciplinary violence in the first place. Even Animals, a philosophically sophisticated 
narrative that arguably problematizes this anthropocentric fetish for supposedly innate 
and quintessentially ‘human’ capacities, addresses the bulk of its critique of speciesism 
towards a rigidly static construction of subject-as-citizen that fails to account for the 
relational and dynamic emergence of subjectivity. The rationalist register of this address 
is only partly mitigated by the affective register of Naomi’s accompanying manuscript, 
which for all its passion remains both highly feminized and infantilized. In the following 
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chapter, I will consider SF narratives that complicate the entwined notions of the subject 
as human-like and the subject as always-already unavailable for use by presenting 
scenarios that foreground ethical response-abilities based on recognizing difference 
rather than similitude and emphasize the fundamental edibility of all ecological agents. 
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3. Kin and Carrion: Appetite, Ethics and Alien Encounters
The previous chapter examined how human cattle stories treat human beings the way 
other animals are currently treated under carnocapitalist regimes in order to 
problematize the anthropocentric notion that ethical subjectivity should be reserved only 
for members of our own species. In this chapter, I examine two twenty-first century SF 
series centrally concerned with zoophagy—that is, the human practice of eating 
members of other species. I engage these texts not in an effort to prop up an absolutist 
notion of the subject as inherently inedible (a patent absurdity, since all embodied 
beings are food for others [Plumwood 2000]), but to argue against the hegemony of 
extensionist theories of morality that measure the moral relevance of other lives against 
a preconceived set of (usually anthropocentric) criteria to ‘bestow’ subjectivity upon 
certain classes of creatures, whilst leaving the rest out in the cold. I argue that this kind 
of measuring against a human yardstick demonstrates a profound inability to ethical 
engage with difference, thus reifying similitude as the paramount ethical guiding 
principle and encouraging the containment or incorporation of the other within the self. 
Through a consideration of SF narratives’ engagement with philosophical concepts such 
as deep ecology, ontological veganism and respect-use dualism, I argue for the 
necessity of a contextual and relational ethics that engages rather than subsumes 
difference and eschews grand moral calculations or injunctions in favour of sustained, 
dialogical and response-able engagements with alterity.
Anti-anthropocentric egalitarianism in Traviss’ Wess’har Wars
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Consisting of six books and spanning two star systems and four planets, Karen Traviss’ 
sprawling Wess’har Wars hexology (2004-2008) imagines a scenario where humans are 
impudent upstarts who come up against a vastly superior alien civilization. Shan 
Franklin, a “copper” working for a future European Union’s ‘Environmental Hazards 
Enforcement’ division, leads a military expedition to a distant planet to check on a lost 
colony of religious separatists. They discover that the planet is defended by the 
wess’har, powerful quadrupeds with four-lobed eyes and technology so advanced as to 
seem magical. The wess’har are “like vegans. They make no use whatsoever of other 
species beyond food plants and they have no tolerance of anyone who does” (2004a, 
121). Although the wess’har adhere to a philosophy of noninterference, their parent 
species, the eqbas vorhii, are not so restrained. These “highly militarized vegans," best 
described as something of a cross between “galactic policemen” and interstellar 
restoration biologists, bring down any civilizations that “cross their line of ecological 
morality” (2008, 8), provided they are invited to intervene by a member of a suffering 
species. When the Australian government (ostensibly representing the interests of 
Indigenous Australian and Canadian peoples, but really seeking an advantage over 
other terrestrial superpowers) invite the eqbas to intervene on Earth, the galactic 
policeman oblige, promising (or threatening) to drastically reduce the human population 
in order to restore ecological “balance." Meanwhile, Shan herself becomes infected with 
an alien parasite that makes her invincible, enters into a polyandrous relationship with a 
wess’har male and a human man and becomes an honorary wess’har “matriarch” 
herself.
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The series readily lends itself to material ecofeminist literary critique: Murphy finds 
Traviss’ space-operatic saga of interplanetary “extreme restoration biology…highly 
reminiscent of Val Plumwood’s work in particular” (Murphy 2013, 131). The 
“dehomocentric, heterospecies egalitarianism” (ibid) explored throughout Traviss’ series 
has clear affinities to Plumwood’s dialogical interspecies ethics (ibid), although, as I will 
argue below, the late feminist luminary would surely balk at the alien wess’har’s policy 
of radical, unilateral interventionism in matters of planetary ecology (not to mention their 
hardline veganism).  Vint (2010, 148; 2006) has discussed the Wess’har Wars as a 32
work of anti-anthropocentric ecocriticism and Sullivan (2010) has parsed the lability of 
concepts like ‘balance,' ‘restoration' and ‘nature’ in the series, pointing out the 
problematics of seeking to “restore” a living (if moribund) ecosystem to some 
hypothetical ‘natural’ state (problems of which Traviss’ characters are keenly aware). My 
 Traviss is a quick to rebut critics who presume to conflate her characters’ viewpoints with her own, she 32
is, in her own words, “not a feminist," “not a vegan, not a liberal, not my characters” (Traviss 2007, 620 ; 
Traviss & Scalzi 2006, no pagination). I will refrain from speculating about Traviss’ personal politics, but I 
certainly agree with the author’s rebuttal to those critics (see Hickman 2007) who persist in describing the 
Wess’har Wars hexology as feminist in any substantive sense, beyond the most superficial tropes of a 
strong female character and a matriarchal alien society. Wess’har matriarchs are as inherently rational 
and powerful as their males are biologically predisposed towards subservience and clinginess and human 
protagonist Shan “one of the lads” Franklin makes such a good candidate for matriarch precisely because 
of her repeatedly referenced stereotypically ‘masculine’ attributes (like being tall, no-nonsense and not 
afraid to use violence when necessary). The narrative’s “dichotomized gender logic based mostly on a 
simple reversal with a few special touches is reductive,” as Sullivan points out (2010, 9).  Furthermore, for 
an author who insists that she does not share her character’s viewpoints or motivations, main character 
Shan’s brand of prickly gender conservatism certainly seems a bit on the nose: “If girls want to play boys’ 
games and get boys’ pay, they have to do what the boys do," the “copper” shrugs in one particularly 
revealing passage (2004a,141). Critics hoping to read a queer message into Traviss’ central interspecies 
menage-a-trois will likewise be disappointed—the arrangement is one of staid, one-at-a time polyandry 
rather than anything more labile, with her two male suitors never engaging in any sexual contact with 
each other. Moreover, the assertions of several characters through the series support an essentialist and 
heterocentric understanding of human nature, namely that “humans are monogamous” (2005, 258) and 
that there is no greater purpose in life than childrearing one’s own genetic progeny. Character viewpoints 
may be idiosyncratic or fallible, but the arc of the narrative itself also serves to reinforce these 
conservative family values—Shan’s polyandrous relationship soon dissolves, with the alien member of the 
trio returning to his kind to raise children and the remaining human heterosexual pair settling down in 
traditional marital bliss.
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focus is on how eating is presented in these novels, particularly non-obligate zoophagy, 
a practice shunned by the vegan wess’har, who espouse a praxis of multispecies 
egalitarianism in which all motile creatures are ‘people’ and the category ‘animal’ simply 
does not exist. The wess’har for the most part reject practices that use other ‘people’ as 
a means to an someone else’s ends, instead insisting upon responsible ecological 
stewardship and generally espousing a policy of interspecies equality-of-interests for all 
‘people.' However, although they are vegans who respect the personhood of individual 
creatures, they are also utilitarians who accept that certain deaths might be required for 
the greater good of ecological flourishing. The wess’har and especially their more 
militant eqbas faction, do not shy away from interpersonal violence if it helps promote 
the ‘justifiable end’ of ecological ‘balance,' a loaded and labile term that Traviss’ 
characters spend a good deal of time problematizing. The series culminates with the 
eqbas “restoration” of the ecologically-ravaged Earth, which they achieve by decimating 
the human population with engineered pathogens and forbidding the remaining humans 
from eating other animals.
The anti-anthropocentric egalitarianism explored throughout Traviss’ series brings the 
wess’har into conflict with humans, whom the vegan aliens refer to as “gethes," carrion 
eaters. The wess’har reject any kind of dominant-species chauvinism and oppose the 
hierarchical anthropocentrism of the humans they encounter, arguing forcefully that 
neither “complex language nor the ability to conjure up abstract concepts” is a 
satisfactory ground for ethical relevance (2004a, 302).  The wess’har disdain the 
shortsightedness of the gethes, their inability to recognize value in the alterity of the 
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other: “difference makes others invisible to gethes," as one wess’har character observes 
disapprovingly (2004b, 302). The narrative repeatedly emphasizes how much easier it is 
to empathize with and value those others who are most like us. When human 
protagonist Shan recounts how an early encounter with a gorilla opened her eyes to the 
subjectivity of the other-the-human, her wess’har companion shrugs that the gorilla is 
still “another humanoid” (2004a, 263), similar to humans in form and cognitive function. 
The human characters are constantly challenged to extend their openness to alterity to 
those others who do not resemble the self, “And squid? and other things that don’t look 
like us and don’t look smart?," Shan ponders (2004a, 237). In this sense, as Vint 
argues, the series is as much a work of ecocriticism as much as genre sf: “both are 
modes of world-building that acknowledge a non-human perspective” (2010, 148). 
“Where’s the line now?”
Travis dedicates Crossing the Line (2004), the second novel of the series, “to all those 
who question where we have drawn the line” (2) regarding more-than-human ethics, 
singling out Richard Ryder (who coined the term “speciesism”) and Andrew Linzey (a 
Christian vegetarian theologian) in particular. The series is peppered with references to 
animal protection philosophy, including Jeremy Bentham, St Francis of Assisi and Henry 
Beston and the wess’har’s philosophical position mirrors that of the animal liberation 
movement here on earth, seeking to extend the rights usually afforded members of the 
human species to nonhuman animals, so subjects of all species fall within the bounds of 
the new, more generous moral community. As I argued in chapter two, this extension of 
the boundaries of conventional morality to include members beyond the human species 
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is a vital political project. However, the problem with what Plumwood calls “extensionist 
theories of morality” that identify a cluster of attributes as morally relevant and align 
these attributes with ethical subjectivity, is that their “intense emphasis on the need for a 
[supposedly objective] boundary between what counts and what does not” (2002, 149) 
necessitates that at some point a line must be drawn, beyond which fall lives not worth 
grieving (Butler 2009), relegated to the outer darkness of object-status and absolute 
dismissal (Midgley 1983). This kind of extensionist morality predicated upon subject-
object dualism risks “close[s] the barn door of ethical consideration right after your 
chosen group has gotten out of the cold of historical neglect” (Nealon 2015, xii). Traviss’ 
characters struggle with this ethical boundary policing: “Plants on Earth try hard to avoid 
being eaten," Shan points out. “They defend themselves with poisons and spines, so 
they probably don’t want to be eaten. But we all eat plants here. Where’s the line 
now?” (2006, 283). Although the narrative does not dwell on the question of what sort of 
responsibilities we might have towards non-animal beings like plants and bacteria, nor 
is their ethical mattering foreclosed: “moral ambiguity and ethical heterogeneity remain 
watchwords in series” (Vint 2010, 153). The line may be drawn, but it is constantly 
questioned. One character muses that, “if push came to shove, he wasn’t even sure that 
he could define a plant” (2006, 155) and later notes that “bacteria lived and died within 
every living thing each second of the day," although “there was a limit to how much even 
wess’har could mourn” (2008, 297). Here and throughout, working through the 
difficulties of a non-dichotomous onto-epistemology of human and other-than-human 
lifeworlds “is part of the intellectual project of Traviss’ series which continually both 
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challenges and validates the wess’har axiom that all life must be regarded as absolutely 
equal” (Vint 2010, 151).
Deep ecology and denial of difference 
There is much to appreciate in Traviss’ brilliant work of ecocritical vegan SF and much 
to admire in the wess’har insistence that cross-species alterity is to be valued, not 
hierarchized. However, a close reading of the philosophy of the wess’har, particularly 
their interventionist ‘interplanetary vegan police’ faction the eqbas vorhii, reveals that the 
failure of which they accuse the “gethes”—that is, to appreciate and respond to 
difference—is a failure to which they themselves succumb. The eqbas flatten intra-
human dissimilarities and advocate forcible conversion to a plant-based subsistence 
lifestyle—essentially enforcing a universal moral injunction against zoophagy. As Vint 
(2010) observes, the eqbas’ failure to ethically engage with alterity is highly reminiscent 
of the philosophy of deep ecology (151). Originally articulated by Arne Naess as an 
alternative to an anthropocentric, so-called “shallow” ecology primarily concerned with 
preserving “the health and affluence of people in the developed countries” (Naess 
1995[1973], 3), deep ecology favours a non-anthropocentric “relational total-field image” 
of human-environment continuity, advocates biospherical egalitarianism, diversity and 
(in Naess’ formulation) adopts an explicitly “anti-class posture” (5). Plumwood 
commends Naess’ work for seeking a “historic shift in human consciousness away from 
the dominant instrumental relationship and towards one based on respect and 
communicative virtues” (2000, 59), but argues that it does so through a form of self-
realization based on a kind of totalizing identification with nature that subsumes the 
 94
alterity of the other (2000; 1994, 71). Especially in Anglo-American and Australian 
versions, which “differ markedly form the aspirations and methods of Naess” (van Wyck 
1997, 39), deep ecology champions a sense of self predicated upon “a complete 
breakdown of the distinction between self and other” (van Wyck 1997, 41). Australian 
deep ecologist Warwick Fox has even asserted that “to the extent that we perceive 
boundaries, we fall short of deep ecological consciousness” (Fox 1985, in van Wyck 
1997, 35); ecofeminists see this tendency to obliterate rather than renegotiate 
boundaries as fundamental to deep ecology’s systemic failure to ethically engage 
difference both within and between species, systems and scales (Plumwood 1994; 
Cuomo 1994; Cheney 1994; Lahar 1993, van Wyck 1997,1). The subtext underlying the 
deep ecological concepts of self-realization, identification with nature and ecological 
consciousness “is the idea of containment, containment of the other, of difference, 
rather than genuine recognition, acknowledgement and embracing of the 
other” (Cheney 1994, 164; Braidotti 2013,  85. Assuming that on some fundamental 
level “all knowers are the same” (Cheney 1994, 167; Plumwood 2002, 203), similar to 
the self in certain key respects that makes consensus and world-building possible, deep 
ecology often fails to appreciate that others may have different dispositions, desires and 
responsibilities than the self’s. This monological elision of of alterity underpins deep 
ecology’s unfortunate tendency to “subsum[e] difference within a totalizing vision or 
salvational project” (Cheney 1994, 164), rather than working towards the “negotiated 
relationships of mutual adjustment” (Plumwood 2002, 195) that ecologically embodied 
intersubjectivity entails. As van Wyck argues, the deep ecological construction of the 
subject merely reverses the constitution of the modern Western subject it seeks to 
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supplant, “an operation that lifts and relocates a contested and confused modern 
subject from its structured relations to ideology, politics, the unconscious and so on, to a 
smooth, noncontradictory ecological space” (1997, 105). 
Whether or not Traviss intentionally evoked deep ecology (a distinct possibility, given 
how philosophically literate the novels are), the philosophy of the eqbas and the 
philosophy of deep ecology share several striking parallels. Both argue that the 
psychological mechanism of anthropocentrism is to blame for the ecological crisis, that 
this mechanism is a design flaw inherent to all members of the human species and that 
the human population needs to be drastically reduced in order to maintain (or recreate) 
a flourishing biosphere. This monological and interventionist approach to interspecies 
ethics is both validated and critiqued within Traviss’ narrative. Not only are the more 
pacifist wess’har dubious as to where and how their militaristic eqbas cousins draw the 
line between aid and interference, but on a more sophisticated level the narrative 
troubles the assumption that “all knowers are the same," that all agents face the same 
choices and must choose according to the party line. In one passage, a wess’har 
matriarch takes the human species to task for their tendency to “labor on under the 
willingly shared lie that all beings will be reasonable and behave like humans if they are 
treated like humans. Logic and history tells us we will behave like isenj, or like wess’har, 
or like ussissi. We all behave as we are” (2004b, 231). Although the critique is levelled 
at humans, is is this very same “shared lie”—that the other must behave like the self—
that makes possible the eqbas’ salvational mandate to forcibly rehabilitate 
“gethes” (“carrion eaters”) into “acceptable humans” (2004b, 225). In this way, the 
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eqbas eco-warriors are actually very similar to the “gethes” they seek to convert to 
sustainable veganism—not only do the eqbas and “gethes” expect all “knowers” to be 
like them, but the eqbas’ focus on population and resource management is also 
suspiciously similar to the human practices they despise: “They culled, like herdsmen,” 
one human character observes of the aliens (2005, 69). And like deep ecologists, we 
might add (Vint 2010, 151). Traviss’ narrative makes crystal clear this is not a flattering 
comparison.
The strategy of incorporation that assumes the sameness of all knowers also underpins 
the flattening of intra-human difference common to both deep ecology and eqbas 
foreign policy—humanity as a whole is to blame for the ecological crisis and the 
importance of hierarchies within and between human groups is minimized or ignored 
(Heller 1994, 226; also Plumwood 1994, 72; Lahar 1993, 109; van Wyck 1997). In this 
way, both deep ecological and eqbas vorhii conceptions of subjectivity are revealed to 
be dangerously unitary, “clos[ing] off the possibility of heterogeneous subjectivities by 
representing humans as a singular ecological category” (van Wyck 1997,2). 
Environmental destruction is then conceived of as the result of undifferentiated ‘human’ 
action, ‘human’ attitudes and ‘human’ teleology which “aims inevitably toward total 
dominion over and exploitation of the nonhuman realm” (Cuomo 1994, 95). Eliding the 
diversity of human world-views and the disparities in human power relations enables a 
kind of victim -blaming approach to population control, in which the crucial sociomaterial 
factors underlying population size—such as gender, race and other axes of power—are 
neglected (Cuomo 1994, 96; Heller 1993, 226). Eqbas and deep ecologists alike are 
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thus guilty of privileging psychological factors over cultural patterns, positing the 
theoretical primacy of the atomised self over the collective intra-action of confederations 
of differentially-positioned selves and others. 
The flattening of intra-human difference also informs the rhetoric of “choice” that the 
underpins the eqbas insistence that non-obligate zoophagy must to be forbidden—those 
who have a choice whether or not to eat other animals must make that choice and 
apparently must make it in the negative. As Shan defensively tells a wess’har 
questioner, “before you ask, yes we do eat meat because we can, not because we need 
to” (2004a, 174). This stipulation of the capacity to “choose” reproduces a dichotomy 
between moral agents and moral patients, between creatures who can choose (i.e. 
humans) and creatures who cannot (the rest of the animal world, presumably): a move 
only possible under the problematic assumption of the sovereign subject as fully 
autonomous and uniquely agential. The wess’har emphasis on choice also echoes 
ecofeminist arguments over contemporary vegetarianism. Plumwood, herself a longtime 
vegetarian, has taken issue with the blanket assertion that “humans have a choice 
whether to eat meat or not” (2000, 305), pointing out that the unmarked “human” who 
supposedly has this choice is likely to be a privileged one, with some humans are 
located in an ecological or economic niche that makes meat eating necessary or 
ecologically optimum. As such, any universal, cross-cultural and transhistorical 
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condemnation of zoophagy, Plumwood argues, must be understood a neocolonial 
imposition of Western values.  33
An inability to grasp the significance of intra-human difference underlies the problematic 
vocabulary of choice that the eqbas invoke in their salvational mission to convert Earthly 
humans to a vegan subsistence lifestyle—and perhaps underlies Traviss’ rather 
whitewashed vision of twenty-second century humanity. Although the Australia of 
Traviss' 22nd century is majority Muslim and Canada is under Indigenous governance, 
none of the six novels in the series feature any Indigenous characters; the main human 
characters seem to be White (or at least pale-skinned), while a couple of supporting 
characters are hinted to be of South or West Asian ancestry. As mentioned previously, 
the eqbas are initially invited to intervene on Earth by an Australian government 
purportedly representing the interests of Indigenous peoples. When the galactic 
policemen actually arrive, however, ideological differences between the militant vegan 
aliens and Indigenous human groups whose cultures have long practiced sustainable 
hunting come into sharp relief. Imagining how Indigenous peoples might respond to this 
new colonial incursion into their cultural integrity, Traviss opens a chapter late in the 
series’ third novel with a statement ostensibly written by “Irniq Sataa, Indigenous person 
and Canadian People’s spokesperson”:
 Although correct in her assertion that not all humans do have a choice as to whether or not to eat other 33
animals, Plumwood’s (2000) critique of Adams (1993) is less than robust—as Eaton (2002) has pointed 
out, Adams was discussing catering at feminist academic conferences when she asserts that “humans 
have a choice whether or not to eat meat," not implying that all humans all over the world and across 
history have had equal access to plant-based nutrition options. 
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Our people have always lived by hunting and managing our natural resources 
with restraint and respect. It’s an insult […] to seek to impose a new world order 
of vegetarianism on Indigenous peoples, especially as it’s [Western industrial] 
culture that seems to be the one that’s had the most adverse impact on global 
ecology. Stuffing yourself with soybeans doesn’t give you the moral high ground. 
(Traviss 2006, 347)
“Irniq Sataa” is a figment of Karen Traviss’ imagination. Nevertheless, Travis is correct in 
suggesting that Indigenous perspectives on human-nonhuman relations might clash 
with the eqbas’ top-down injunction against zoophagy; as Robinson points out, 
“Indigenous culture is frequently portrayed as opposed to vegan practices” (2014, 
682).  However, Traviss’ parsing of Indigenous Canadian perspectives of other animals 34
as “natural resources” to be “managed” with restraint is only part of the story. 
Indigenous Canadian and North American perspectives regarding animal subjectivity 
turn out to have an awful lot in common with the philosophy of the eqbas, in which all 
animals are “people." Many Indigenous societies have never needed futuristic aliens 
from outer space to tell them that other animals are “persons”; as Linton (1993: 4) points 
out:
Set within a broader framework, one that gives due attention
 For example, “In her acceptance speech for the Polaris Music Prize, Inuk throat singer Tanya Tagaq 34
portrayed veganism as colonial when she encouraged the consumption and wearing of seal as a 
“sustainable resource” and then added “Fuck PETA,” referring to People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals” (Robinson 2014, 682). This is not to say that veganism is necessarily incompatible with 
Indigenous philosophies; Robinson’s ecofeminist analysis of Mi’kmaq legends and rituals argues that
The values obtained from an ecofeminist exegesis of Mi’kmaq stories can serve as a starting 
point for an Indigenous veganism. The personhood of animals, their self-determination and our 
regret at their death show that choosing not to ask for their sacrifice is a legitimately Aboriginal 
option (2013: 193).
Robinson personally understands veganism as a set of “daily practices that are in keeping with the values 
of our ancestors, even if they may be at odds with their traditional practice” (194).
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to other cultural perspectives—notably, Native American traditions—an
inclusive concept of personhood is not postmodern at all but actually
pre-modern. (4)
Indigenous Canadian and North American ontologies of human-animal/human-nature 
continuity and nonhuman agency starkly differ from the Western tradition of hierarchical 
dualism and human exceptionalism that Traviss’ series (and this dissertation) critiques. 
While there is no single view on animals that is shared by all Indigenous Canadian and 
North American people, let alone all Indigenous people worldwide (Robinson 2014, 
672), TallBear points out that many “Indigenous peoples have never forgotten that 
nonhumans are agential beings engaged in social relations that profoundly shape 
human lives” (TallBear 2015, 234). As such, the issue is not meat consumption/
nonconsumption per se but rather “the ontologies of humans and animals that informed 
and structured how people ate, who could be eaten and in what manner” (Struthers-
Montford 2017, 30).  Kinship and edibility are not mutually exclusive categories in an 35
ontology of human-animal continuity in which nonhumans of all kinds (not just animals) 
are seen as relatives engaged in mutually reciprocal relations of use and respect. 
Such nuances are lost on the invading the eqbas; although they allow certain 
Indigenous populations to continue consuming other animals, they do so with the strict 
caveat that this is only permissible wholesale reversion to a neolithic lifestyle and even 
then hunting must be both obligate for survival and ecologically optimum. Flattening out 
the differences between human populations in order to locate the roots of the ecological 
 For Indigenous Canadian and North American scholarly perspectives on animals, animality and 35
veganism see TallBear (2011, 2013, 2017), Belcourt, (2014) and Robinson (2013, 2014). 
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crisis in the individual psychology of anthropocentrism rather than attending to the 
sociological inequalities that contribute to it, the eqbas are rendered deaf to the voices 
of Indigenous humans who protest that they don’t want to eat soybeans, that 
responsible hunting of other animals has been part of their shared lifeworld for millennia 
and that the ecological crisis the eqbas seek to address is not at all their doing. The 
eqbas’ response to the very valid concerns raised by Indigenous groups in the novel 
subsumes Indigenous agency and power of self-determination beneath the hegemony 
of a technologically advanced superpower, blithely recapitulating the legacy of intra-
human colonialism that has so thoroughly devastated Indigenous cultures worldwide. 
The narrative touches on but does not linger on these problems—ultimately, the magical 
technological supremacy of the wess’har makes all debate on this point moot. 
Bright boys and better toys
As indicated above, Traviss ultimately achieves her vegan-environmentalist heterotopia 
through a technofix, relying upon the the simplistic equalizer of unlimited technology 
(Sullivan 2010, 274) to achieve her SF vision of interplanetary, interspecies justice. As 
Sullivan points out, the wess’har’s astounding technology apparently “has no ecological 
costs in terms of extraction, production, nor of waste and its use is unlimited” (Sullivan 
2010, 274 ). This “technofix’ solution is not only disingenuous, but problematic from an 
ecofeminist standpoint—the implication is that “all we need is a few bright boys and 
better toys to get us out of… the ecological mess we have made” (Plumwood, in 
Sullivan 2010, 277). This discourse of technohubris, recently articulated as a solution to 
the ecological crisis of the anthropocene in ‘An Ecomodernist Manifesto’ (Asafu-Adjaye 
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et al 2015), reframes the ecological crisis as an opportunity for human technological 
ingenuity to finally “liberate” us from the material constraints of the natural world. The 
framework of the ecomodernist technofix leaves no space to question the intensification 
of human consumption practices, which since 1950 have gobbled up more resources 
than those used by all previous generations in the history of humanity combined (Crist 
2015, 249). Hamilton (2015) diagnoses the technofix approach to the ecological crisis 
as “a secular manifestation of the religious idea of Providence” (234) and Latour (2015) 
is even more forceful: “Wake up you ecomoderns, we are in the Anthropocene, not in 
the Holocene, nor are we to ever reside in the enchanted dream of futurism” (223), he 
declares. Traviss’ scenario refines the ecomodernist position in that her proposed 
program of technological bioremediation is only part of the solution; sweeping social 
changes in consumption practices must also be effected. However, in positing that this 
social transformation can only be enforced via the threat of punishment from the 
technologically superior eqbas, the basic tenets of the technofix solution remain in 
place. To be clear, I am not suggesting that we should hold SF writers to task for the 
technological feasibility of their inventions—a futile endeavour, particularly in light of 
Arthur C. Clarke’s famous maxim that “any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic” (1973, 16). However, in giving SF writers licence to 
stretch the limits of technological possibility (and SF readers license to suspend 
disbelief), one need not uncritically accept the seductive fantasy of unlimited 
technological mastery over the material world, nor the wider cultural beliefs within which 
such fantasies gain currency. As Plumwood has pointed out, technologies of control are 
necessarily rooted in the anthropo- and ratiocentrism of Western civilization, “whose 
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contrived blindness to ecological relationships is the fundamental condition underlying 
our destructive and insensitive technology and behaviour” (2002, 21). The “technofix” 
solution to our current environmental crisis becomes thinkable only in the shade of 
these “blindspots of rationalist hubris” (Plumwood 1992, 239)—and it is just such a 
technofix that Traviss’ narrative ultimately leans on to achieve its startling vision of 
militarily-enforced interspecies egalitarianism.
In Traviss’ eqbas, then, we find a narrative materialization of the (sometimes 
contradictory) leitmotifs of deep ecology and ecomodernism. I have argued that the 
deep ecological premise of the sameness of all knowers underpins the eqbas colonial 
invasion and “restoration“ of Earth, deafening them to the voices of the subaltern 
humans who never bought into the radical separation of humans and animals in the first 
place and who have to come to a different conclusion than the eqbas regarding how to 
live responsibly and maximize flourishing for all ecological actants. This assumption of 
the sameness of all knowers, I contend, stems from a dualistic conception of self and 
other wherein the latter can only be valued insofar as it can be incorporated into the 
former. Furthermore, in leaning on the technofix as the only solution to the disastrous 
rapaciousness of tecnocapitaliism, the series both anticipates and reifies the 
problematic naivety of the ecomodernist faith in technological salvation.  As VInt puts 
it, “the harsh vision of ecological justice in the Wess’har war series suggests that this 
deep-ecology-like perspective that refuses to recognize and work through difference is 
unlikely to lead to a better future, but instead will reproduce something as grim as the 
one the singular human-animal boundary has produced” (Vint 2010, 157). 
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Respect/use dualism
Another problematic philosophical position that the eqbas take, built again on the 
dualism of subject/object and the monological foundation of ‘or’ rather than ‘and,’ is the 
mandate for universal veganism (Plumwood 2000b, 293). As Plumwood points out, any 
philosophy grounded on the conviction that no fleshy bodies can ever be consumed 
places an “intense emphasis on the need for a boundary between what counts and what 
does not” (2002, 149). This insistence on an absolute boundary risks reifying a “respect-
use dualism” (ibid.) that divides the world into subjects who must never be used and 
objects that may be used ruthlessly and without compunction. Plumwood diagnoses 
respect-use dualism as a symptom of Western alienation from the rest of the living 
world, operating via a kind of horror at the thought the edibility of the human body (a 
horror of which the cannibal stories in chapter one all partake) (2008, 324): “in the 
human supremacist culture of the West there is a strong effort to deny that we humans 
are also animals positioned in the food chain” (2000a, 146). Plumwood has first hand 
experience of what it is like to be part of the food chain. In her powerful essay “Being 
Prey” (2000a), she recounts her near-fatal crocodile attack, which she experienced at 
the time as ”a shocking reduction” to the status of mere meat. “This can't be happening 
to me, I'm a human being. I am more than just food!” (135), she recalls thinking as the 
“great saurian” seizes and “death-rolls” her. She concludes that while not only humans 
but all creatures can make the claim to be more than “just food,” we are nevertheless all 
food for someone else eventually, even if only for worms and microorganisms (2000a): 
“Through death," Plumwood writes, “we nourish others” (2008, 324).
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The notion that all bodies can be understood as simultaneously food and more-than-
food is acknowledged within the Wess’har hexology, but only in briefly and in passing. 
Typically for the narrative (Vint 2010, 153), this point is raised by an alien character in 
order to deflate human exceptionalism: “Aras had never understood why some humans 
were repelled by the idea of their bodies being devoured by creatures like rockvelvets. 
What did they think decomposition was? Decay and predation were both consumption, 
returning the components of life to the great cycle” (Traviss 2005, 88). This passage 
indicates that the wess’har mandate for universal veganism for those moral agents (if 
not moral patients) for whom such a diet is biologically possible, is not understood (by 
them) as an attempt to remove themselves from the food chain or set themselves above 
it. But this idea is never really developed—across some 3000 pages and six novels, this 
is one of the only overt acknowledgements that all creaturely bodies are fundamentally 
edible. Thus, I argue, although it works to problematize and interrogate the ethical 
boundary policing that stems from human exceptionalism, the Wess’har Wars hexology 
to some extent sanctions a dualism of ‘food’/‘morally considerable.' 
Savagery and civility in O’Guilín’s Bone World
Peadar O’Guilín’s Bone World trilogy (2007-2014) is an excellent foil for the universal 
veganism and attendant respect-use dualism explored in Traviss’ Wess’har Wars. 
Critically well-received despite its “unsettling” subject matter,  Bone World 36
 The trilogy’s first instalment,The Inferior (2007, London, Corgi), garnered positive reviews and was 36
published internationally in seven different languages. The Deserter (2011, London, David Flicking) came 
out to mixed reviews and was mostly ignored. The final volume in the trilogy,The Volunteer (2014), was 
self-published.
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problematizes the notion of respect-use dualism through its depiction of a world where 
anyone and everyone is meat for everyone else. Though the books are aimed at a 
younger audience than those of the meticulous mass-market veteran Traviss, O’Guilin’s 
trilogy successfully and succinctly effects a nuanced exploration of edibility, otherness 
and response-ability. The trilogy’s first instalment, The Inferior (2007), opens on a stone 
age tribe in a mysterious crumbling city, forced to  hunt alien ‘beasts’ in a brutal struggle 
for survival in a world where all plant matter is apparently inedible. This human ‘Tribe’ is 
structured along a strict patriarchal division of power and labour, wherein men are 
‘natural’ hunters and leaders and women pound moss and smoke meat for their 
husbands—an arrangement reminiscent of longstanding and influential ‘man the hunter’ 
discourses in paleoanthropology (Noske 1989; Haraway 1989). In this respect, The 
Inferior evokes Kingsbury’s Courtship Rite (see p52, n13), which is also set on a 
cannibal planet where all plant life is poisonous, all human life is patriarchal and survival 
is only for the fittest. However, whereas Kingsbury “rigs” his cannibal society to establish 
and naturalize his misogynistic libertarian political agenda (Clute 1982), O’Guilín makes 
‘rigging the game’ an integral part of the story itself. The stone-age Tribe of beast-
hunting men and moss-gathering women do not represent any kind of natural atavism—
they are in fact a carefully managed population of posthuman prisoners and their red-in-
tooth-and-claw planet where only the most brutal can survive is a theme park designed 
and operated by a technocratic elite ruling from a vast space habitat above.
Every member of the Tribe, including stuttering protagonist Stopmouth and his evil-
genius elder brother Wallbreaker, has been genetically and nano-technologically 
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modified by their unseen overlords to survive the peculiar demands of their prison 
planet. Their metabolisms have been tweaked so that they (unlike ordinary humans) are 
able to survive as true carnivores, eating almost nothing except meat. To endure on a 
planet with no edible plants, the Tribe practices funerary cannibalism and hunts various 
types of fearsome ‘beasts’—actually several different alien species, all captured, 
stripped of their technology and stranded on the prison planet known as ‘Bone World.'  37
All the large motile species on Bone World have been been altered on a cellular level so 
that the flesh of each species is mutually edible to every other (2014, 236). All the Tribes 
of Bone World, human and nonhuman alike, are imprisoned as unwilling and 
unsuspecting participants in a media bloodsport of unimaginable scale, consumed by 
billions of eager human fans watching from above. The architects of this bloody theme 
park are oligarchs who live overhead in a vast orbital structure called “the Roof," a self-
replicating but now-decaying technological marvel which encloses the entire Bone 
World planet “as a skull does the brain” (2011, 34). Many billions live in the Roof, 
completely unknown to the Tribes below. The ruling Roofdwellers are like puppet 
masters or reality television producers, orchestrating and capturing the bloody action on 
the planet’s surface and broadcasting it to the enormous population in Roof above—all 
of whom are strict vegetarians who construct their self-styled ‘civilized’ identity out of 
and above the ‘savage’ carno-cannibalism of the Tribes (human and alien) they 
ruthlessly exploit. The narrative opens with a “civilized” woman, Indrani, literally falling 
from the sky and into the ‘ManTribe’s’ brutal and cloistered world, sparking a clash of 
dietary philosophies that leads Stopmouth and Indrani on a quest to dismantle the 
 ‘Bone World’ without italics refers to the fictional planet; ’Bone World’ in italics refers to the trilogy of 37
novels named after and set upon the fictional planet. 
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Roofdwellers’ toxic culture of repression and violence and build a more equitable and 
livable world for all of Bone World’s various species.
“How and why, some people are judged ‘inferior’” is a central theme of the series 
according to the author (O’Guilín &Swede, 2007). O’Guilin is particularly concerned with 
how eating patterns can be used to prop up social hierarchies. As he points out, “[a] few 
unusual carnivorous habits” can be all it takes “for one human being to look down his 
[sic] nose at another” (ibid.). In interviews, O’Guilin decries the hypocrisy at work in 
condemning another culture’s eating habits as “savage” when one’s own “civilized” 
culture has such a brutal track record with other animals and wonders “whether the fact 
that a savage’s dinner can talk back to him [sic] makes him [sic] any less noble than we 
are” (O’Guilin & Scalzi 2012). The Bone World trilogy is the result, a “laboratory 
universe” (O’Guilín & Swede 2007, O’Guilín & Scalzi 2012) within which to explore the 
role played by diet in delineating savagery from civility. In contrast to Traviss’ Wess’har 
Wars, which focused on deflating human exceptionalism via the encounter with a vastly 
powerful alien species of militarized vegans, Bone World is centrally concerned with 
intra-human hierarchy. The hypocritical disdain of the “civilized” Roofdwellers—for 
whom no flesh can ever be edible—for the carnivorous “savages” of the world below is 
continually lampooned and critiqued within O’Guilín’s narrative. The Roofdwellers' 
contempt for flesh eating is shown to be motivated by hierarchical in-group thinking 
(civilized/savage) rather than any particular concern for the wellbeing of those who are 
eaten. “Only savages eat flesh,” one Roofdweller explains: “Civilized beings eat other 
things made from plants” (2007, 305). However, despite occasional lip service to the 
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suffering of other animals (2007, 306), the vegetarianism of the Roofdwellers is primarily 
an artefact of their ideology of human-nonhuman hierarchy. As in DeFord’s ‘Season of 
the Babies’ (see chapter one), ‘beasts’ are unclean and debased and so are those who 
consume them. This is demonstrated by the antipathy of the Roofdwellers toward 
Stopmouth and Indrani, once the intrepid pair have found their way off-planet to the 
giant orbital habitat of vegetarians above: “the savage had ruined one civilized woman 
already, turing her into a disgusting meat-eater no better than himself. ‘He’s little more 
than a beast!’ ” (2011, 58)  The Roofdwellers’ disgust at meat consumption is, of course, 
a perspective entirely at odds with their eager media consumption of the violent and 
perpetual bloodsport their ruling caste has carefully created. Not only have the Roof-
dwelling elite altered the biochemistry of their prisoners to allow them to eat one 
another, they have also banned any edible plants from the planets surface—“just for the 
pleasure of watching you bleed," as Indrani tells Stopmouth. (2011, 35). As Stopmouth 
wryly notes, “for a people that hated cannibalism so much, the Roofdwellers certainly 
went to enormous lengths to make it possible” (2011, 279). 
The hypocritical attitude of the Roof civilization towards the ‘savages’ they have 
imprisoned on Bone World below clearly serves as an indictment of western European 
colonialism and its attendant hierarchical dualism of civility/savagery. However, the 
dominant racialization of civilized and savage is reversed in the Bone World trilogy: the 
savage cannibals of the Tribe are light-skinned and the sneering civilized hypocrites of 
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the Roof dark-skinned.  The second novel reveals that the pale cannibal Tribe of 38
surface dwellers are descendants of the ‘Deserters’—humans from prosperous (and 
predominantly white) nations who ‘deserted’ an ecologically devastated Earth thousands 
of years ago. These Deserters, continuing the pattern of “centuries of their cruel 
civilization” (2014, 206), used up the planet’s last remaining resources in order to build 
interstellar spacecraft to escape the wasteland they had created, leaving the rest of 
Earth’s population stranded on a barren world (2014, 52). However, although the 
Deserters “abandoned the poor to what they thought was certain death,” their past 
would eventually catch up with them—literally (2014, 145). Earth’s remaining humans, 
predominantly people of colour, somehow (O’Guilín is vague here) built ships of their 
own and escaped the dying planet. Eventually these ships overtook the hibernation 
spacecraft of some the original Deserters, capturing their sleeping human cargo (2014, 
311). The former left-behinds imprisoned the Deserters on a poisonous exoplanet and 
built a vast orbital habitat from which to observe their unending punishment: to be 
stripped of all complex material technology and forced to compete for survival in an 
unending, bloody, eat-or-be-eaten circus. Perhaps as a point of contrast with the 
voracious ‘Deserters,' whose greed devoured ‘Old Earth,' the Roofdwellers eventually 
came to adopt a stance of universal vegetarianism, wherein nothing but plant matter 
can ever be ontologized as edible—at least not by anyone ‘civilized.' The Deserters—a 
term that has been inherited by Stopmouth and Wallbreaker’s light-skinned Tribe—are 
thus made abject by their continuing (albeit forced) consumption of flesh.
 I am refraining from mapping onto fictional cultural groups what would, in the Bone World universe, be 38
anachronistic racial categories like white or South Asian (these being the in-universe progenitors of Bone 
World’s cultural groups, rather than identity terms that would be meaningful to those fictional cultural 
groups themselves). 
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In Bone World, pale-skinned people are kept in a state of enforced stone-age savagery, 
while everyone else sits back in civilized comfort to enjoy the show. The trilogy thus falls 
within the tradition of race reversal SF, a trope that risks appropriating the trauma 
experienced by people of colour under colonial and white supremacist regimes and 
subsuming it within a narrative that centres whiteness (Berlatsky 2014). In offering 
“agents of privilege an invitation to occupy the position of victims,” race reversal SF all 
too often absolves white people of guilt while investing in them “the moral authority of 
retributive agency” (Higgins 2016, 51).  O’Guilin seems aware of these dynamics and 39
takes care to problematize any reading of Bone World as advocating this kind of white-
centred “imperial masochism” (ibid.). Although the Roofdwellers are apparently all 
vegetarian people of colour, the populace is far from homogenous. Instead, the 
enormous Roof—bigger than the planet it encloses, containing “cities too big to walk 
across in a human lifetime” (34) and untold billions of human souls—is home to a 
dizzying array of cultures, languages, religions, classes and political groups. Many 
Roofdwellers are are oppressed minorities themselves—some even oppose the 
imprisonment of the Deserters on the planet below. O’Guilin is also careful to stress that 
his Roofdwelling civilization should not be understood as analogous to any Earthly 
ethnicity or nationality. When one Roofdwelling character ruminates on “the dark skin of 
his Dravidian ancestry,” O’Guilin ensures that same character spouts a monologue 
 At its its worst, race-reversal SF can reinforce “the most horrific racial stereotypes imaginable” (Heer 39
2014: np). In Heinlein’s Farnham’s Freehold (1964) for example, a white family wakes up to find 
themselves 2000 years in the future, where White America has been enslaved by Black cannibals. A 
contemporary example of ill-advised race-reversal SF can be found in Victoria Foyt’s Save the Pearls: 
Revealing Eden (2012).  For more critical and nuanced examples of the race reversal trope, see the work 
of Malorie Blackman (Noughts & Crosses) and Bernadine Evaristo (Blonde Roots).
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explicitly denying any substantive continuity between himself and his South Asian 
progenitors: 
Thousands of real years and light years separate them from us and all the while 
we’ve been changing. They would hate us. We’re as far from them as 
Stopmouth is from… the ancient Romans. Our languages are different, our 
customs are different and as for our religions… our ancestors wouldn’t 
recognize anything about us.” (2011, 164, ellipsis in original)
By making the Roofdwellers culturally and ideologically diverse and emphasizing their 
distinctness from any Earthly ethnicity, O’Guilin attempts to sidestep the fraught territory 
of race-reversal SF wherein people of colour are positioned as the “real” agents of 
oppression and white characters enjoy the sympathy and righteous indignation of 
victimization. While readers may disagree as to how successful O’Guilin is in avoiding 
the pitfalls of white-authored race-reversal SF, the trilogy nevertheless makes the point 
that the hellish inequalities of Bone World are borne from the environmental racism and 
ethno-nationally balkanized destruction of our home planet: the greedy have been 
punished and the no-longer meek have inherited the new world (if not the original 
Earth).
Eating your neighbours
Whereas “eating your neighbours” is unthinkable for Traviss’ wess’har (2008, 282), 
eating their neighbours is a non-negotiable condition of survival for all inhabitants of 
O’Guilin’s Bone World. What is unthinkable is an ontology of respect-use dualism, 
cleaving as it does the morally considerable from that which is consumed as food. Dead 
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Tribe members are lovingly eaten and old and infirm Tribe members are routinely 
“volunteered” to alien tribes in return for their own unwanted members in “a simple 
exchange of loved ones for food” (2007, 27). Moreover, the ethical subjectivity of the 
alien “beasts” that the Tribe hunts, kills and eats is never denied, despite the ambivalent 
animalization that the moniker suggests. Numerous passages throughout the trilogy 
describe in uncomfortable detail the carno-cannibal appetites of the Tribe humans, who 
have learned over generations of bloody conflict to savour “the thrill of breaking through 
bone to the sweetest of marrows; the properties of various organs that differed subtly 
from creature to creature,” including other humans (2014, 130). A clearer articulation of 
the insight that ‘kin’ and ‘food’ are not self-evidently exclusionary categories could hardly 
be imagined (Villagra, 2012).
Communicative interspecies ethics
Although the Tribe understands all flesh (regardless of species) to be meat sooner or 
later, the trilogy centres on Stopmouth coming to question and overthrow the status quo 
of perpetual, media-orchestrated bloodshed. This occurs not through his exposure to 
“civilized” Indrani’s flawed vegetarian counterdiscourse, but as a result his own 
experiences with the alien ‘beasts’ he must hunt and kill. The importance of 
communication is paramount here—in Bone World, it is only through some kind of 
communication that empathy between species becomes possible. This communication 
need not be linguistic—the language of each species is mutually incomprehensible to all 
others, although rudimentary understanding of certain words (like “flesh”) is possible 
between tribes who share a vocalized language (other tribes communicate through 
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olfactory or telepathic means). Sensitive Stopmouth, himself a liminal member of the 
human Tribe due to his stutter, finds himself confronted by the inscrutable agency of the 
other through his careful observation of his alien prey. Like Derrida arrested by a 
moment of sustained eye contact with his cat (1991b), Stopmouth comes to the 
realization that “one of the creatures gazed back, studying him in return perhaps” (2007, 
39). Later, the young hunter observes a group of alien juveniles playing “a game. It must 
be. Not so unlike us, after all” (2007, 56). Stopmouth sees aspects of himself and his 
family in the aliens he watches and who in turn watch him back: “Was that your brother 
we killed?” he wonders after one encounter; “Are you the Bloodskin version of 
me?” (2007, 73). In yet another scene, happening upon a slumbering pair of aliens, 
Stopmouth is reminded of his lover: “the furred beasts slept, intertwined. They made 
Stopmouth think of Indrani for some reason” (2007,153). Bird Rose argues that it is 
though “opening one’s self to others as communicative beings [that] one places one’s 
self in a position of being able to experience communication” (2013, 97). Stopmouth 
needs no special powers of intellect to perceive what other members of his Tribe 
apparently do not; indeed, perhaps it is the ‘shortcoming’ of his stutter that encourages 
Stopmouth to learn to ‘listen’ in the active tense and in multiple registers and thus 
perceive the affective commonalities between himself and the ‘Beasts’ he hunts. 
O’Guilín seems to be suggesting that the capacities of terrestrial nonhuman animals, 
like those of alien ‘beasts,' “are at least in part the products of our communications with 
them, of social exchanges rather than a priori qualities” (Vint 2008a, 318). Against an 
ontology of hyperseperation that denies humans-nonhuman continuity and backgrounds 
listening (and more broadly, paying attention) over speaking (Rose 2013, 102; 
 115
Plumwood 2002), stuttering outcast Stopmouth adopts a posture of attentive listening 
(Donovan 2016) that does not foreclose the subjectivity of the more-than-human. In 
doing so, the narrative approaches subjectivity not as a preexisting capacity but as an 
emergent property of various intra-actions with agencies of alterity, foregrounding the 
communicative encounter as an agential entanglement that brings forth observer and 
observed. While Stopmouth’s attentiveness to the mindedness of the Other is borne of 
relations of material use, he remains open to ethical concern for the bodies he must kill 
and eat, approaching them not as dead material “but as a living presence, one located 
in a particular, knowable environment and … capable of dialogical 
communication” (Donovan 2016, 11).
Stopmouth’s burgeoning empathy for the beasts he hunts and kills stems from his 
recognition of commonalities and similarities between them and him, theirs and his. 
However, this recognition of similarity does not entail the downplaying of difference or 
the containment of the other within the self. As Plumwood insists, “the underlying 
metaphysical choice of Same/Different is a false dichotomy: both continuity with and 
difference from self can be sources of value and consideration and both usually play a 
role” (2002, 200). Subsequently, Stopmouth’s ambivalent encounters with alien ‘beasts’ 
enact a ethic of radical alterity that does not hinge on the recognition of similitude but 
rather seeks “to attend to heterogeneities where reductive homogeneities have been 
posited” (Calarco 2016, 37; Levinas 1969). Unlike the eqbas of the Wess’Har Wars 
hexology, who drown in Plumwood’s “Ocean of Continuity" in an attempt to avoid the 
“Desert of Difference” (1994, 3), the characters of Bone World never fall into the 
 116
assumption that all knowers are the same. Even when a universal translator device (the 
pinnacle of Roof technology) makes linguistic communication possible between alien 
species, O’Guilín is careful to stress the radical alterity of any Other, even one of the 
same species. Explaining the ‘Talker’ contraption to an incredulous Stopmouth, exiled 
Roofdweller Indrani warns that cross-cultural translations of even basic concepts can 
only ever be approximations:
Yes, it’s a miracle but it’s a dangerous miracle. It makes you think you 
understand beasts and you never do. When it comes down to it, you can’t even 
understand your own species. (2007, 258)
Indrani is not positing an unbridgeable gulf between humans and other species, or 
between the self and other; rather, her comments stress that any form of understanding 
between differentially materialized actants is necessarily a negotiation, an estranging 
encounter that leaves a mark.  Bone World thus highlights how ethics “arises precisely 40
as a response to the Other, from a source radically different from [the self] that calls into 
question [one’s] typical ways of thinking and living” (Calarco 2015 32). Stopmouth’s 
alien encounters, I argue, “have an uncanny way of sticking with [him], getting under 
[his] skin and slowly reworking [his] subjectivity and existence from within” (Calarco 
2015, 32; Levinas 1969). In this sense Bone World articulates a “creaturely ethics” (Pick 
2011) or an “ethic of care” (Donovan 2016) that does not seek to subsume alterity 
beneath similitude via the fulfilment of anthropocentric preliminary criteria, but rather 
recognizes “the materiality of and vulnerability of all living bodies” as a call to response-
ability (Pick 2011, 193). But even so, the political and material organization of planetary 
 I am indebted to J. Keeping for this point. 40
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life ensures that Stopmouth’s hunger for flesh persists: “Now he couldn’t even eat 
without thinking of the pain that had brought food to his lips. Even so, his mouth 
watered” (2007, 379). The affinities between Stopmouth’s empathic killing and 
Plumwood’s ecological embodiment can only be pushed so far—Bone World is no 
natural ecosystem, but a gladiatorial arena of carefully managed posthuman prisoners 
pitted against one another for the the spectatorial pleasures of the Roofdwellers above. 
Nevertheless, through the sympathetic portrayal of Stopmouth and the demonstrable 
hypocrisy of the meat-rejecting yet voyeuristically bloodthirsty Roof inhabitants, the 
narrative works to problematize the apparent contradiction between Stopmouth’s 
empathy and hunger, forcing the reader to confront an ontology of hyperseperation that 
backgrounds the nonhuman world and creates a false dichotomy in which food can only 
ever be abject and respect precludes use. 
Lifeboat ethics
O’Guilín has repeatedly described the trilogy as a “laboratory universe," built to explore 
questions of diet and ethics. One such thought experiment unfolds in the second novel, 
as Stopmouth and Indrani, trapped in the crumbling Roof, are forced forced to choose 
between helping other humans escape or saving themselves and their daughter. 
Stopmouth and Indrani’s terrible choice echoes, but ultimately inverts, the infamous 
“lifeboat” scenario, a crude thought experiment deployed by utilitarian and deontological 
animal ethicists like Singer (1975, 87) and Regan (1982, 32) to “force the clarification of 
intuitions about the relative value of human and animal life” (Bailey 2009,129). The 
lifeboat situation compares and ranks difference by “drawing lines around various 
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categories of living beings” in order to uncover a universalizable moral equation, 
“indirectly reinforc[ing] assumptions that are not only anthropocentric, but also tied to 
racist, sexist and ethnocentric stereotypes” (Bailey 2009, 143, 129).  Initially, 41
Stopmouth justifies the pair’s decision to save each other rather than attempt to save a 
group of strangers through just such a lifeboat scenario of human-animal hierarchy, 
“These others were only beasts, their skins for clothing, their skulls for plates” (2011, 
381). However, having spent much of the previous two novels questioning this ranking 
of human over nonhuman, Stopmouth almost instantly recants this ontology of 
hierarchical dualism, “They are not beasts," he insists—not morally excludable bodies 
always-already available for instrumentalization (2011, 382). Indrani agrees, but insists 
that other humans struggling in lifeboat Roof “are not my child. They are not my 
man” (ibid), articulating a creaturely ethics in which rights do not automatically trump 
obligations (Pick 2011, 193). As Haraway points out in When Species Meet, 
“proceed[ing] as if calculation solved the dilemma” (2008, 87) usually proves 
inadequate. Put another way, “we will never have moral theory that functions as 
precisely as a pocket calculator” (Bailey 2009, 144). Affective, relational ties and the 
response-abilities that accompany them cannot easily be overridden by any abstract 
moral injunction, as Stopmouth and Indrani find. This subversion of overarching rule-
based morality is central to O’Guilín’s project: like the blanket ethical condemnation of 
cannibalism that Bone World works so hard to complicate, the lifeboat-Roof scenario 
 “Ecological oligarch” Garret Hardin (Plumwood’s term, 2002, 64), for example, deploys the cold 41
equations of the lifeboat scenario to lend credibility to ethnonationalist and anti-immigrant ideologies (See 
Hardin, 1974). Within SF, the lifeboat scenario has most famously been deployed in the short story ‘The 
Cold Equations’ by Tom Godwin, first published in Astounding Magazine in 1954, in which a young female 
stowaway must be thrown off of a spaceship in order to ensure the survival of the rest of the crew. 
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demonstrates how quickly neat ethical rules tend to fall apart in context. Like LePan’s 
Animals (a fictional materialization of the argument from marginal cases) and Traviss’ 
Wess'har Wars (a space opera built on the principles of deep ecology and universal 
veganism), Bone World employs the tools of narrative storytelling to flesh out and 
complicate established concepts in academic moral philosophy.
Human cattle: redux
As the trilogy progresses and the Roof society begins to collapse, the careful biopolitical 
management of alien populations breaks down and nearly all alien ‘beasts’ upon the 
surface of Bone World become extinct. When the superstructure of the Roof itself finally 
crumbles, the few survivors (known as Ship People or Roof People) find themselves 
stranded on a prison planet with no substantive sources of nutrition except for a few 
contraband crop seeds, wholly at the mercy of the savage surface-dwelling human Tribe 
they despise. The Tribe itself splits into two factions, the first, led by protagonists 
Stopmouth and Indrani, advocates a gender-egalitarian collaboration between 
Roofdwellers and Tribe members for the mutual benefit of both; the second, led by 
Stopmouth’s brother and the series’ main antagonist, Wallbreaker, sees the Roof 
refugees as subhuman beasts. The struggle between these two incommensurate 
visions of planetary life provides the narrative energy for the trilogy’s final instalment 
and completes the story arc of the series. 
Although Wallbreaker’s “savage” splinter-Tribe and the “civilized” Roof refugees despise 
each other, both share an ideological foundation of human supremacy and a similar 
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propensity for hierarchy and violent instrumentalization. The culture of the Roof is built 
on a policy of rigid species hierarchy in which genocidal expansionism is not only 
permitted, but mandated. “The people here believe it is human destiny to control 
everything," Indrani explains (2014, 239), whether that destiny is expressed as a secular 
mission “to defend ourselves and Old Earth against aliens” or a “sacred duty to rid the 
universe of demons” (2011, 117). The ruling Roofdwellers scour the universe for alien 
species, “hunt[ing] them out across the vast emptiness that lies between worlds” (2011, 
117) and destroying their homeworlds in order to enslave the survivors in a perpetual 
bloody spectacle upon Bone World’s surface—all in an effort to control and contain the 
nonhuman agency that such “beasts” enact. For the Roofdwellers, controlling the 
universe through exterminating or instrumentalizing all nonhuman life is no less than the 
teleology of human destiny. Villainous chief Wallbreaker operates within a similar 
monological rationalism of hyperseperation (Plumwood 2002), albeit on a ‘merely’ 
planetary rather than galactic scale: “We are not like the other beasts that feed us so 
well. This is our world!” he proclaims (2014, 80). ‘Savages’ and ‘civilized’ alike, it seems, 
can share a foundation of genocidal, teleological anthropocentrism, a belief that only 
human (however that category is defined) lives really matter and that it is human destiny 
to rule over other forms of life. The anthropocentrism of the Roofdwellers interlocks with 
their speciesist hatred of alien “beasts," and their racist hatred of those “savages” who 
consume their flesh. The anthropocentrism of Wallbreaker’s Tribe feeds his conviction 
that the known world belongs to humanity alone, his racist insistence that the 
Roofdwellers are not really human at all and his regime of patriarchal violence.  
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It is through antagonist Wallbreaker that Bone World’s most pointed critique of this 
shared dualistic moral ontology comes to the fore. To the villainous chief, whose world is 
structured upon the hierarchical dualism of Tribe/beast, only his original, patriarchal tribe 
of light-skinned cannibal hunters is morally considerable—everyone else, Roof humans 
included, simply do not count as “Tribe." Wallbreaker denies the humanity of the Roof 
people even as he fetishes them sexually, demonstrating again that “human” is a social 
category deployed to demarcate those who matter from those who matter less, or not at 
all. “We will dominate your dark-skinned weaklings, who probably aren’t even human 
anyway,” Wallbreaker proclaims (2014, 225), reasserting the old racial hierarchies that 
set this whole brutal cycle in motion. He promises his most loyal followers that each will 
“get his pick of the Ship Brides” (2014, 231) in a chilling recapitulation of the racialized 
sexual violence of old Earth. Disdaining the vegetarian diet of the Roofdwellers and 
unconvinced that unfamiliar items such as “rice” and “lentils” are fit for human 
consumption, Wallbreaker plans to “show the Ship People they aren’t the only ones who 
know how to farm” (2014, 247):
Humans cannot live on rice. I know that. But Roof People can. They will have all 
the world to grow it… They will feed to their hearts content and live long lives 
without fear. And then, painlessly—I promise you!—painlessly, they will give 
their flesh to us, the true humans.” (2014, 263)
Wallbreaker plans to enslave the Roof refugees as farm labourers, growing Earth crops 
which will be used to fatten them up for slaughter and consumption by his tribe of “true 
humans," for whom a vegetarian diet would be unthinkable. 
 122
At the narrative climax of the trilogy, then, the titular planet of the Bone World series 
teeters on the brink of becoming a bona fide human cattle dystopia, akin to those 
analyzed in the previous chapter. However, O’Guilín is not about to conclude his SF 
“laboratory universe” with such a dismal experimental result. Instead, Stopmouth’s 
coalition of humans (‘savages’ and Roof refugees) join forces with one of the last 
remaining alien species, the ‘fourleggers,' to form a new “hybrid tribe” (2014, 193). 
Communication barriers between human groups are bridged and humans and 
fourleggers find a mutual framework for communication in a sign language creole 
spontaneously invented by the children of this new hybrid tribe. Thus, Stopmouth’s 
multiracial, multicultural and multi-species coalition is able to defeat Wallbreaker’s racist/
sexist/speciesist faction and secure a just and liveable future for the remaining 
inhabitants of Bone World. 
Conclusion: Food and respect/use dualism
In this chapter, I have engaged popular print SF to consider the pitfalls of moral 
extensionist theories that seek to extend the privileges of subjectivity without 
challenging the underlying dualism of subject/object that makes such extension 
thinkable. I have argued that the narrative of Bone World affirms an ethics predicated 
upon the shared vulnerability of and response-ablites towards, corporeal bodies. In 
these closing remarks, I want return to Traviss’ Wess’ har Wars in an attempt to flesh 
out the normative applications of respect-use dualism within carnocapitalist culture. As 
discussed earlier, in equating availability as food with moral exclusion and insisting that 
“nothing that is morally considerably can ever be…ontologized as edible” (Plumwood 
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2002, 156), respect-use dualism “is forced to insist on a substantial outclass of living 
beings” (ibid, 155) whose lives and deaths, although necessary to sustain human life, 
cannot matter (at least, not if we are to remain ethically pure). Hence, one crucial facet 
of this dualist matrix is the that food is positioned as abject. This abjection, born of 
respect-use dualism, sanctions the entrapment of ‘food’ animals’ within economic 
relations of property that position animals a priori as raw material or “deaded 
life” (Wadiwel 2015; Stanescu 2013). Incarcerated in an animal industrial complex built 
on the ruthless exploitation of their “metabolic labor," respect-use dualism reduces 
animals unlucky enough to be positioned as ‘food’ to the debased status of always-
already meat (Beldo 2017; Vint, 2010). The Wess’har Wars series shows this abjection 
of the edible in action, vividly illustrating how respect-use dualism sanctions human 
practices of domination and instrumentalization towards other beings. In the first novel, 
the scientists under Shan’s command break local ordinance to collect specimen 
samples from the alien planet on which they have landed. One of these specimens is a 
juvenile ‘bezeri,' a technologically-adept aquatic species with a rich cultural history who 
communicate with each other through a complex visual language of 
photoluminescence.  Unfamiliar with bezeri biology, the scientists incorrectly assume 42
the “specimen” is dead and proceed to vivisect the creature. The scene foregrounds the 
instrumentalizing drive of scientific rationalism, with its conception of world and 
everyone else in it as “standing reserve” for human use (Vint 2010). However, 
underlying this critique of technoscientific hubris is an astute acknowledgment of the 
 It is not until much later in the series that Traviss reveals that the bezeri are no innocents, possessing a 42
dark past of virulent xenophobia that once lead them to hunt other species to death in the name of ethnic 
cleansing: in effect, “nazi squid” (Traviss 2006, 42)”
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ways in which respect-use dualism operates as a function of culinary culture. While 
other alien species in the novel are said to resemble badgers, meerkats and spiders, 
the unlucky bezeri bear an unfortunate resemblance to Earthly squid—as one wess’har 
character succinctly puts it, “the bezeri remind you of an item on the menu” (2004b, 
198). Routinely targeted for vivisection here on Earth due to their evident intelligence, 
cephalopods nevertheless remain ‘food’ even for those who experiment upon them: 
biologist Martin Wells (H. G. Wells’ grandson), for example, sees no conflict of interest in 
his statement that “I work on octopus and squid and things like that, when I’m not eating 
them” (who could imagine Jane Goodall making a similar claim?) (Tiffin 2014, 159). This 
insight—that items on the menu are often perceived as always-already violable bodies
—is borne out by the behaviour of the human scientists who prepare the juvenile bezeri 
for dissection, who comment on the specimens resemblance to “calamari” (2004a, 201) 
and joke about “serving it with a nice beurre manié sauce” (2004a, 202). The bezeri look 
like squid and squid are killed and dismembered for food, so the bezeri must also be 
bodies that do not matter—bodies that may be violently instrumentalized without 
compunction in service of human interests. Later, as Shan returns the baby bezeri to 
creature’s family, she reflects that “there was something undignified and desperately 
sad about scraping the little corpse together like spilled food” (2004a, 206). Traviss’ 
simultaneous conflation and juxtaposition of “little corpse” with “spilled food” 
emphasizes what ecofeminist (and later, critical animal) thinkers have long stressed: 
that for animals unfortunate to be ontologized as food within a carnocapitalist culture of 
human supremacy, ethical relevance is foreclosed a priori; they are always-already 
killable, are always-already meat.
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As Plumwood has forcefully argued, replacing untrammelled carnism with compulsory 
universal veganism is an untenable solution to task of ethically negotiating 
heterospecies coexistence: “rather, it is a matter of trying to understand what kinds of 
care, regard and responsiveness might be possible for us in relationship to the natural 
world” (2002, 165). What we need instead is need to “acknowledge the ethical and 
epistemological centrality of difference rather than subsuming difference within a 
totalizing vision or salvational project” (Cheney 1994, 164). Plumwood stresses that we 
must “recognize ourselves in mutual, ecological terms, as part of the food chain, eaten 
as well as eater," arguing that although “we cannot give up using one another… we can 
give up use/respect dualism, which means working towards ethical, respectful and 
highly constrained forms of use” (2002, 159). Part of this project of ethical multispecies 
coexistence entails a critical skepticism regarding the very notion of the subject, even as 
any contemporary anti-anthropocentric ethic must recognize that subject-centred moral 
discourse operates as a crucial intervention against the status quo of carnocapitalist 
culture. In the next chapter, I aim to further complicate the interdependent assumptions 
that being a subject is a precondition for moral relevance and that ‘subjectivity’ is a 
stable ontological construct in the first place. I will do so through an examination of 
disembodied meat as a semi-living form of corporeal agency that shatters received 
notions of subject-object dualism.
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4. Disembodied Meat: Storying Semi-living Subjectivities
Twentieth century commodity capitalism has worked hard to sever the conceptual 
connection between meat and animal, absenting the referent of the butchered 
nonhuman from the sanitary bundles of shrink-wrapped flesh on the supermarket shelf 
(Adams 1990; Vialles 1990). Twenty-first century developments in “cellular agriculture” 
promise to literalize this disconnection by adapting established biomedical tissue culture 
techniques to food production in an effort to completely decouple meat from any living 
animal (Stephens 2013; Datar, Kim & d’Origny 2016, 129). By cultivating animal flesh in 
vitro, outside of the organism in technologically mediated environments, cellular 
agriculture aims to eliminate the waste (and avoid the contested ethics) of ‘growing’ 
meat ‘on the hoof’ by growing it in the laboratory bioreactor instead. The promissory 
narrative of contemporary in vitro meat (IVM) thus offers carnist consumers a technofix 
solution to the ethical and ecological problems of the animal industrial complex: with 
IVM, discerning consumers can have their steak and eat it too, without the messy 
business of animal incarceration and slaughter or environmental degradation, or the 
supposedly unappealing deprivation of a vegan diet.
It is not my intention in this chapter to assess the veracity of the ethical:claims of in vitro 
meat, nor to argue for or against the pursuit of this technology as part of critical 
ecofeminist or vegan praxis committed to ethical multispecies co-existence—others 
have covered this ground (Twine 2010, 2013; Miller 2012; Cole & Morgan 2013; Twine 
& Stephens 2013; Stephens 2013; Sinclair 2016).Rather, I want to flesh out the 
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technology’s implications through an engagement with science fiction, a literary mode 
constituting not so much a “prehistory of victimless meat” (Guy 2013: no pagination) as 
an imaginative discourse emerging in intra-action with the nascent technology.  43
Diffractively reading in vitro meat discourses through SF reveals how the entire concept 
of ‘real artificial meat’ troubles the notion of subjectivity—both the subjectivity of the 
human consumer within a carnophallogocentric matrix and the very idea of subjectivity 
through the ‘semi-living’ agential corporeality of in vitro meat itself (McHugh 2010, 181; 
Miller, 2012; Catts &Zurr, 2006; 2013; Dixon 2009). Through this strategy of remaining 
attentive to meat’s role in human subjectification and rejecting subject-object dualism as 
ontologically untenable, I express a material ecofeminist openness to ethical intra-
actions with liminal forms of life has beyond the animal, the organism and even the 
animate.
Technologies of living substance
Over the first decade of the twentieth century, new and existing tissue culture 
techniques were consolidated within an emergent body of shared scientific literature. 
Cells, it seemed, had attained an unexpected autonomy from the holistic body 
(Landecker 2007, 67). The technology came to widespread public prominence in 1912, 
While a complete bibliography of IVM in SF is beyond the scope of this chapter, the following are a few 43
notable early examples: “synthetic meat” in  Exiles of the Moon (1931) by Nat Schrachner and Leo 
Zatt; synthetic food and “meats grown in large test tubes” in Unto Us a Child is Born (1933) by David 
Keller; “Syntho-steaks”in Farmer in the Sky (1950) by Robert Heinlein; “psuedoflesh” in Whipping Star 
(1969) by Frank Herbert; and “animal tissue-culture vats” in Uller Uprising (1953[1983]) and “carniculture 
plants” in Four-Day Planet (1961) by H. Beam Piper. Synthetic human meat also features prominently in 
the genre: “The Food of the Gods” (1964) by Arthur C. Clark, Stars in my Pocket like Grains of Sand 
(1984) by Samuel Delany and The State of the Art (1991) by Iain M. Banks all feature tissue-cultured 
human meat. The State of the Art (a time travel tale) even features a cannibalistic feast of meat grown 
from the power figures of 1977:
Stewed Idi Amin or General Pinochet Con Carne ... General Stroessner Meat Balls and Richard 
Nixon Burgers ...Ferdinand Marcos Saute and Shah of Iran Kebabs ... Fricasseed Kim Il Sung, 
Boiled General Videla and Ian Smith in Black Beans Sauce… (38).
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when Franco-American surgeon Alexis Carrel demonstrated not only that cells could 
survive outside of the body, but that they could continue doing so in perpetuity—a 
“permanent life” of cellular immortality (Landecker 2007, 16). The Nobel laureate 
successfully sustained a pulsing sliver of avian myocardial cells in a bowl fed with 
nutrients, reportedly managing to keep this scrap of chicken heart tissue beating for 
thirty-two years (McHugh, 2010). Scientists now consider Carrel’s claim dubious and 
suspect that he had (inadvertently or not) been putting new cells in the culture dishes 
each time he fed them using an “embryo juice” made from pureed poultry tissue 
(Landecker 2007, 16; Skloot 2010, 61). Nevertheless, the image of an immortal chicken 
heart beating away for three decades in a petrie dish captured the publics imagination 
(Landecker 2007, 92-7), undoubtably helped in no small part by longstanding cultural 
discourses that understood the heart as the seat of life (ibid.) Temporally reconfiguring 
animacy through the production of functionally immortal cell lines and spatially 
reconfiguring living material by disembodying biological tissue (ibid. 232), Carrel’s 
experiments inspired no less than Winston Churchill to predict a future wherein these 
“technologies of living substance” (Landecker, 2007, 1) would be applied to food 
production. In a 1932 essay titled “Fifty Years Hence," the future Prime Minister of the 
UK asserted that the agriculture of tomorrow would “escape the absurdity of growing a 
whole chicken in order to eat the breast or wing, by growing these parts separately 
under a suitable medium” (in McHugh 2010, 191). 
Some eighty-six years on, the worldwide biomass of disembodied animal (including 
human) tissue is estimated to be in the millions of tonnes (Catts & Zurr 2006, 1)—
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however, we are only marginally closer to commercially available in vitro meat (IVM) 
(Stephens, 2013), with only very small quantities of tissue actually being produced for 
human consumption.  In August 2013, IVM technology specifically geared towards 44
large-scale commercial production achieved a heightened public profile, when an IVM 
burger was served at a London press conference (Schaefer & Savulsecu 2014; Varaska 
2013). Named for its chief engineer Mark Post, but also serving as a delicious pun 
gesturing towards the sort of post-animal meat production system that Churchill long 
ago envisioned, the “Postburger” (van Mensvoort & Grievink 2014) is a costly and 
labour intensive piece of culinary science. To produce the burger patty, primitive muscle 
strands known as myotubes were grown from a biopsy of bovine myosattellite cells,  45
“exercised” through cycles of warmth and cold in a bioreactor to form hooplike fascicles 
and then sliced open and flattened to form single straight strands. Some 20,000 strands 
of fascicles were then combined to form a single beef patty (mosameat.eu; van 
Mensvoort & Grievink 2014, 10-11). As of yet, the Postburger has not exactly 
revolutionized the contemporary meatscape, partly because of its prohibitive cost—
 In 2003, for example, bioartists Catts and Zurr of the ‘Tissue Culture and Art Project’—a group 44
considered to be world leaders in their field—staged their ‘Disembodied Cuisine’ exhibit in a French art 
gallery (Dixon, 2009, 412). The show juxtaposed a bioreactor growing disembodied amphibian tissue with 
an aquarium housing healthy living frogs. On the final day of the show, the “frog steaks” were served in a 
theatrical “nouvelle cuisine” dinner and the frogs themselves were released to a pond in the local 
botanical gardens (McHugh, 2010; Carruth 2013). The same artists also theatrically prepared and served 
in vitro meat as part of the ‘ArtMeatFlesh’ event in 2012. Framed as avant grade art exhibits and intended 
to provoke questions around the intersection of ethics, ontology and diet, Catts and Zurr’s  work was 
never intended as a direct precursor to the commercial production and consumption of disembodied meat 
(perhaps fortunately, as two of the two of the six diners at the ‘Disembodied Cuisine’ exhibit spat their 
steaks out). 
 Myosattelite cells are multipotent cells found in mature muscle tissue, responsible for muscle 45
regeneration. 
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reputedly €250,000 for five ounces ounces of edible tissue (ibid 23; Varaska 2013).  46
Mark Post’s Netherlands-based startup ‘Mosa Meat’ aims to scale-up IVM production in 
an effort to reduce costs and bring disembodied meat to market.  Other in-vitro meat 47
startups are likewise making progress in adapting tissue culture techniques to meat 
production—Israeli startup SuperMeats is currently in the process of developing 
cultured chicken (Tobin 2016) and in 2017 secured a $300 million deal to import in vitro 
meat to China (Jones 2017);  fellow Israeli IVM companies Future Meat Technologies 48
and Meat the Future recently gained a significant investor in the form of US 
agribusiness giant Tyson foods (Jones, 2017).  In 2017, San Fransisco-based 49
‘Memphis Meats’ (a company backed by US billionaires Bill Gates and Richard 
Branson) publicly unveiled their lab grown chicken strips and duck l’orange, apparently 
to gastronomic approval of their taste testers (Lant, 2017).  The technology to produce 50
in vitro meat certainly exists—however, given funding restrictions, economies of scale 
and the entrenchment of the animal industrial complex in national and transnational 
foodways, the question of whether or not IVM will be hitting supermarket shelves in any 
great quantity anytime soon remains open. 
  Apparently Post and his team have been bankrolled by Sergey Brin, a Google co-founder with a vegan 46
vision and very deep pockets (Post 2014, 48 in van Mensvoort and Grievink 2014)
 “Homepage," mosameat.com, Last modified: September 24, 2018. Accessed September 28 47
2018. https://www.mosameat.com
 “Homepage," supermeat.com, Last modified: February 27, 2018. Accessed September 28, 2018. http://48
www/supermeat.com
 “Tyson foods backs Israeli startup to grow meat in the lab," reuters.com, Last modified: May 2, 2018. 49
Accessed September 28, 2018.  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tyson-foods-israel/tyson-foods-
backs-israeli-startup-to-grow-meat-in-the-lab-idUSKBN1I31DP
 “World’s first chicken produced without the animal," memphismeats.com, Last modified: March 15, 50
2017. Accessed September 28, 2018. http://www.memphismeats.com/blog/2017/3/15/breaking-worlds-
first-chicken-produced-without-the-animal
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Liberation from corporeal form?
IVM is usually articulated within a utopian narrative of liberation from the limitations of 
both corporeal form (Agapakis 2014, 117) and ethical accountability (van Mensvoort & 
Grievink 2014): disembodied meat (so the story goes) “will prove a panacea for the eco-
catastrophes wrought by modern meat industries” (McHugh 2010, 183). From 2008 to 
2014, for instance, animal advocacy group PETA offered a one million dollar prize to 
whomever first brings in vitro chicken meat to market.  The organization explained their 51
support of this “interesting technological phenomenon” as stemming from ethical 
principles of nonviolence: in vitro meat was something that PETA saw itself as “morally 
required to support” (in McHugh, 2010, 187). Although the prize expired, unawarded, in 
2014, PETA announced that “the operation was a success," having spurred interest, 
investment and ultimately “breakthroughs” in tissue scaffolding and muscle 
development.  PETA's ideological (if not, ultimately, financial) support of cultured meat 52
is unsurprising; the organization hews closely to the philosophy of Peter Singer 
(1975[1990]) and a meat-producing organism with no capacity for suffering is indeed 
“the utilitarian’s dream creature” (McHugh 2010, 191). As a character in Oryx and Crake 
caustically observes, “the animal welfare freaks won’t be able to say a word, because 
this thing feels no pain” (Atwood, 2003, 203): such an entity would not register on a 
Silngerian utilitarian scale of ethical relevancy. Aside from reducing animal suffering, 
IVM is also presented as ethical from the more anthropocentric perspectives of 
promoting environmental sustainability and alleviating global (human) hunger. The 
 “PeTA’s In Vitro Chicken Contest." peta.com. Last modified: April 4, 2014. Accessed: Sept 28, 2018. 51
https://www.peta.org/features/vitro-meat-contest/
 ibid.52
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organization ‘New Harvest,'  for instance, was established in 2004 as a “non-profit 
research institute building and establishing the field of cellular agriculture,”  a mission it 53
seeks to accomplish by “consolidating all relevant research, launching and incubating 
companies in the field, being the point of connection between various players, directing 
funds in the form of grants” and educating the public (Datar, Kim & d’Origny 2016, 129). 
On the organization’s website, their stated goal is to “reinvent the way we make animal 
products” in an effort to “continue to provide affordable and sustainable food to a 
growing population."   54
In these ways, in vitro meat functions as a promissory narrative—a vision for the future 
application of new technologies that continually frames these technologies in the 
present (Stephens 2013, 162). IVM promises to save the environment, feed the world 
and spare farmed animals their lives—all while encouraging consumers to continue 
enjoying the meat-centric diet of the industrial West. Critics of the IVM discourse are 
quick point out the naivety of some of these promissory claims. Although IVM 
proponents emphasize the potential to one day utilize non-animal sourced polymer 
scaffolding and mushroom or algae-based cell-growth medium, the technology as it now 
stands is heavily reliant on slaughterhouse products; Catts and Zurr estimate that the 
serum from a whole foetal calf was needed to grow their two tiny frog steaks (McHugh 
2010, 189; Simonsen 2015). The entire concept of “real artificial meat” also entrenches 
the conceptual centrality of animal protein in dietary-nutritional discourses (Sinclair 
 “About." new-harvest.org. Last modified May 2 2018. Accessed September 28 2018. http://www.new-53
harvest.org/about
 ibid.54
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2016)—why not just “feed the world” with plants instead of technologically sophisticated 
iterations of nonhuman animal flesh, vegan critics of IVM ask (Cole & Morgan, 2013)? 
The culinary imperialism of seeking to spread the meat-centric diet of the industrial West 
to the rest of the world, all under the rubric of ‘aid’ and ‘feeding the masses’ should be 
obvious (Twine & Stephens, 2013). Although the technology may one day satisfy the 
utilitarian mandate to minimize creaturely suffering, when understood in biopolitical 
terms IVM is “utterly continuous with the technologies and dispotifs that are exercising a 
more and amore finely tuned control over life and ‘making live’ at the most capillary 
levels of social existence” (Wolfe 2012, 97; see also Miller 2012, 47), IVM thus needs to 
be understood as part of capitalism’s project of “trumping of ecological and material 
limits” (Twine 2010, 14). The objection that it will divest control of foodways into the 
hands of corporate interests and out of the hands of communities themselves is 
particularly prominent as the technology becomes more viable and existing agribusiness 
corporations (like the aforementioned Tyson) take notice: “while in vitro meat grows 
outside of an animal, it doesn’t grow outside of industrial models of food 
productions” (Agapakis 2014, 118).
Miller (2012) argues that “widespread reliance on cultured meat, should it transpire, 
risks amplifying the power of large corporations through their control of patented and 
trademarked commodities” (55), rightly emphasizing the necessity of thinking 
carniculture in terms of biopower so as to interrogate this speculative technology’s 
imbrication within a globalized and corporatized food system. SF representations of 
disembodied meat often take this route. The substance usually signifies a kind of 
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nightmare, a dystopian world where governmental or corporate interests totally control a 
society’s foodways (and much else besides). In Pohl and Kornbluth’s The Space 
Merchants (1956), for example, chunks of flesh are routinely sliced off of a giant, 
disembodied poultry creature and fed to the subjugated, false-consciousness dwelling 
proletariat—here, in vitro meat represents (among other things) “corporate greed run 
amok” (McHugh 2010, 192). In vitro chicken flesh in Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) 
serves a similar narrative function (ibid). SF is full of in vitro meat as a signifier of 
hypercontrol, blandness and over-civilization. Dissenting voices are rare: one prominent 
contemporary example is The In Vitro Cookbook (van Mensvoort & Grievink 2014). 
IVM and culinary culture: The IVM Cookbook
The In Vitro Meat Cookbook is not SF in the traditional narrative sense—rather, it is a 
“bizarre cookbook from which you cannot cook” (van Mensvoort & Grievink 2014, front 
cover) designed by members of the Dutch art collective ‘Next Nature Network’ in an 
effort “to explore the creative potential of in vitro meat as an answer to what they 
perceived as a lack of attention to food culture among meat-culturing 
scientists” (Jönsson 2017, 850).  The book features forty-five IVM recipes, each 55
accompanied by a one-to-four star feasibility rating, covering the three main issues for 
which IVM is often touted as an ethical solution (promoting environmental sustainability, 
avoiding harm to animals, preventing human food shortages) and adding the 
 The idea of “speculative cookbook” is not new—in 1976 To Serve Man: A Cookbook for People was 55
published by Hugo and World Fantasy Award-winning SF fan, author and editor George H. Scithers 
(under the pseudonym Karl Würf) with an introduction from the important and enigmatic SF writer 
Margaret St. Clair. Firmly tongue in cheek, the text is notable for its barely subtextual homoeroticism and 
features “beefcake” illustrations of muscular men in the style of Tom of Finland by prominent gay 
illustrator Jack Bozzi (AKA “ADAM”). 
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“exploration of new food cultures” as an oft-neglected fourth (2014, 7). A slickly 
presented hardcover book, clad in a textured finish reminiscent of raw meat and lavishly 
illustrated inside, The In Vitro Meat Cookbook is a visceral exploration of heretofore 
impossible culinary potentials of IVM and a rare example of the reimagining of 
‘carniculture’ as local, small scale, DIY and even artisanal. The cookbook concludes 
with an essay by New Harvest CEO Isha Datar and collaborator Robert Bolton 
imagining “an industry comprised of many diverse products and players and production 
on many different scales” (Datar & Bolton 2014, 156)—including cheap in vitro meat of 
the ChickieNobs variety, but also mid-range lab-grown meat made locally in urban 
areas, high-priced meats ‘micro-cultured’ in trendy neighbourhoods at boutique 
gastropubs and even countertop bioreactors for home-brewers (157). Coining the term 
‘carnery’ as cognate to bakery, winery and brewery, Datar and Bolton suggest that 
“carniculture might be dressed with similar connotations and aesthetics to the craft brew 
and farm to table movements” (155). Contra the dystopian tendency to mobilize in vitro 
meat as a trope of centralized governmental and corporate control over community 
foodways,  Datar and Bolton envisage “communities of home carniculturists, who began 
as foodies and DIYbio enthusiasts, swap[ping] techniques and recipes at cultured meat 
cook-offs, fairs and night markets” (157). Meat production “moves from the hands of the 
few to the hands of the many. And people grow more authentically connected to the 
origins and creation stories of what they eat” (158). Demonstrating a sophisticated 
understanding of the optics of new food movements, The In Vitro Meat Cookbook (Datar 
and Bolton’s essay in particular) simultaneously mimics and punctures the pretensions 
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of contemporary bourgeois gastronomic discourse, subverting the dominant culinary 
narrative of in vitro meat as phoney, unpalatable and corporate. 
From a more overtly critical animal studies perspective, the possibility that IVM will 
stimulate commercial demand for slaughtered meat rather than outright replace it is a 
major concern. Although conceivable that in vitro meat would render slaughtered meat 
ethically obsolete,  it seems much more likely that in vitro meat will simply supplement 56
business-as-usual animal abuse and incarceration: as Tyson Foods’ assures 
stakeholders regarding the meat giant’s recent investment in IVM, “we continue to 
invest significantly in our traditional meat business but also believe in exploring 
additional opportunities for growth that give consumers more choices.”  Above all, 57
such extra consumer choices must generate profit; if cheap and plentiful meat can be 
produced in vitro, the possibility that “real” meat from “real” animals will be fetishized, 
coveted and costly is a very real one (Miller 2012, 46; Parry 2009). If IVM could be 
deployed to further hierarchize consumption practices while maintaining a market for 
meat of the old-fashioned slaughtered variety, such a scenario is a clear win-win for 
existing stakeholders in animal (ab)use industries. At the first international conference 
on the production of cultured meat, for example, the ‘In Vitro Meat Consortium’ (a now-
defunct organization of researchers seeking “to promote scientific excellence and to 
 “Synthetic meat” has rendered animal slaughter obsolete in Exiles of the Moon (Schachner & Zatt 56
1931[2016]), as has “psuedoflesh” in Whipping Star (Herbert 1970). The narrator of Samuel Delany’s 
Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand (1984) is horrified to discover he is eating slaughtered and not 
tissue-cultured meat; slaughtered meat is similarly taboo in Lois McMaster Bujold’s Vorkosigan Saga 
(from 1986) and Iain M. Bank’s Culture novels (from 1987).
 “Tyson foods backs Israeli startup to grow meat in the lab," reuters.com, Last modified: May 2, 2018. 57
Accessed September 28, 2018.  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tyson-foods-israel/tyson-foods-
backs-israeli-startup-to-grow-meat-in-the-lab-idUSKBN1I31DP
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coordinate alternatives to conventional meat production” [Datar, Kim & d’Origny 2016, 
123]) offered the following rumination on the commercial viability of the product:
If this production strategy were to replace a substantial part of the current meat 
production regime, this may allow development of a downsized animal 
production industry which can acquire a competitive edge in the upper-level 
meat market (2008; in Miller 2012, 52).
Lab-grown meat, the ‘In Vitro Meat Consortium’ reassures ‘conventional’ meat 
producers and investors, can supplement and stimulate existing animal use industries, 
creating profitable new markets of elite consumers willing to pay for the real thing.  We 
can readily see this in SF iterations of IVM. Consider the following from William Gibson’s  
much-feted Neuromancer (1984):
“Jesus,” Molly said, her own plate empty, “gimme that. You know what this 
costs?” She took his plate. ‘They gotta raise a whole animal for years and then 
they kill it. This isn’t vat stuff.” She forked a mouthful up and chewed (Gibson 
1984, 137-8).
Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) makes this same point about in vitro meat’s 
potential adoption within gastronomic regimes that reify “a perceived opposition of 
authenticity and technicity” (Miller 2012, 46). On a dinner outing with the successful and 
moneyed Crake, working-class Jimmy watches in awe as his old friend orders a plate of 
“real Japanese beef, as rare as diamonds. It must have cost him a fortune” (Atwood 
2003, 289). Since “real” meat is costly, in vitro meat must conversely be cheap, 
unsuitable for sophisticated palates. The novel describes a form of cell-grown “meat 
tuber” marketed as ChickieNobs, a product that undercuts traditional factory farming 
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expenses and eventually edges “real” chicken out of the fast-food take-out market. The 
product, however, never escapes the taint of its unnatural, vegetative origins. When 
Jimmy makes the mistake of bringing home a bucket of fried ChickieNobs to his 
pretentious roommates, they stop speaking to him for a week (Atwood 2003, 242). And, 
although Jimmy himself (like many other people of limited income) has become used to 
eating “ChickieNobs” (Atwood 2003, 285-6), he is quick to denounce them when he gets 
the opportunity to eat the real thing while dining at a posh restaurant with Crake 
(Atwood 2003, 292). Far from replacing dead-animal meat, then, in this scenario IVM 
seems more likely to supplement it; as Miller writes, “we could face a scenario of ‘real’ 
food for the rich; simulated food for the poor” (2012, 53). While such a scenario might 
reduce farmed animal suffering from a utilitarian standpoint, it does nothing to 
problematize carnism more generally, serving instead to reinscribe of a classist 
hierarchy of meat consumption. In the speculative futures of Oryx and Crake and 
Neuromancer, the old taboos regulating who gets to eat which kinds of meat are more 
powerful than ever and, just as housewives and children in the industrial revolution 
deferred their portions to the man of the house (Adams 1990, 29; Twigg 1983, 24-5; 
Rifkin 1992, 242-3), meat in these speculative visions is for the rich, the powerful, the 
socially elite.
Suffering as spice?
When real-world carniculturists propose that that IVM might supplement ‘traditional’ 
animal agriculture by creating a market for high-priced slaughtered meat, they typically 
suggest that this value-added commodity would accrue its cultural cachet “by 
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documenting that it is ecologically sound and meets basic animal welfare 
requirements” (‘The In Vitro Meat Symposium’ 2008, in Miller 2012, 52). Essentially this 
is an speculative elaboration on the “happy meat” movement we see today, where 
consumers with the requisite cultural and economic capital can demonstrate their 
elevated tastes by rejecting factory farmed meat and purchasing meat discursively 
constructed as “happy” (Parry 2009; 2010; Cole 2011; Pilgrim 2013; Stanescu 2014). 
The carnicultural iteration of this narrative simply replaces ‘factory farmed meat’ with ‘in 
vitro meat’—the idea is that factory farmed meat is intolerably cruel and should be 
replaced with an IVM alternative, but that a much smaller and kinder meat industry 
would (could? should?) persist, driven by the the tastes of discerning and moneyed 
consumers who don’t mind paying extra for “the added ‘value’ of ethical self-satisfaction” 
(Cole 2011, 84). Putting aside skepticism about just how ‘happy’ real-life ‘happy meat’ is 
(Stanescu, 2016), I believe we have good reason to doubt this narrative of IVM 
stimulating welfare-improved in vivo meat production. Atwood seems to doubt this, too. 
Dining at an expensive restaurant on his friend’s dime, Jimmy reflects that he “was so 
used to eating ChickieNobs by now, to their bland tofu-like consistency and inoffensive 
flavour, that the capon tasted quite wild” (Atwood 2003, 292).  Capon, the term for a 58
rooster castrated at a young age, absolutely does not “meet basic animal welfare 
requirements," at least according to current British legislation, which has banned its 
production in the UK on animal welfare grounds.  For Jimmy, however, the cruelty 59
 As Adams argues, “tofu often functions as the synecdoche, or shorthand phrase, for all of 58
veganism” (Adams 2016b, 251)
“An HSUS Report: Welfare issues with caponizing chickens.” humanesociety.org. Last Modified July 18, 59
2006. Accessed September 28, 2018. http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/farm/HSUS-Report-on-
Caponization.pdf
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inherent in the production of capon seems of little concern. Perhaps it is even the point: 
while the “inoffensive” ChickieNobs are produced without maiming or slaughtering any 
living animal, the capon is the real thing—dead flesh from a creature who suffered.
Fiddes (1991) argues that it is precisely this intentional infliction of suffering, this overt 
and deliberate performance of dominance over the nonhuman Other, that has made 
meat so desirable throughout the history of Western pastoralism (44, 65). “The fact that 
most of us make little mention of the domination inherent in rearing an animal for 
slaughter does not indicate that it is irrelevant," he writes (44). “Veal, for example, 
enjoyed high prestige for many years partly . . . because of the extreme subjugation of 
the creatures intrinsic to its production” (ibid.). SF depictions of animal products wherein 
the cruelty of the means of production is part of the appeal emerge in comedic and 
tragic registers. A good example of the former approach can be found in SF television 
show Futurama (Keeler & Cohen, 2009), which features the following exchange at a far-
future fancy eatery:
Chef: We’ve got a wonderful grizzly bear that’s been dipped in cornmeal and 
lightly tormented.
Diner: What was the bear’s name?
Chef: JoJo.
Diner: Oooh, I’ll have him! (2009: no pagination)
Perhaps unsurprisingly given her fixation with death and pain (Philip, 2007), James 
Tiptree Jr is one of the few to broach this topic with any gravitas. Two short stories (‘We 
Who Stole the Dream,’ 1978; ‘And I Awoke and Found Me Here on the Cold Hill’s Side,’ 
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1972) and one novel (Brightness Falls From the Air, 1985) describe a delicious and 
highly sought after elixir, similar in cultural cachet to the finest of wines, manufactured 
from the secretions of an alien creature in intense psychological pain; the most sought-
after vintages are procured by torturing these creatures to death in front of their loved 
ones. This phenomenon—food wherein part of the appeal is the cruelty of the means of 
production—is by no means confined to the realm of fantasy. Veal is a modern example; 
the songbird ortolan is another, traditionally prepared by drowning the creature in 
cognac and said to be eaten with a napkin draped over one’s head, to hide one’s shame 
from God. Eighteenth century urban England was a veritable hotbed of sadistic cuisine:
they chopped up live fish, which they claimed made the flesh firmer; they 
tortured bulls before killing them, because they said the meat would otherwise 
be unhealthy; they tenderized pigs and calves by whipping them to death with 
knotted ropes; they hung poultry upside down and slowly bled them to death; 
they skinned living animals. Recipe openers from the era said such things as, 
“Take a red cock that is not too old and beat him to death…” (Ackerman 1991, 
147).
Consider the following example from an iconic nineteenth-century cookbook ‘The 
Cook’s Oracle,' in which a still-living goose or duck is partially plucked and then roasted 
alive (ibid). The recipe concludes, “she will cry as you cut off any part from her and will 
be almost eaten up before she is dead: it is mighty pleasant to behold!” (ibid.). 
Of course, Western social mores regulating cruelty to animals have shifted dramatically 
in the last couple of hundred years (Franklin 1999, 11-22) and such a blatant display of 
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raw dominance over nonhuman animals had for the most part fallen out of favour by the 
twentieth-century. However, as I have argued elsewhere (2009; 2010; 2011), there 
remains something significant about animal death—even when the animal referent is 
absented from dominant Western discourses concerning meat (Adams 1990), the 
(abstract) knowledge that an animal had to die for the flesh on one’s plate is in some 
way part of the appeal. The characters of Oryx and Crake illustrate this point: in the 
novel, substitutes for dead-animal meat are tolerated out of necessity but are always 
rejected when the opportunity to eat the real thing arises. It is as if meat procured 
without killing is not real, not authentic, not really meat. Similarly, the popular carno-
gastronomy of the twenty-first century presents the killing of animals for meat as a rite of 
passage through which to prove oneself adult, rational, masculine (or at least not 
governed by unruly femininity)—in short, a fully human subject (Parry 2009; 2010; 2011; 
Bailey 2009, 139; Pilgrim 2013). ‘Real’ meat is a product of killing; subjectivity emerges 
through this metonymic ingestion of animal carnage. 
Carnophallogocentric subjectivity
The concept of carnophallogocentrism can help make sense of this continuing centrality 
of dead meat (even over the “real artificial” in vitro variety). A portmanteau coined by 
Derrida and sketched in his interview ‘Eating Well, or the Calculation of the 
Subject’ (1991a), carnophallogocentrism combines two previously established 
posthumanist critiques of subjectivity — “logocentrism” and “phallocentrism” — and 
adds the prefix “carno-” to form a concept largely unexamined in continental philosophy 
prior to Derrida’s ‘animal turn,' but long familiar to (eco)feminist scholars, who had been 
 143
writing about the intersectionality of sexism, ratiocentrism and anthropocentrism for 
decades (Salmon 1973; 1982; Adams 1975; 1976; 1990; Merchant 1980; Benney 1983; 
Salleh 1984; Kheel 1984; 1985; Lansbury 1985; Collard & Contrucci 1988; Davis 1988; 
Noske 1989; Haraway 1989).  “Logocentrism," as Calarco (2016) glosses it, denotes 60
the privileged position Western philosophy awards the self-aware, speaking, rational 
subject; phallocentrism the consummately virile and masculine features of Western 
social institutions and notions of subjectivity (32). As Calarco explains, Derrida suggests
that ‘carno' should be added to phallogocentrism in order to emphasize that the 
notion of the subject that is being critiqued in post-humanist thought should be 
understood not simply as a fully self-present, speaking, masculine subject but 
also as a quintessentially human, animal-flesh-eating subject. (33)
The concept of carnophallogocentrism thus identifies three coordinates in the 
constitution of subjectivity: self-presence (understood as the possession of reason and 
speech), masculinity (as a construct that dominates the socio-cultural order) and 
carnivorism (which Derrida understands as a powerful enactment of the “commitment to 
anthropocentrism [and] the hierarchical ranking of human subjects over nonhuman 
animals”) (Calarco 2016, 33). 
Teasing out the affinities between Derrida’s carnophallogocentrism and her own earlier 
scholarly work on the sexual politics of meat (Adams 1975, 1976, 1990), Adams 
understands the concept as Derrida’s articulation of the “primary social, linguistic and 
 As Haraway bluntly puts it, “Derrida did some wonderful stuff, but he doesn’t start animal 60
studies” (2009-2010, 157).   For a discussion of what in Plumwood’s terms could be termed the 
backgrounding and denial-of-dependency of feminist animal studies in dominant critical strains of 
posthumanism, see Fraiman (2012)
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material practices that go into becoming a subject in the West and how explicit 
carnivorism lies at the heart of classical notions of subjectivity, especially male 
subjectivity” (2016, 34). The violence underlying meat eating constitutes the “sacrifice” 
so important to Derrida’s account of the metaphysics of the subject (ibid). This sacrificial 
logic cleaves the human from the animal and forbids the murder of the former while 
sanctioning or even demanding the perpetual “non criminal putting to death” of the latter 
(Derrida 1995, 278). As Gross (2015) clarifies, for Derrida
“Sacrifice” here comes to name a procedure, milieu and ultimately a mode of 
being in the world—a mode of being a subject—that both necessitates a 
“nonviolence” synonymous with the inviolability of the human and, in the name 
of this restraint, justifies violence of potentially unlimited scale (139)
Derrida calls this double operation of human exceptionalism and animal immolation “the 
sacrificial structure of subjectivity” (1992, 42-43,18-19; 2002, 389), but “the scapegoat 
structure” might be more accurate, capturing the way in which the supposedly supreme 
value of human life is dependent upon the sacrifice of the animal other (Lawker 2007, 
86). While this sacrificial economy of Western metaphysics rests heavily on Abrahamic 
and particularly Christian religious ideas (Keenan 2005), as Haraway points out 
narratives of sacrifice and salvation “pervade U.S. scientific discourse” and indeed 
much of secular society (Haraway 1997, 47; Birke, Arluke & Michael 2007), a “totalizing 
mythology” comprising “the conceptual prison circumscribing all political 
language” (Csicsery-Ronay Jr 1991, 387). It is through the sacrifice of the animal that 
the salvation of the human becomes possible—and this sacrificial structure is crucial to 
the constitution of the carnophallogocentric subject. For Derrida, eating animal flesh is a 
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keystone of the sacrificial logic of humanism: “the establishment of man’s privileged 
position requires the sacrifice and devouring of animals," he argues. “Humanism rests 
on the sacrifice of the animal, on the implicit swallowing up of the animal” (1990[2009], 
2). What chance would a vegetarian stand of being elected head of state, Derrida 
wonders? (1991a, 114).  For Derrida, meat-eating functions (in part) as a performative 61
enactment of proper human subjectivity, as “a sign of the subject’s autonomy, security 
and indemnification” (Wolfe 2012, 20). “One may prove one’s subjectivity by reducing 
these ‘others’ to mere objects that may be disposed of at will," as Bailey puts it (2009, 
139): through the perpetual sacrifice of the animal other, the human subject emerges as 
an ontologically coherent entity.
Crucially, as Calarco argues, one need not understand carnophallogocentrism as 
definitively capturing “the dominant schema of metaphysical subjectivity," or even “that 
there really is something called ‘Western metaphysics’ whose dominant schema can be 
uncovered” in the first place (2016, 39). Instead, carnophallogocentrism must be 
understood as a useful but necessarily incomplete heuristic—a strategic principle that 
captures “important tendencies in our culture surrounding the constitution of ‘properly’ 
human subjects” (40) and suggests “possible linkages among various critical 
perspectives and movements for social transformation” without seeking closure over 
 Derrida is certainly correct that a vegetarian would stand little change of being elected President of 61
France; as Cherry (2016) points out it is “extremely difficult to find vegetarian food in France,” a nation 
with a fiercely proud culinary heritage and one in which the animal advocacy movement remains 
comparatively weak in relation to other new social movements, and in relation to the animal advocacy 
movement in other countries (5) Across the Atlantic, Bill Clinton only adopted a (mostly) vegan diet after 
his term as US President; during the 1992 presidential campaign, he proved himself to be the citizen’s 
candidate by his well-publicized penchant for stopping in for hamburgers at local diners (Adams, 2018, 1). 
Similarly, in 2008 “the press made fun of Barack Obama for drinking green tea, while Sarah Palin’s grit 
was evidenced by her ability to hunt and gut a moose” (Oliver 2009: 104).
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other critical analyses of subjectivity (40, 51). The latter point is one Derrida himself 
would probably contest. “We can no more step out of carnophallogocentrism to some 
peaceable kingdom," he insisted, “than we can step out of metaphysics” (1991a, 115). 
Sinclair parses this insistence on the impossibility of “sacrificing sacrifice” as an 
acknowledgment that “the structure through which we consume others, excluding 
certain bodies from ethical recognition, rendering them killable without cost” is inherently 
sacrificial (2016, 243). While undoubtedly true that the moral dismissal of eaten bodies 
constitutes a form of sacrifice, eating need not entail the expulsion of certain bodies 
from ethical recognition—must not, lest we fall into the the trap of use-respect dualism 
that equates edibility with abjection (Plumwood 2002). Critical ecofeminists (and other 
critical animal scholars) must therefore reject Derrida’s dim view of the prospects of 
challenging the carnophallogocentric constitution of Western metaphysics. As Wood 
(1999) argues,
Carnophallogocentrism is not a dispensation of Being toward which resistance 
is futile; it is a mutually reinforcing network of powers, schemata of domination 
and investments that has to reproduce itself to stay in existence. (33)
Both as an ideal subject position and in its materialization in individual subjects, 
carnophallogocentrism must accordingly be understood as a performative enactment 
(Butler 1993, 3), not a fixed quality. For example, Adams (2016b) observes that meat 
advertisements which trade on the performance of normative masculinity frequently 
construe tofu is as downright threatening: so-called “manly acts” are apparently “so 
unstable that they can be undone by cooking tofu [instead of meat] on a barbecue 
grill” (251). In this way, we see how carnophallogocentrism underwrites a hegemonic 
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subject-position that must be “repeatedly enacted, called into being in line with the 
conceptual-discursive-institutional idea it invokes” (Calarco 2016, 44). The fact that 
carnophallogocentrism has to be reiterated in the first place demonstrates its 
sociohistoric contingency and ontological instability, guaranteeing that “there are ever 
new ways of reinforcing carnivorous virility that we need to attend to,” challenge and 
contest (ibid.).
3-D printed moose steaks?
Carnophallogocentrism is not an inbuilt feature of the human psyche, but a 
sociohistorically contingent material-discursive apparatus of domination; it is a “key 
export for the success of capitalist globalization, one borne on the backs of billions of 
dead animals” (Wolfe 2010, 100). In vitro meat presents an ambiguous challenge to 
carnophallogocentric subjectivity and its materializations in the transnational animal 
industrial complex. On the one hand, IVM reinforces the centrality and necessity of meat 
to proper (Western, rationalist, male) human life (Sinclair 2016); on the other, its 
procurement without bloodshed—its elision of killing—challenges the sacrificial logic so 
crucial to Derrida’s understanding of carnophallogocentric subjectivity. Critical animal 
scholars have for the most part been leery of the prospect that any technology  so 
geared towards the control and manipulation of living bodies might mitigate or transform 
carnophallogocentric tendencies in the constitution of the subject (Wolfe 2012, 97; 
Sinclair 2016; Davis 2016; Strutters-Montford 2018). IVM is critiqued as an expression 
of “human entitlement to reconfigure the bodies and psyches of other creatures to fit our 
schemes and satisfy our lust for manipulating life to reflect our will” (Davis 2016: 194). 
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Sinclair argues that whether grown in a lab or even assembled from plant matter, meat 
analogues “depend upon the framework of recognition that makes particular speciesed 
others always already edible” (2016: 231); instead of replicating certain kinds of animal 
flesh as food, “we must detach so-called animals from their association with edibility 
altogether” (2016, 223). Sinclair uses “edible” in the sense that Haraway uses 
“killable” (ie. always-already edible/killable); nevertheless the very suggestion that 
earthly bodies must be conceived of as inedible ought to ring alarm bells for critical 
ecofeminists who take Plumwood’s diagnosis of respect-use dualism seriously. It is thus 
crucial to consider how this burgeoning technology might be understood outside of a 
Western carnophallogocentric framework. Robinson draws from traditional Mi’kmaq 
stories to argue that IVM could allow new configurations of human-animal 
intersubjectivity that are consistent with traditional Mik’maq ontologies. Mi’kmaq thought 
understands other animals to remain alive as friends and siblings even as they are 
present as dead bodies that can be eaten (the figure ’Moose’ persists despite the death 
and consumption of this particular moose) (274). While some stories emphasise that 
successful hunting involves outwitting other animals, others suggest the relationship be 
understood as an agreement between humans and other animals wherein animals 
sacrifice themselves in return for responsible use—a very different configuration of 
sacrifice than that demanded by Derridian carnophallogocentrism, which holds that 
subjectivity emerges via the sovereign power to forcibly sacrifice others, particularly (but 
by no means exclusively) other animals. Robinson suggests that IVM technology could 
“renegotiate that agreement to one in which the moose provide stem cells rather than 
laying down their lives”:
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[i]n a future where I can order a moose steak from a 3-D printing machine, or 
purchase one grown in a lab, my relationship with actual living moose becomes 
freed from a relationship of sacrifice, as well as dependence and can begin to 
approach something akin to that of relatives who, after a long period of tension, 
have finally become friends. (2016, 275)
Robinson understands IVM as having the potential to “free” other animals from 
relationships of sacrifice with humans, in a fashion resonant with traditional Mi’kmaq 
understandings of human-animal reciprocity and siblingship. Similarly, within a Western 
carnophallogocentric paradigm van der Weele and Driessen (2013) speculate that “in 
the future we might all have a pig in our backyard or in our local community, from which 
some stem cells are taken every few weeks in order to grow our own meat, either in a 
machine on our kitchen sink or in a local factory” (2013, 650; see also van Mensvoort 
and Grievink (2014, 55, 76-7). Samuel R. Delany imagined something similar in Stars in 
My Pocket Like Grains of Sand (1984), wherein the human protagonist donates his 
cellular material to grow the meat to feed an entire society. Such a sharing of bodily 
matter is considered an honour: “we will savour the complexities of your flesh for years 
to come and it will lend its subtleties to myriad complex meals," effuse the hungry locals 
(280). Technologically mediated to relinquish the need for killing, perhaps flesh 
consumption can come to be understood as “a sort of gift exchange between 
races” (Parasecoli 2008, 81).  Obviously considerable pragmatic issues arise in this 62
scenario, including the question of the circumstances in which cell samples are to be 
 Niven (1978[2006]) takes a different tack in the short story “Assimilating Our Culture, That’s What 62
They’re Doing!”: in vitro human meat is grown and consumed by aliens as the ultimate example of cultural 
appropriation. 
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harvested and the role of formerly ‘food’ animals within an economy that has rendered 
their deaths—and to an extent their lives—obsolete. CAS scholars have rightly rejected 
Haraway’s argument that veganism “would consign most domestic animals to the status 
of curated heritage collections or to just plain extermination as kinds and as individuals” 
—there are more ways to relate to domestic animals than just eating them, collecting 
them or eradicating them (2008: 80; Giraud 2013b, 104). Similarly, CAS should keep an 
open mind as to the possibilities of IVM—while the prospects of lab-grown meat 
effecting radical change within extant capitalist-carnophallogocentric structures may be 
dim, outside of this culturally contingent framework all bets are off. CAS scholarship 
should not dismiss the possibility IVM might serve to “trouble the divisions that insert 
themselves between different kinds of human and animal bodies” in ways conducive to 
multispecies flourishing (Dennis & Witchard 2015, 162). Perhaps we could stand to 
learn a thing or two from thought experiments like Robinson’s and Delany’s that 
reimagine webs of interspecies relations as they could be, in ways that do not deny but 
rather affirm the fundamental ontological edibility of all creaturely bodies.63
This is all well and good for the moose—but what about the moose steak itself? 
Disembodied meat “is still a product of life, albeit of a cellular, non-organismic 
variety” (Marder 2016, 108). Cells live and die in the production of IVM—can cell death 
 I am less sanguine about learning a thing or two from van der Weele and Driessen’s (2013) “pig in the 63
garden” thought experiment, which blunts the critical force of its argument by arguing that their vision of 
“conscientious” IVM offers a corrective to the “bleak” alienation of “urban vegans [who] are completely 
separated from nature and from animals” (656). As Poirier 2018 points out,  
on the contrary, many vegans consider their avoidance of animal consumption to constitute a 
significant relationship to the more-than-human world….By calling the backyard model 
“conscientious,” and then immediately referring to veganism as “bleak,” the authors imply that 
envisioning a relationship with animals in which they are not eaten is undesirable and should be 
avoided (Poirier 2018, 19).
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“count” towards this sacrifice, upon which carnophallogocentric subjectivity (if there can 
be said to be such a thing) allegedly depends? What kinds of killing counts? What lives, 
even if they are not grievable (Butler, 2003), are killable and how does the “semi-living” 
status of IVM (Catts & Zurr 2006, 2013; Dixon 2009) complicate this equation? In order 
to parse these questions, we need to understand how disembodied meat complicates 
not only carnophallogocentrism as a (sociohistorically specific) metaphysical disposition 
(Wolfe 2012, 20), but the very form of the subject itself (McHugh 2011). The In Vitro 
Meat Cookbook (2014) offers a good point of entry in attempting to interrogate 
subjectivity and agency by diffractively thinking them through the spectral materiality of 
disembodied meat. In The In Vitro Meat Cookbook, the agential possibilities of 
carniculture are for the most part elided in favour of presenting disembodied meat as an 
inert object that is ethically and gastronomically superior to the in vivo variety. Only in 
those recipes which call for motile meat is the liminal liveliness of these speculative 
edibles acknowledged: the recipe “spear-fishing for the semi-living” suggests grilling 
“semi-living creatures” on a hotplate, where they can “skitter and slither across the 
electrified surface, cooking as they scoot along (75).  However, as the recipe on the 64
previous page assures, because these “creatures” “have no organs or nervous systems, 
they’re not truly alive” (73), merely reacting to mechanical stimuli. Of course, life can 
exist without organs or nerve cells—the tiny multicellular Trichoplax adhaerans 
 The idea that motility could be a desirable feature of foodstuffs was prefigured in SF in William Tenn’s 64
1957 story “Winthrop Was Stubborn” 
where a popular dish of the future is this purple spaghetti which actively squirms up from the 
plate towards your mouth and wriggles about cosily once it’s inside. As a passing gourmet 
explains, “…In addition to flavour, texture and aroma, [you] experience motility. Think of it, food 
not just lying there limp and lifeless in your mouth, but food expressing eloquently its desire to 
be eaten”  (in Langford 2005, 32).
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manages quite well without either, foraging and digesting algae across shallow sea-
floors worldwide (Smith, Pivovarova & Reese 2015). In reconfiguring motile, 
multicellular assemblages as “not truly alive,” The In Vitro Meat Cookbook strategically 
objectifies and de-animates these dynamic and (presently) hypothetical “lab-grown 
creatures” in order to facilitate a simultaneous refutation and reinscription of the 
(sociohistorically contingent, as we have  seen) Western taboo against consuming meat 
that is not quite dead. The implicit liveliness of motile bodies (Chen 2012, 8) 
necessitates the disclaimer that such bodies are ‘not really alive’ and thus fair game for 
consumption and incorporation—even as this liveliness adds the thrill of transgression 
to the dining experience. The In Vitro Meat Cookbook thus strategically exploits and 
disavows the vitality of IVM as a part of a uniquely sensual (to the point of sexual) 
culinary culture that can still be understood as ethical (Mensvoort & Grievink 2014, 73).
The In Vitro Meat Cookbook’s reference to “semi-living creatures” that “have no organs” 
gestures towards the Deleuzian concept of the “body without organs”: borrowed from 
Dogon philosophy,  the body without organs is “permeated by unformed, unstable 65
matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or 
transitory particles" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980, 40). Phenomena that appear as stable 
entities are anything but and may be better understood as “a collection of potentials” 
that hang together only though the shifting exchange of flows of matter and meaning 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). In this sense, what we think of as discrete “organisms” are 
really temporally and spatially contingent coagulations of lively matter, “not static 
 The Dogon are an Indigenous people of Mali.65
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organized unities, but porous bodies that assemble into compositions through a variety 
of relations” (Buchanan 2008, 174). This radically kinetic ontology informs and aligns 
with material feminist understandings of embodied life as transcorporeal (Alaimo 2010, 
2; 2008), permeated by flows of earthly substances and emerging in intra-action with 
various material agencies that cumulatively “dissolve the outline of the subject” (Alaimo 
2014, 187). With materiality and the body having long been an “extraordinarily volatile 
site for feminist theory” (Alaimo & Hekman 2008, 1), material feminisms draw upon 
Deleuze’s body without organs (1980), Latour’s actor network theory (1993), Barad’s 
agential realism (2007), Alaimo’s transcorporeality (2008) Bennet’s thing-power (2010), 
Haraway’s naturecultures (2008), Bradotti’s nomadic subjects (1994) and other so-
called ‘new’ materialisms (Grosz 1995; 2005; Moe 2014, DeLanda 2000; Kirby 1997; 
2011; Morton,  2007; Coole & Frost 2010; Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012) to mount an 
intersectional analysis grounded by “keen interests in engagements with matter” (Hird 
2009, 330). Aspects of “new” materialism have been notably prefigured in Indigenous 
thought (TallBear 2011;  2017; Todd 2014); ecofeminist thinkers have likewise innovated 
key insights in the field (Casselot 2016, 74; Gaard 2011), notably Plumwood’s 
theoretical stance of intentional recognition towards the agency of the more-than-
human, itself indebted to Indigenous Australian philosophies (Plumwood, 1996; 2002, 
182). Material feminisms emphasize the agentic capacities of nonhuman forces in order 
“to catalyze a sensibility that finds a world filled not with ontologically distinct categories 
of beings (subjects and objects) but with variously composed materialities that form 
confederations” (McHugh 2010, 99). Agency in this orientation is understood not as a 
trait that some beings possess, but instead as “a pervasive and inbuilt property of 
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matter, as part and parcel of its generative dynamism” (Iovino and Opperman 2014, 3). 
Matter itself is rendered animate, understood not as “a thing, but as a doing, a 
congealing of agency” (Barad 2007,151). Applying material feminism to literary analysis, 
Iovino and Opperman (2014) articulate material ecocriticism as 
the study of the way material forms—bodies, things, elements, toxic substances, 
chemicals, organic and inorganic matter, landscapes and biological entities—
intra-act with each other and the human dimension, producing configurations of 
meanings and discourses that we can interpret as stories. (7)
Material feminist ecocriticism (or material ecofeminist literary criticism), then, 
acknowledges the communicative potential of nonhuman matter and adopts a 
theoretical posture of attentive listening (Donavan 2008) and intentional recognition of 
nonhuman agency (Plumwood 2002) in order to recuperate and legitimate the “rich 
narrative description of the nonhuman sphere” (Plumwood 2002, 188) so crucial to any 
intra-active project of creative world-making (Fawcett 2000, 2012). 
Cells as Selves?
The phenomenon of in vitro meat is particularly ripe for material ecocritical analysis. Cell 
culture technology radically reconfigures the spatial and temporal dimensions of living 
bodies (Landecker 2007, 232), manifesting as as a provocative challenge not only to the 
concept of subjectivity, but to such fundamental ontological categories as “organism” 
and even “life” itself (Seiler 2007, 243). In this way, speculative discourses around 
disembodied meat participate in an established genealogy of complications to these 
fundamental categories. Although the designation ‘organism’ has no precise meaning, 
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bioscientific discourses deploy the term pragmatically as a “stable target for 
explanation” (Fox Keller 2002, 12); definitions of ‘organism’ usually take aim at “a living, 
autonomous biological entity that occupies a single body” (Seiler 2007, 247). The 
concept materialized in intra-action with the early modern “emergence of the individual 
bio-political citizen” (Griffith 2015, 37; Gilbert Sapp & Tauber 2012) and has 
subsequently been articulated via sociohistorially contingent epistemological cultures 
(ecology in the nineteenth century, genetics in the twentieth, genomics in the twenty-
first) (Fox Keller 2002; see also Knorr-Cetina 1999). It has been coming apart at the 
seams almost since its inception. Not only has the material turn rendered the distinction 
between organism and environment porous and contingent (Buchanan 2008; DeLanda, 
2000; Deleuze & Guattari 1983; Alaimo 2008, 2010, 2014; Iovino, 2012, 2015; Iovino & 
Opperman, 2014), but the ubiquity of interspecies symbiosis has shattered any 
conception of organisms as discrete “biological individuals” in anatomical, 
embryological, physiological, immunological, genetic, or evolutionary terms (Gilbert, 
Sapp & Tauber 2012, 325). Chimeras such as lichens (a symbiotic merger of fungi and 
photosynthetic bacteria or protists) and the oft-cited Mixotricha paradoxa, a termite gut 
symbiont that is itself an aggregate of at least five separate species (Gilbert, Sapp, & 
Tauber 2012, 363; Haraway, 2008a, 285–286; Griffith 2015; Margulis & Sagan 2007, 42) 
are the rule and not the exception. “We are all lichens” (Gilbert, Sapp & Tauber 2012, 
366; Haraway 2014), symbionts all the way down (Hird 2009), not ‘organisms’ but 
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‘holobionts’ (Margulis, 1991, 2), always already multiple (Martin 2007).  Even the 66
distinction between life and the non-living is is not a hard and fast biological fact 
(Speigelman, in Dawkins 2004, 582–94), but a non-innocent negotiation always already 
enmeshed in the political (Maisenchein 2003, 262; Derrida 1991b, 3099 n3; TallBear 
2017). Biological agents such as viruses—macromolecular crystals capable of 
highjacking the transcription and translation processes of the eukaryotic cells they enter 
in order to produce copies of themselves—epitomize this profound ontological 
indistinction between vitality and inertness, but a veritable bestiary of microbial entities 
straddle the life-nonlife divide, including but not limited to prions, plasmids, integrons 
(gene capture and integration systems) and transposons (‘jumping genes’) (Dupre & 
O’Malley 2009, no pagination).
Hanging in technologically mediated suspension between life and death, temporally and 
spatially reconfigured as immortal and amorphous, disembodied meat carries an 
“uneasy and problematic vitality” (Catt & Zurr 2013, 101). It presents a unique challenge 
to the idea of life as easily demarcated from non-life and of the organism as a skin-
encapsulated individual (Seiler 2007, 249). Van Valen and Majorana (1991) have even 
argued that certain kinds of disembodied human tissue ought to be understood as a 
new species of organism, albeit one restricted to a particular technologically-mediated 
 Since the 1953 discovery of human genetic chimerism, “a small but growing group of people, allied 66
mostly through Internet communities, support groups and particular psychotherapeutic approaches, 
conceive of themselves as multiple because of an early loss and/or absorption of their twins” (Martin 
2007, 219). Symbiogenesis theory and the broader ‘microbial turn’ suggest that this multiplicity can be 
understood as characteristic of all human bodies, not only those identified as genetic chimeras, thus 
continuing the “dissolution—or at least a historical, cultural and biological fluidity—of the very entity called 
the person” (221).
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environment (In Seiler 2007, 249).  IVM thus escapes the (admittedly already vexed) 67
present taxonomies of the life sciences (McHugh 2010, 189), confounding biological or 
cultural classification though the weird agency of these “kind-of-alive” “kind-of-
beings” (in McHugh 2010, 188). McHugh “caution[s] against naively retrofitting such 
complex entities into the terms of human subjects and nonhuman objects (the familiar 
foundations of discourse)” (2011, 196, 183). Consequently, material ecofeminist 
engagements with IVM must resist anthropocentric scientific and scholarly discourses 
that “fail to give an agency or even a proto-agency to the living fragments” of 
disembodied biological matter and treat “the semi-living as quasi-life at best and in most 
cases as equal to inert objects” (Catts & Zurr 2006, 1; e.g. Squier, 2004; Andrews & 
Nelkin, 2001; Waldby & Mitchell 2006). Nor is it enough to fall into "the too easy habit of 
reducing all actants to agential origins” (Thacker 2005, in Catts & Zurr 2006, 1) and 
conceive of the agential capacities of disembodied biomatter as merely derivative, 
bestowed upon them by their human creators (e.g. Roosth, 2009). After all, living 
cells (including those that make up IVM) demonstrably possess an agential power all of 
their own, quite apart from their enmeshment in human technical systems. This agential 
power, which Fitch (2008) dubs “nano-intentionality," constitutes "a microscopic form of 
aboutness, inherent in individual eukaryotic cells, that make up a goal-directed capacity 
to respond adaptively to novel circumstances” (2). Eukaryotic cells (the kind possessed 
by all animals, plants and fungi) “respond adaptively and independently to their 
environment, rearranging their molecules to suit their local conditions, based on past 
 Specifically the HeLa cell line, biopsied from the terminally ill Henrietta Lacks (without her knowledge or 67
consent) in 1951 and growing in immortal fecundity in labs worldwide ever since; Van Valen and Majorana 
propose the binomial Helacyton gartleri for this novel species of organism.
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(individual and species) history" (4-5) Furthermore and “crucially, this capacity is as 
characteristic of a neuron in the brain as it is of a free-living amoeba” (3). Lynn Margulis 
has also suggested that eukaryotic cells manifest a form a consciousness in their 
responsive and communicative capacities (2001) and that the phenomenon of 
consciousness itself emerged from microbial spirochete ecology (2007). Martin (2007) 
has parsed the late-twentieth century reification of cells as synecdochically representing 
the self to which they genetically belong, but it is in a very literal sense that Margulis 
argues that “cells are selves” of their own, the smallest possible unit of subjectivity 
(Margulis 2011, 2). 
In this light, as tissue composed of eukaryotic cells IVM is absolutely agential—although 
the question of whether cellular lives and deaths can be understood as a the kind of 
sacrifice necessary to satisfy carnophallogocentric metaphysics remains open. 
Conventional meat found at any ordinary butchery also possesses this kind of cellular 
vitality, at least while fresh (Catts & Zurr 2006, 1-2)—and yet the act of killing living cells 
in meat (through cooking or digestion, for example) does not seem to hold any symbolic 
valence distinct from the bare presence of the fragmented animal bodies those cells 
constitute. Even fresh vegetables teem with living, nano-intentional eukaryotic cells 
(Seiler 2007, 263), but—as Derrida alleges—a vegetarian still stands little chance of 
becoming head of state of any Western nation: “The chief must be an eater of 
flesh” (Derrida 1991a,114). IVM’s (supposed) elision of animal sacrifice complicates the 
sort of “predatory subjectivity” that Derrida’s carnophallogocentrism evokes (Miler 2012, 
47)—the act of eating a meal composed of disembodied lab-grown cells thus troubles 
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Derrida’s configuration of carnism as hinging on the domination of the figure of the 
animal (Struthers-Montford 2017). My hunch is that cell death is largely insufficient to 
satisfy the sacrificial logic of carnophallogocentrism, based as it is upon a hierarchical 
and dualistic ontology of human/animal that leaves little space for the consideration of 
the liminal semi-lives of intra-organismal entities. 
Pohl and Kornbluth’s Chicken Little and Pohl and Atwood’s ChickieNobs
This is certainly the case in Oryx and Crake, where disembodied meat is routinely 
denigrated in comparison to the real thing and semi-living forms like ChickieNobs are 
discursively constructed as functionally equivalent to inert objects. As McHugh points 
out, Oryx and Crake “imagines the real artificial meat source as an utterly abject 
creature, an animal whose revolting qualities are decoupled from any sense of 
agency” (McHugh 2010, 192). Casting her gaze half a century back from Atwood’s 
ChickieNobs to Pohl and Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants (1956), McHugh argues 
that
Unlike ChickieNobs, the amorphous Chicken Little plays an active role in the 
earlier novel, sheltering members of the resistance movement and working to 
bring down the system that exploits her (and she is distinctly gendered female 
as well). (McHugh, 2011, 204)
Chicken Little’s sex of course reflects the material reality of avian life under under 
capitalism—it is overwhelmingly hens and not roosters who bear the brunt of the animal 
industrial complex’s atrocities. It should also be obvious that gendering a less-than-
sentient, wholly consumable and endlessly regenerative body as female is a 
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representational strategy that risks reinscribing hegemonic constructs of female 
passivity and nurturance. And yet, I argue, the very act of using subject pronouns of any 
gender to describe a corporeality that would usually be understood as inert works 
against this passivity, serving to vivify rather than deanimate the body in question. 
Derrida has argued that the ethical recognition of the other is predicated on them being 
a “who," and that animals have a priori been denied this response-ability through the 
logic of logocentrism (1991a, 96, 110). By resolutely describing Chicken Little with 
subject pronouns (she, who) rather than object pronouns (it, that), The Space 
Merchants manipulates what Chen (2012) describes as “animacy hierarchies," in which 
“the sentiency or liveliness of nouns” (2) informs and suggests “a conceptual order of 
things, an animate hierarchy of possible acts” and actors (3) that manifests as “a scale 
of relative sentience that places humans at the very top” (89). In using language usually 
reserved for human subjects—the supposed apex of the animacy scale—to talk about a 
piece of meat, Pohl and Kornbluth deploy the dominant linguistic hierarchy of liveliness 
in order to subvert the ontological pecking order that such a linguistic strategy usually 
signifies. The result is that Chicken Little exhibits the exactly the kind of weird and 
uneasy vitality upon which Catts and Zurr insist and that material (feminist) ecocriticism 
strives to foreground.
The Space Merchants (Pohl & Kornbluth, 1956) depicts an ecologically ravaged, 
urbanized future Earth in which vast corporate interests cynically and ruthlessly 
manipulate the desires of an oppressed and exhausted proletariat, a world where 
“reckless exploitation of natural resources has created needless poverty and needless 
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human misery” (1956, 101). Food production is corporatized and centralized, with algae 
and yeast substitutes for animal products ubiquitous across the globe. An underground 
“terrorist” organization known as the World Conservation Association (the “Consies") 
struggles against this corporate hegemony, operating as a decentralized resistance 
movement against the voracious consumer capitalism that has despoiled the 
environment and impoverished human life. Clearly drawing inspiration from Carrell’s 
experiments with poultry cardial cells, Pohl and Kornbluth imagine Chicken Little as a 
corporate biotech product intended as an inexpensive source of protein for the working 
class, an amorphous and uncannily omnipresent meat creature growing in 
technologically-mediated fecundity in the catacombs of this urbanized dystopia.  They 68
offer the following description of Chicken Little in one of her underground “nests”: “it was 
a great concrete dome, concrete-floored. Chicken Little filled most of it. She was a gray-
brown, rubbery hemisphere some fifteen yards in diameter. Dozens of pipes ran into her 
pulsating flesh. You could see that she was alive” (106). Already the agency and vitality 
of Chicken Little surpasses that of the “meat-tuber” ChickieNobs. 
Pohl and Kornbluth in no way anthropomorphize Chicken Little, yet nor do they strip the 
(semi-)creature of all semblance of agency. Consider the following passage,
Chicken Little grew and grew, as she had been growing for decades. Since she 
had grown from a lump of heart tissue, she didn’t know any better than to grow 
up against a foreign body and surround it. She didn’t know any better than to 
In her uncanny omnipresence, Chicken Little echoes Moby Dick. See Armstrong (2008)68
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grow and fill her concrete vault and keep growing, compressing her cells and 
rupturing them. As long as she got her nutrient, she grew. (96)
Even though Chicken Little is not ventriloquised as possessing metaphysical or political 
subjectivity in any conventional sense, nor is she depicted as “mindless." She is not 
unknowing—she just doesn’t know any better, as befits her genealogical historicity. She 
is even “liked” by Herrera, the worker who tends her, carefully pruning her fleshy bulk to 
ensure that no parts become infected or cancerous (107). The narrative suggests that 
the affection Herrera feels towards Chicken Little might displace a more traditional 
relationship (he doesn’t have a wife), but nevertheless emphasizes the response-
abilities that the “vet/mechanic, the farmer/artist or the nurturer/constructor” exercise 
towards semi-living systems (Zurr & Catts 2002, 5). Real-life disembodied forms like 
Catts and Zurr’s “semi-living sculptures” must be fed regularly with nutrient medium and 
protected from microbial contamination. Failure to do so can be deadly: semi-living 
forms can be mortally susceptible to the bacteria and fungi borne on the human skin. In 
this sense and others, carniculturists must (in a profoundly unequal manner) meet the 
the cells to some degree on their own terms (Landecker 2016): “by the most obvious or 
‘natural’ act of human nurturing, through caressing, we kill communities of cells which 
are stripped from their host body and immune system” (Zurr & Catts 2002, 7). Similarly, 
Chicken Little must be cared for in ways that challenge anthropocentric notions of 
guardianship or attentiveness, underscoring that “care” must be negotiated in intra-
action with the specific needs of whatever is being cared for (whether semi-living forms 
like cellular biomatter or unambiguously vital creatures like animals or plants): “humans 
must learn to translate their limited understandings and perceptions towards a different 
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set of instincts of a different living system” (ibid.). Ethics inheres in and emerges from 
the encounter between (always already intra-acting) entities, a participatory 
epistemology wherein knowing “necessarily includes an ethical dimension” (Donovan 
2014, 76; Barad, 2007).
By way of comparison, consider the encounter between ChickieNobs and narrator 
Jimmy in Oryx and Crake, 
What they were looking at was a large bulblike object that seemed to be 
covered with stippled whitish-yellow skin. Out of it came twenty thick fleshy 
tubes and at the end of each tube another bulb was growing… The thing was a 
nightmare. It was like an animal-protein tuber. (2002, 246) 
The ChickieNobs creature is an nightmarish “object” that revolts Jimmy, who opines that 
“this thing was going too far” (246). There is no suggestion of agency or mindedness, let 
alone ‘likeability’: ChickieNobs elicit only disgust. While the very idea of caring for 
ChickieNobs is ridiculed in Oryx and Crake, The Space Merchants does not foreclose 
the possibility of (unequal but genuine) relations of care between humans and semi-
living forms like Chicken Little. Whereas “those ChickieNob things can’t even 
walk!” (Atwood, 2003, 405), Chicken Little “does tricks” (Pohl & Kornbluth 1956, 107)—a 
silent whistle is deployed to encourage her to change shape, forming passageways 
within her flesh through which ‘Consie' resistance agents may pass and gain access to 
secret rendezvous points (107). Rather than an object of revulsion, Chicken Little is an 
agent in revolt (McHugh 2010): though originally engineered by corporate interests as 
an inexpensive meat source for the working class, she resists the regime that created 
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her through her enmeshment in a heterogenous confederation of intra-acting agencies 
(Bennet 2010, 94), including those of cellular tissue, agricultural scientists, meat 
consumers, technical systems, resistance agents, nutrient medium, meat harvesters 
and the political-economic system of capitalism itself. 
Chicken Little is written in such a way that her agency exceeds that of an inert object—
she is reactive, gendered, a ‘who’ not a ‘what,’ a weird semi-being enmeshed in 
strategic alliances with radical eco-socialists, despite her origins as a mass-produced 
and marketed piece of meat. Like Haraway’s cyborg, Chicken Little—designed as a 
cheap meat source— is “the illegitimate offspring” of patriarchal capitalism and state 
socialism and, like her cyborg sibling, she too is “exceedingly unfaithful” to her origins 
(1991, 152). “The capacity of Chicken Little to revolt alongside human social 
revolutionaries” foregrounds the “potentials for coordinating mutually sustainable 
cooperation with semi-living agency forms” (McHugh 2010, 196) and underscores what 
Plumwood has articulated as
the importance of our openness to the non-human other’s potential for 
intentionality, including their potential for communicative exchange and 
agency….open[ing] to rich forms of interaction and relationship which have an 
ethical dimension. (Plumwood 2002, 181)
This openness to intentionality, this willingness to hang suspended between familiar 
discursive constructs like “subject” and “object” and work towards relations of mutual 
flourishing between humans and other living or even semi-living entities, is crucial to 
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any critical ecofeminist project that strives towards ecologically embedded forms of 
ethical inter- (or intra-)relationality with Earth others.  
Conclusion
Science fictional representations of in vitro meat are proliferate from and are braided 
back into discourses of tissue engineering technologies, food politics, culinary 
aesthetics and animal ethics, to name a few. Intra-acting with these wider sociotechnical 
discourses, SF narratives of IVM support, subvert and shape ideas about how this 
nascent technological practice might materialize within the real and imagined 
socioeconomic regimes of (post)modernity and beyond. The semi-livingness of IVM 
complicates the carnophallogocentric matrix in which symbolic violence towards animals 
is implicated in the emergence of human subjectivity; furthermore, the weird agency of 
these amorphous not-quite-organisms shatters scientific constructions of “the living 
organism” and philosophical notions of the autonomous subject alike. CAS’s emphasis 
on nonhumans as oppressed subjects need not elide possibilities for ethical alliances 
with semi-living forms like IVM; ecofeminism and new materialism’s more expansive 
scope offer vital correctives to such a foreclosure. As Plumwood argues, ethics “is a 
matter of trying to understand what kinds of care, regard and responsiveness might be 
possible for us” in relation to the more-than-human world—including techno-biocultural 
entities like IVM (2002, 165). The following chapter continues my project of troubling the 
autonomous and individual subject by diffractively reading the counter-epistemic 
evolutionary theory of symbiogenesis through the estranging lens of science fiction to 
argue that life on Earth has been hybrid and multiple since its inception, unfolding not 
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only through linear and filial lines of succession but also via dizzyingly tangled 
chimerical and symbiotic mergers that demolish fantasies of autonomous selves and 
human ontological supremacy (Margulis 1967; 1991; 2007; Haraway 2013; 2014; 2016).
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5. Me(a)tamorphoses: Indigestion, Infection and 
Symbiogenesis in SF
New developments in nutritional and genetic sciences lend weight to the truism that it is 
impossible to eat and remain unchanged. Understanding food not simply as fuel but “as 
a miasma of biologically active molecules in which genomes are immersed” and 
expressed (Landecker 2011, 169), nutritional epigenetics encounters a human body 
“teeming” with genetic components from the food we ingest (Landecker 2013, 1), raising 
provocative questions about the integrity of the subject in a world of vibrant, agential 
and intra-acting matter. Promiscuous exchanges of regulatory signals and genetic 
material between eater and eaten threaten the skin-encapsulated human self with 
contamination, corruption and even dissolution—a discourse of infection and contagion 
that reveals a deep-seated anxiety regarding the threat of the other to the self. However, 
that same transcorporeal “persistence of others in the flesh” (ibid) also evokes new 
avenues of transformation and response-ability for the ecologically embedded more-
than-human subject (Alaimo 2010; Haraway, 2008a). Haraway (2013; 2014; 2016) 
engages the evolutionary theory of symbiogenesis (Margulis 1967; 1991; 2007; 
Margulis & Sagan 1997: 2002: 2007; Margulis, Asikainen & Krumbein 2011) as a 
powerful alternative origin story in which agents of alterity become together through the 
alimentary encounter. A secular creation myth hinging not on “cooperation” or 
“competition” but rather “indigestion” (Haraway 2014, np; also Margulis & Sagan 2002, 
13), symbiogenesis contests and complicates what Foucault identified as origin 
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narratives of fixed essence (1971, in Peppers 1995, 48). instead understanding 
subjectivity as a dynamic, entangled and  always-already multiple. This chapter 
diffractively reads symbiogenesis theory through two contrasting SF texts centrally 
concerned with meat-eating, symbiosis and subjectivity. Published over thirty years 
apart and written by profoundly differently-positioned authors, Clifford D. Simak’s short 
story ‘Drop Dead’ (1956) and Octavia E. Butler’s groundbreaking Xenogenesis trilogy 
(2000[1987-9])  illuminate and interrogate different approaches to symbiogenesis as 69
infectious threat or ambiguous boon to the human subject, with differential implications 
for that subject’s response-abilities towards the more-than-human world. 
Disease as a relationship
SF's “extensive tradition” of narratives concerning infection and transformation 
(Magnone 2016, 110) emerge in intraaction with real-world immune system discourses 
and changing ideas about ‘self’ and ‘non-self’ (Haraway 1991). Contagion narratives 
trade on an “immunitary logic” of self-other hyperseparation that seeks to inoculate the 
munus of the (human) social body against the taint of the (human or nonhuman) Other 
(Agamben 2004; Haraway 1991; Plumwood 1994, 2002). Constructions of AIDS as a 
gay plague or Ebola as a threat to civilization from “deepest, darkest Africa” 
demonstrate the efficacy of infection narratives in categorizing and ranking human 
difference; however, the indiscriminate rapacity of infectious microbial agents threatens 
to dissolve not only these intra-species boundaries, but the outline of the the individual 
 Although originally published as Dawn (1987), Adulthood Rites (1988) and Imago (1989), this trilogy 69
was conceived as a single narrative and my references use the sequentially paginated omnibus edition, 
published as Lilith’s Brood (2000). Like most critics, I use the trilogy’s original name, Xenogenesis.
 169
human subject as well (Schell 1997, 96). Citing an influential immune system textbook 
of the 1980s wherein “the dangers to individuality are almost lasciviously recounted," 
Haraway details how dominant immunological discourses emphasize “the aggressive 
defence of individuality” against the threat of the microbial multitudes (1991, 223). 
Calling the question of what counts as an individual “the nub of the matter," she argues 
that for immune system discourse "everything else is ‘not-self' and elicits a defence 
reaction if boundaries are crossed” (1991, 223-4). This parsing of infection in terms of a 
military encounter between the (individual) self and the (multitudinous) other, in which 
not-self conflates with “foreign” and therefore threatening (Martin 1994) overwhelmingly 
defines the dominant discursive parameters of animal meetings-with microbes (Hird 
2009, 26). Filmic SF is particularly fond of this pathogen paradigm; movies such as 
Andromeda Strain, Outbreak, I Am Legend, 12 Monkeys and 28 Days Later engage 
these “popular, alarmist ideas” about microbes by “constructing infection in terms of 
contagion," debilitation, death or abjection (Bollinger 2009, 377). These narratives
represent disease as a rampant invader, threatening the purity and safety of the 
community, the home, the human body itself. In a genre so often motivated by 
the drama of Us versus Them, infection can be the ultimate Other: nonhuman, 
irrational and utterly amoral (Magnone 2016, 109).
Through the “invasion” of the ostensibly pure human body by infectious “others," the 
supposedly inviolable border of the individual self is threatened with dissolution. 
From a broader biological perspective, however, animal meetings-with microbes are 
inescapable and absolutely necessary to Earthly life, “Infection is now and always has 
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been unavoidable. The only beings that have prospered on this planet have done so not 
because they learned to avoid infection but because they learned to thrive on 
infection” (Callahan 2006, 18). Ten percent of the dry weight of the human body is 
bacteria—without microbial others, “we would sink in our feces, drown in our urine and 
choke on the carbon dioxide we exhale” (Margulis 2007, 35). They are our most intimate 
and ubiquitous companion species, “messmates’ without whom life would be impossible 
(Haraway 2008a). Pathology is the exception, not the rule, to encounters with microbes. 
In a very real sense “disease is a relationship’ (Haraway and Goodeve 2000, 75), albeit 
one characterized by “an overstepping of the line by one side or the other, a biological 
misinterpretation of borders’ (Thomas, in Hird 2009, 86). Contagion “is co-implicated, it 
signifies as much debility and death as it does the possibility of flourishing” (Hird 2009, 
86).
Symbiosis and symbiogenesis
Whether debilitating or enlivening, any enduring human-microbe encounter is 
fundamentally a relationship of symbiosis—“an ecological term that describes two or 
more organisms of different kinds in protracted physical contact” (Margulis & Sagan 
2002, 18). Symbiosis describes the long-lasting cohabitation of differently-named 
organisms in corporeal intimacy (Hird 2009, 58; Margulis & Sagan 2002, 18). This 
intimacy may be obligate or optional, parasitic or pathogenic, as long as it persists for 
the bulk of the life of at least one of the partner species (although disease may of 
course cut short the lifespan of either party involved). The possibilities for flourishing 
latent in microbial encounters come to fullest fruition in the phenomenon of 
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symbiogenesis, “long term stable symbiosis that leads to evolutionary change” (Margulis 
& Sagan 2002, 12). Yoking together portions of totally different genomes to “form a 
symbiotic consortium which becomes the target of selection as a single entity” (Mayr 
2002, xiii), symbiogenesis occurs with “the appearance of a new phenotype, trait, tissue, 
organelle, organ, or organism formed through a symbiotic relationship” (Hird 2009, 58). 
The paradigmatic example is the mitochondria in animal cells:
mitochondria live inside our cells but reproduce at different times using different 
methods than the rest of the host cell. They are descendants of ancient, 
oxygen-using bacteria that were either engulfed as prey or invaded as 
predators. These bacteria took up residence inside ancient motile cells to form 
an uneasy alliance. (Margulis 2007, 31)
Ancient symbioses between single celled organisms and free-living mitochondrial 
bacteria lead to the symbiogenic emergence of a new intra-cellular organelle; still 
nestled within the cells of all Earthly animals, this mitochondrial organelle enables 
eukaryotic organisms “to survive the ravages of the poisonous gas oxygen” (Hird 2009, 
29). Rather than the other being a threat to be contained or repelled, the case of 
mitochondria reminds us that it is only through the enfolding of self with other that 
animal life on Earth ever became possible.
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Despite half a century of Russian botanical scholarship outlining the theory,  70
symbiogenesis only came to the attention of the Euro-American scientific mainstream in 
the late sixties due to the efforts of American evolutionary biologist Lynn Margulis, 
whose formative paper “On the Origin of Mitosing Cells" was rejected by fifteen journals 
before finally achieving publication in 1967 (Balcombe 2010, 103; Bollinger 2010, 34). 
Margulis hypothesized a primordial amalgamation of eubacteria with archaebacteria as 
the origin of eukaryotic cells: “together, as a permanent merger, this ancient chimera in 
the mid-Proterozoic Eon became the earliest nucleated cell. The swimming, sulfur-
metabolizing chimera was an ancestor to all nucleated life forms alive today” (Margulis, 
Asikainen & Krumbein 2011, 4). The symbiogenic origins of organelles such as 
chloroplasts and mitochondria have now achieved “biological orthodoxy” and are taught 
in high school textbooks (Margulis & Sagan, 2002, 30-31), though the fuller implications 
of the theory—namely, that all eukaryotic (enucleated) cells owe their existence to 
ancient fusions of once-free living bacteria and that symbiogenesis is the main engine of 
evolutionary change—remain controversial (Hird 2009).
A “new age feminist plot”
The failure of the Russian botanists to find an audience in the Euro-American scientific 
community can be partially explained by vagaries of geopolitics, but the torturous route 
 The phenomenon of symbiogenesis was first described and named in 1909 by Russian naturalist 70
Konstantin Merezhkovsky, who argued that chloroplasts in plant cells had originally been separate 
microorganisms. His successor Boris Kozo-Polyaznsky “showed clearly in 1926 that symbiogenesis is a 
major creative force” in speciation (Margulis & Sagan 2007, 44-5) and American anatomist Ivan E. Wallin 
concurrently and independently came to a similar conclusion, arguing that symbioses of all kinds had 
played a crucial role in the evolution of organisms with enucleated cells. None of these pioneers made 
much of an impact in the wider scientific world; “their studies were ridiculed and nearly 
forgotten” (Margulis & Sagan 2007, 44-5; Fet 2011)
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to publication taken by Margulis’ seminal article demonstrates that it was always 
something more than the Iron Curtain that kept symbiogenesis from mainstream 
acceptance.   As Keith Ansell Pearson argues, symbiosis 71
has had a curiously awkward history which reveals much about the 
anthropocentric determination of the subject and about hominid fears of 
contamination. It has played and continues to play, a subversive role in biology 
since it challenges the boundaries of the organism (1997, 132, in Hird 2009, 66). 
The anthropocentrically-determined subject as an autonomous and impermeable “self in 
a case” has long functioned as one of modernity’s “recurrent leitmotifs” (Elias 1978, in 
Margulis & Sagan 2007, 21); symbiosis complicates this notion of the human as a “skin-
encapsulated ego” separate from the rest of the teeming masses of Earthly life (Watts, 
in Margulis & Sagan 2007, 17). While symbiogenesis continues Darwin’s demolishment 
of human exceptionalism and his expression of human-‘nature’ continuity and human-
animal kinship, the theory’s emphasis on shifting alliances of interdependent actants as 
a significant evolutionary driving force complicates Darwin’s theory of natural selection, 
particularly mid-late twentieth-century neo-Darwinist articulations of evolutionary 
processes that reified competition on a genetic level. A microbial counter-epistemology, 
symbiogenesis also challenges the zoocentric ,“big like us” understanding of the world 
as a stage upon which human and other animal actors, with varying degrees of skill, 
play out the evolutionary drama (Hird 2009). Symbiogenesis theory emphasizes that 
big-like-us creatures such as ‘organisms’ and ‘individuals’ are, as Haraway insists, 
 I use the term ‘iron curtain’ here in a expansive sense congruent with the term’s long history.  The first 71
English-language reference to an ;iron curtain; separating Soviet Russia from the West is attributed to 
feminist social reformer Ethel Snowden in her 1920 in her book Through Bolshevik Russia and by the mid 
twenties at least two other publications had followed suit (Morson 2011, 125-6)
 174
“ontologically contingent constructions from the point of view of the biologist, not just in 
the loose raving of a cultural critic or feminist historian of science” (Haraway 1991, 220). 
From a symbiogenic perspective, the individual actor-organism is really a consortia of 
macro- and microscopic creatures living in corporeal intimacy; it is through this 
“collaboration of many different lineage-forming entities” rather than (solely) the 
success of the individual organism (or that organism’s genetic blueprint) that the 
evolutionary process unfolds (Dupré & Malley 2009, 19).
Challenging not only the zoocentric and anthropocentric subject but the androcentric 
one as well, ‘mainstream’ biology initially derided Margulis’ articulation of 
symbiogenesis as a “new-age feminist plot” (Slonczewski 2013, np). Bollinger argues 
that this may be because “the notion of selfhood through incorporation is implicitly tied 
to the feminine”:
After all, we are accustomed to considering that women may sometimes 
incorporate other selves during pregnancy, with their individuality both 
challenged by and reaffirmed through such incorporation. (2010, 35) 
Whether or not symbiogenesis (and symbiosis more generally) evokes an “implicitly 
feminized selfhood” (Bollinger 2010, 35), feminist theorists have found in the theory a 
rich counter-epistemology to masculinist meta-narravites of evolution as driven by 
ruthless individualistic competition a la “Man the Hunter” (Gontier 2007; Margulis 2007; 
Haraway 1989; Le Guin 1989; Landau 1989). New materialisms and posthumanisms 
have likewise creatively engaged the theory of symbiogenesis to articulate the subject 
as always already multiple, always-already enmeshed in and emerging alongside a 
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legion of other agencies. Symbiogenesis reveals the autonomous individual subject as a 
biologically untenable construction: “the evolution of our ‘selves’ is already polluted by 
histories of encounter” (Tsing 2015, 29). The living subject, human or otherwise, does 
not precede the relational encounter with alterity but emerges through it (Barad 2007) 
as an intraactive assemblage of multiple and differentially converging materialities, 
species and allegiances (Braidotti 2013, 144).
Symbiogenesis in SF: “inheriting and embodying the eaten”
If, as Pearson and Bollinger argue, symbiosis and symbiogenesis challenge the modern 
anthro- and androcentric determination of the subject, it only makes sense that SF 
would find in these these theories a rich repository of thematic material with which to 
continue the genre’s longstanding exploration of more-than-human agency and 
subjectivity (Vint 2010). SF has engaged symbiogenesis theory for decades, with the 
transformative potentials of microbial meetings-with running the gamut from deleterious 
to transcendental. Sometimes the transformation that microbial infection effects deforms 
the human subject to the point of annihilation (Watts 1999; Hideki 1995), but critics point 
to the work of Greg Bear (Blood Music, 1985, Darwin’s Radio, 1999; Darwin’s Children, 
2003), Joan Slonczewski (Door into Ocean, 1986; Brain Plague, 2000), Nicola Griffin 
(Ammonnite, 1992), Storm Constantine (Wraeththu, 1993) and Octavia Butler (Clay’s 
Ark, 1986; Xenogenesis, 2000[1987-9]) for examples of science fictional 
symbiogeneses of a more ambiguous nature in which infection can be “a door opening 
onto a possible new future of community and inclusion” for humanity’s own 
‘others’ (Schell 1997, 123; also Thomas 2000, Bollinger 2009; 2010; Magnone 2016; 
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Schell 1997; Alonso 2013; Ferreira 2010; Theiss 2017). The dominance of women 
authors in the short list above demonstrates that women science fiction writers have 
been at the forefront of imagining the posthuman possibilities of infectious 
transformations (Thomas 2000), further evidence for the intra-activity of symbiogenesis 
and feminist discourse. However, the robust body of feminist literary criticism on science 
fiction and symbiosis/symbiogenesis (Bollinger, 2009; 2010; Magnone 2016; Schell 
1997; Alonso 2013; Ferreira 2010; Theiss 2017; Pak 2017; Dowdall 2017) has thus far 
elided what for Haraway and Margulis is too compelling to be ignored: that “the origin of 
complex cellularity is an act of indigestion” (Haraway 2014, np). The merger of 
eubacteria with archaebacteria that gave rise to the first eukaryotic cells was a nutritive 
encounter of “abortive cannibalism," wherein one microbial party was “eaten but not 
digested” by another (Margulis & Sagan 2002, 13; Hird 2009, 82). According to the 
theory of symbiogenesis, complex life on earth began because “some bacterial sorts of 
critters ate others and got indigestion and stuck around with each other” (Haraway 
2014, np).  This ancient alimentary “truce rather than war” gathered self and non-self 72
together in a “tense proximity” (Crist & Tauber 2000, 524) through which speciation and 
the evolution of multicellular life became possible. 
 In line with the concerns of this monograph, my account of the rise of eukaryotes foregrounds eating; 72
however, others have found the sexual dimension of the encounter more compelling. Consider Shaviro 
(1997), 
No cellular reproduction had occurred, yet a new, monstrous hybrid was born, the first sexual 
being, the first infection. The universal feeding frenzy was transformed into a delirious erotic 
intermingling… And that's why plants and animals have gonads today. It's also why our cells are 
stuffed with organelles, mitochondria that let us breathe oxygen, chloroplasts that plants use to 
photosynthesize. These are all contingent effects of unplanned, miscegenetic encounters, the 
evolutionary fallout of prokaryotic sex. (1997, 39)
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Haraway’s enthusiasm for the transformative possibilities of eating emerges during a 
paradigm shift in the life sciences regarding metabolism and reproduction, long 
understood as the “two essential but essentially separate features of life” (2013, 8; 
Dupre & O’Malley 2009, 17). In the traditional epistemological division of labour, 
reproduction proceeds “according to a deterministic plan laid down genetically in 
DNA” (Wheeler 2017, 295) and food is simply a source of fuel to be converted to 
energy. Developments in nutritional epigenetics suggest instead that metabolism and 
gene expression should be understood as intra-active rather than discrete processes. 
Rather than DNA being a static “set of instructions to build a body from 
scratch” (Wheeler 2017, 295), we should approach it as a dynamic poem that is 
constantly being edited and rewritten through the nutritive intra-action of eater, eaten 
and Umwelt (ibid; Landecker 2013, 8). Nutritional epigenetics and symbiogenesis theory 
alike highlight “the continuing presence of the eaten in the eater” (Landecker 2013, 5):
If we eat bacteria and bacteria live in us and their genetic material floats
around in our blood stream doing who knows what and their chemical signals 
interact with our gut cells and our brain cells and probably our placental cells 
(for those of us who have them from time to time) and we eat corn and rice and 
fungi and honey and many other things that interact with chromatin configuration 
and gene transcription and cell division and we inherit microbes from our 
families at the same time as bearing the imprint of changed gene regulation 
from our forebears’ diets—multiply inheriting and embodying the eaten—then, is 
it still possible to say that the metabolic and the reproductive are fundamentally 
different aspects of life, bound together for evolutionary convenience? (8)
 178
The epistemological “split between the replicative and the metabolic” is no longer 
tenable: “there is no genetic action, no manifestation of a genome, without 
metabolism” (Landecker 2013, 4, 8). Epigenetic nutritional sciences encounter not a 
pure human body converting food to fuel, but a chimerical “whirlpool” in which genetic 
and chemical material from the eaten persist in the flesh (8), an intraactive process of 
differential multispecies becoming. “Getting hungry, eating and partially digesting, 
partially assimilating and partially transforming”; according to Haraway, “these are the 
actions of companion species” (2016, 65).
Simak’s symbiogenesis
Although underrepresented in the existing critical literature on symbiogenesis in SF, 
Clifford Simak’s ‘Drop Dead’ (1956) is absolutely a story of symbiogenesis, a revenge-
of-the-microbes tale in which alien bacteria infect and abject a group of arrogant, 
instrumentalizing scientist-economists seeking to turn a profit from the spoils of a ‘virgin 
world.’ Known mainly for the pastoral quality of his stories (Kingsley Amis called Simak 
“the science fiction poet laureate of the countryside” [1963, 62]), ecocritical readings of 
Simak’s oeuvre have led to the author’s reassessment as “a significant pioneer” of 
ecological or Anthropocenic science fiction (Stableford 2009, 159; Cokinos 2014; 
Canavan 2016a, 149) and a notable figure in the genre’s long history of speculation 
about animals (Vint 2008; Gordon 2010). A marked (if muted) “anti-capitalist streak” 
permeates his imaginings (Pringle 1997, 24; Cokinos, 2014), alongside a deep distrust 
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of anthropocentric grand narratives (Clareson 1976, Bailey 1981).  City (1952), for 73
example, reads as a melancholic “version of retrospective Anthropocene 
futurity” (Canavan 2016a, 150; Gordon 2010), haunted by the spectre of widespread 
animal extinctions, ecological collapse and “the anticipatory memory of our own 
deaths” (Canavan 2016a, 150; Scranton 2015). It is frequently “the aliens who colonize 
or inherit the Earth in Simak’s cosmos, not the other way around” (Lomax 1989, 137). 
His writing reveals both an acute awareness of and a deep dissatisfaction with, then-
dominant evolutionary narratives that aggrandized competitive individualism.  74
Caustically observing that while “back in 1950, Man [sic] thought he was the whole 
works," Simak suggests that a sober consideration of the available evidence suggests 
that maybe “he wasn’t so hot after all” (Simak 1940, in Clareson 1976, 68). Framing 
‘Man’s’ “desire to beat the other fellow to it, the hankering for glorification” as “old 
vices…[that] had become virtues from his viewpoint and raised him by his own 
bootstraps,” Simak sees no glory in the cliche that “conflict is our meat” (Simak 1946, 
188, in Clareson 1989, 73). That “old hell-for-leather creed” may have “taken man up 
the ladder,” but it can only take “him” so far—a new creed is needed (“Hunch” 1943, 35, 
in Clareson, 1976, 68). Simak’s early work demonstrates a fascination with symbiosis as 
 Simak’s anti-capitalism is usually expressed as a “subtle inveighing against” the dominant economic 73
system rather than any politicized articulation of a socialist or anarcho-libertarian alternative (Bailey 1981, 
65). The novel They Walked Like Men (New York, Doubleday 1962) constitutes Simak’s most overt 
critique of capitalism—aliens “legally” invade Earth  by buying up all the real estate and augment this 
acquisition with their ability to literally shapeshift into commodity form, essentially turning consumer goods 
into enemy sleeper agents overnight. The story’s dramatic climax features unsuspecting salarymen 
engulfed and invaded by the fruits of their own alienated labour, as cars, dolls and rest of the assorted 
bric-a-brac of consumer capitalism flex their agential muscles and threaten the human subject with bodily 
incorporation (Bailey 1981,65). 
 e.g. “Sunspot Purge," 1940; “Hunch” 1943 and Hobbies, 1946 (collected in the City, 1952); Time and 74
Time Again, 1951. See Clareson 1976
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a corrective to human egoism; in Time and Time Again (1951), for example, the 
encounter with an alien being that can only be described as a “symbiotic abstraction” 
prompts the human protagonist to an epiphany regarding the connectivity and 
multiplicity of all galactic life. ‘Drop Dead’ continues this deployment of symbiotic tropes 
as a counter-epistemological corrective to the evolutionary doctrine of competitive 
individualism, albeit one articulated in a rather cynical register (Lomax 1989, 143 n. 5). 
The story recounts how a group of intrepid capitalist-scientists in search of lucrative new 
food products are ultimately transformed into meat themselves. Like so much of Simak’s 
writing, the narrative pointedly deflates the well-worn SF trope of “‘galactic man’ 
triumphant throughout the universe” (Clareson 1976, 68), in this case by suggesting that 
neo-Darwinist fantasies of genetically-determined competitive individualism, fostered by 
an economic and social system of capitalist delirium, might someday undo the very 
configuration of subjectivity they demand. Variously hailed as “an ironic 
parable” (Stableford 2009, 159) a “bitterly amusing story” (Ewald, 2006, 59) and “a 
completely improbable gimmick yarn” (Schuyler Miller 1962, 160), ‘Drop Dead’ brings 
the figure of the ‘modern man’ face to face with the inexorable alterity of the alien, in an 
encounter that gorily dismembers the cherished integrity of the autonomous human 
subject. 
In ‘Drop Dead,' an interplanetary “Ag Survey” team lands on a distant exoplanet on a 
mission of interplanetary biopiracy, tasked with identifying potential food sources and 
ultimately extracting profit from the biological riches of so-called “virgin planets." 
Although baffled by the “simplicity” of the local ecology, which seems to consist of just 
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one species of large motile animal subsisting off of a single species of grass, the survey 
team’s curiosity is piqued when they get up close to one of the cow-sized “critters” (6), 
who “obligingly” (16) drops dead right in front of the scientists.  The creature seems to 75
be a “crazy quilt” (8) of different textures and colours, with vegetation sprouting in lieu of 
horns. Upon dissection, the scientists discover that the patchwork appearance of the 
critter goes beyond skin deep—the entire body is a motley fusion of materialities, 
various types of flesh and fruit from seemingly disparate species all miraculously 
growing together in one creature. Quickly the agricultural scientists realize the profit 
potential latent in this unassuming, “mixed-up critter” (10):
It’s a walking menu. It's an all-purpose animal, for sure. It lays eggs, gives milk, 
makes honey. It has six different kinds of red meat, two of fowl, one of fish and a 
couple of others we can't identify. (18)
Elated at their “discovery," the scientists dig deeper and find that the critter’s patchwork 
composition seems to have something to do with the “highly adaptable” bacteria that 
“swarm” through the flesh of the creature (19).  Tissue samples show that these 76
bacteria are found “everywhere throughout the entire animal. Not just in the 
bloodstream, not in restricted areas, but in the entire organism”—even “doubling in 
  The assertion that these critters, who “obligingly drop dead” (16) upon encountering a threat, “looked 75
like something from the maudlin pen of a well-alcoholed cartoonist” (6) suggest Simak was probably 
inspired by cartoonist Al Capp’s classic comic strip Li’l Abner. Popular in the 1940s and 50s, the Li’l Abner 
comic strip features a bowling-pin shaped creature called the Shmoo, which has the ability to lay eggs 
that taste like any kind meat one desires—in Capp’s own words, “When you look at one as though you'd 
like to eat it, it dies of sheer ecstasy” (1949, 18). Simak was aware of Capp’s creation, though perhaps 
not a fan of it: in Out of their Minds (1970) a character refers to the “vapid” creatures of the modern 
imagination, Li’l Abner among them (in Clareson, 1976, 77)
 Simak’s emphasis that the mysterious bacteria all belong to a single species both extends the story’s 76
thematic preoccupation with ecological austerity and evokes bacteria’s continuing evasion of taxonomic 
capture—the species concept tends to break down when faced with the mutability of the microbial (Hird 
2009). 
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brass” to take the place of brains and central nervous systems, which these “mixed up 
critters” apparently have no use for. Each “critter” is an assemblage of different species 
living together in a single ecological unit—in other words, each is a holobiont, a term 
originally coined by Margulis (1991) meaning “entire being” (Haraway 2016, 60). The 
moniker supplements the misleadingly unitary term ‘organism’ and sidesteps the 
nonsensical hierarchy of ‘hosts’ and ‘symbionts’ that frequently obscures attempts to 
talk accurately about living creatures (Haraway 2016). The critters of ‘Drop Dead,' like 
all the critters of Earth including the critter reading this page, are not singular organisms 
or hosts-plus-symbionts, but holobionts—assemblages of various micro-and macrobiotic 
agencies intra-acting sympoetically in an ongoing a process of ‘making with’ to comprise 
the ontoepistemological entity variously understood as ‘the organism’ or ‘the self’ and 
which is biopolitically interpellated into the position of ‘the subject’ (Haraway 2016). The 
bacteria that permeate the critters’ bodies are are ubiquitous across the planet’s 
surface, shaped by and shaping the ecology of their native world. They are 
unambiguously agential and effective: they “can acclimatize. They can meet new 
situations” (Simak 1956, 30). And they can apparently remix the genomes of different 
species to form a symbiotic consortium that becomes the target unit of evolutionary 
selection (Mayr 2002, xiii). In other words, the bacteria of ‘Drop Dead’ are just like the 
bacteria of Earth—they are agents of symbiogenesis. Simak’s description of chimerical 
critters swarming with agential bacteria foregrounds their materiality as an 
agglomeration of ancient symbiotes:
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the color squares that gave the critters their crazy-quiltish look were separate 
kinds of meat or fish or fowl or unknown food, whatever it might be. Almost as 
if each square was the present-day survivor of each ancient symbiont. (20) 
Like the varieties of meat that make up a critter, Earthly organisms also contain the 
present day survivors of ancient symbionts in the form of mitochondria and chloroplasts 
in animal and plant cells. Though the term ‘symbiogenesis” is elided within Simak’s story 
in favour of the more generic “symbiosis," the author’s demonstrable familiarity with 
contemporary evolutionary narratives and his previous engagements with symbiotic 
themes strongly suggest the writer had some familiarity with counter-hegemonic 
evolutionary theories such as symbiogenesis.
Evolutionary heresies
Simak’s scientists find the “wholesale symbiosis” of the critters’ planet dangerously 
antithetical to their particular evolutionary doctrine, which hews pointedly close to the 
evolutionary orthodoxy of the 1950s anglophone world inhabited by Simak. Twentieth 
century Euro-American evolutionary science was highly invested in the ‘modern 
synthesis’ of neo-Darwinism. Essentially a melange of “the twin master sciences of the 
twentieth century,” neo-Darwinism combined neoclassical economics and population 
genetics to reify “the self-contained individual actor, out to maximize personal interests, 
whether for reproduction or wealth” (Tsing 2015, 28). This ‘modern synthesis’ provided 
an interpretation of Darwin’s theory that privileged “chronic, bloody competition among 
individuals and species” as the driving force of evolutionary change (Margulis 2007, 32). 
Then and now, neo-Darwinism operates via a “double privileging” (Hird 2009, 67) of 
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autonomous organisms (and/or their genes) and sexual reproduction (as a mechanism 
for gene transfer) as the two key forces in evolutionary change (Hird 2009, 66). 
Symbiogenesis challenges both of these tenets; it understands “autonomy as centrally 
exhibited in collaboration rather than just rugged independence” (Dupre & Malley 2009, 
20), taking the organism-as-consortia and not the organism-as-individual (or the 
individual-as-genome) as the evolutionary unit of selection (Hird 2009, 67). It also 
challenges “the continued anthropomorphic preference for vertical genetic filiations 
through sexual reproduction” (Hird 2009, 66), emphasizing instead the extent to which 
genetic and cytoplasmic material is shared horizontally between organisms, by 
“contamination rather than linear filiation” in processes like lateral gene transfer (Parisi 
2004, 60; Hird 2009, 66-7).  Symbiogenesis, a process of speciation hinging on “the 77
formation of associations [and] the breakdown of genetic, physiological and spatial 
isolation between organisms” (Margulis 1976, in Hird 2009, 65), troubles the central 
neo-Darwinist tenets of reproduction and individual competition as the twin engines of 
evolutionary change. Indeed, renown evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins has even 
gone so far as to declare that the theory of symbiogenesis “denies the very heart of 
[Darwin’s] evolutionary theory” (in Hird 2009, 65). 
This charge—that symbiogenesis and symbiosis more generally are anti-Darwinist—is 
vehemently denied by Margulis (2002): “Everyone today who studies modern biology, 
indeed virtually every scientifically minded modern person, is a Darwinist” (8), she 
 As Parisi argues, when ’heredity is defined as the sexual transmission of genes from one generation to 77
the next…anything else, transmitted sexually or not, is by definition foreign, disease, retrogressive’ (Parisi 
35, 40; in Hird 2009, 67)
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declares, cautioning that “Darwin’s original views must be distinguished from those of 
his successors” (8). While there is no way to know his thoughts on either neo-Darwinism 
or symbiogenesis, Darwin long ago put his position on the multiplicity and complexity of 
evolutionary processes “beyond all doubt” (Midgley 1995, xxii), writing in The Origin of 
Species (6th ed.) that despite having been “much misrepresented” he had never argued 
that natural selection precluded other evolutionary possibilities: “I am convinced that 
natural selection has been the main, but not the exclusive means of modification” (1872, 
395; in Midgley 1995, xxii). Darwin's own protestations notwithstanding, the idea has 
persisted that the process of evolution is wholly reducible to the mechanism of natural 
selection and that natural selection is in turn wholly reducible to ‘competition.' It is as 
readily apparent in the attitudes of ‘Drop Dead’s’ future neo-Darwinists as it was in those 
of the twentieth century. The interstellar survey team is hard-hit by ‘the lingering hint of 
wholesale symbiosis” suggested by this planet of bacteria, critters and grass, a 
phenomenon “that violated all the tenets [they’d] accepted as the truth” (14). “Where’s 
the competition? Where's the evolution?” they ask despairingly, seamlessly eliding the 
two (19). “There was no competition for survival. There was no dog eat dog. There were 
just critters cropping grass” (22), “[l]ike, long ago, all the life-forms said let's quit this 
feuding, let's get together, let's cooperate” (20). For Simak’s scientists, the idea that 
cooperation might trump competition in the evolutionary arms race is shocking and 
disheartening—an affront to the civilized ideals of both of neoliberal capitalism and neo-
Darwninian evolutionary theory. However, as Hird points out in passage that deserves 
quoting at length, 
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the creation of new species through symbiogenesis may be anything but 
cooperative: we might just as easily characterize these phenomena as violent. A 
fungus attacking an alga for nutrients, after say twenty-five thousand times, led 
to the symbiotic emergence of lichen. Moreover, certain associations may be 
defined as both parasitic and mutualistic under different environmental 
conditions and/or during different stages. (Hird 2009, 68)
The line between evolutionary competition and cooperation is thin and fluctuating: 
“guests and prisoners can be the same thing and the deadliest enemies can be 
indispensable to survival” (Margulis & Sagan, 1997, 121). “Vogue terms” like 
“competition,” “cooperation," “mutualism,” “mutual benefit,” “energy cost,” and 
“competitive advantage” are ill-fitting and misleadingly simplified metaphors “borrowed 
from human enterprises and forced on science from politics, business and social 
thought” (2002, 16-17). For Margulis and Sagan, this “entire panoply of neo-Darwinist 
terminology reflects a philosophical error” (2002, 16). Haraway concurs, pointing out 
that “virtually the only actors and story formats of the Modern Synthesis” are “bounded 
units (code fragments, genes, cells, organisms, populations, species, exosystems) and 
relations described mathematically in competition equations” (2016, 62). Midgley dubs 
neo-Darwinism “biologicalism Thatecherism,” a celebration of evolution as “a ceaseless 
crescendo of competition between essentially ‘selfish’ individual organisms, each 
making ‘investments’ for its own separate advantage” and “manipulating” one another to 
get ahead (Midgely, 1979[1995], xvi). This neo-Darwinist insistence on a Euclidean 
playing field of rational individuals engaged in game a perpetual one-upmanship 
“offer[s] scientific respectability to the myth that power resides essentially in competitive 
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commercial mobility” (xviii), in the process obscuring and impoverishing the rich and 
varied metabolic and ecological relations and exchanges that comprise the ongoing 
process of ecological sympoiesis (Margulis 2002,17).
The most galling aspect of symbiogenesis for Simak’s future neo-Darwinists is the 
implication that lowly bacteria are crucial players in evolutionary and ecological 
systems. According to Hird, the emphasis on the agency of “big-like-us” animals over 
the forces exerted by a horde of invisible microbes constitutes “the heart of the conflict 
between [neo-Darwinist] evolutionary and symbiogenesis theories” (2009, 66). This 
pervasive zoocentrism is profoundly shaken by the “the counter-epistemic privileging of 
bacteria found in symbiogenesis theory” (Hird 2009, 67). In an earlier story, Simak 
punctured the self-assuredness of “galactic man” by suggesting that “it was the 
sunspots in the first place that enabled him to rise up on his hind legs and rule the roost” 
(Simak 1940, in Clareson 1976, 68). In ‘Drop Dead,' Simak finds a more plausible 
candidate than sunspots to enlist in his subversion of scientific homochauvinism: maybe 
instead of self-making ‘Man’ pulling himself up by his bootstraps, it was the bacteria 
pulling the strings all along. Of all the supposed evolutionary transgressions of ‘Drop 
Dead’s’ symbiotic planet, the survey team finds the agential bacteria “the worst of 
all” (23). Like his real-world counterparts, Simak’s biologist in particular is deeply 
disturbed by the implication that “the critters are no more than fronting for a bacterial 
world” (24), an epistemology that flouts the dominant neo-Darwinist hierarchy of 
animacy, which (as the biologist points out) usually “associate[s] symbiosis with the 
lower, more simple forms of life” (13). In subverting this hierarchy and its attendant just-
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so story of Man the self-fashioning agent of progress, Simak also anticipates the 
seismic impact microbiology was to have on evolutionary biology in the late twentieth 
century. Long dismissed as inconsequential or maligned as pathogenic, post-Pasteurian 
microbiology argued that bacteria might in fact be seen as the “less glamorous 
backstage machinery that actually produces the show” (von Helmholtz, in Hird 2009, 
22). ‘Drop Dead’ actively (if ambiguously) engages this incipient microbial turn to critique 
what Simak has elsewhere castigated as “the smug egoism that made [‘Man’] the self-
appointed lord of all creations’ (“Hobbies” 1946, 188, in Clareson 1976, 73). Against this 
myopic and “unwavering belief that [‘Man’s’] was the only kind, the only life that 
mattered” (ibid), throughout his body of work Simak “attempts to enunciate a vision 
which sees all sentient creatures, however diverse their forms, as equal parts of a single 
community which is itself the purpose and meaning of the galaxy,” as Clareson puts it 
(1976, 75). This vision is also deeply relational; as one of Simak’s proganists comes to 
realize in a previous novel,
We are not alone. No-one is ever alone. Not since the first faint stirring of the 
first flicker of life on the first planet in the galaxy that knew the quickening of life, 
has there ever been a single entity that walked or crawled or slithered down the 
path of life alone (Simak, Time and Time Again 1951, 105, in Clareson 1976, 
76).78
However, as ‘Drop Dead’ makes crystal clear, those invested in the zoo-anthropocentric 
epistemic paradigm of the ‘modern synthesis’ are likely to find this dethroning of big-like-
us critters in general and autonomous individual ‘Man’ in particular, tough to swallow. 
77 Cokinos(2014) argues that, in this passage, Simak here “extend[s] the notion of Aldo Leopold’s Land 
Ethic to the universe itself”(94).
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The story confronts a group of self-assured neo-Darwinists with incontrovertible 
evidence for a symbiotic world, a revelation so shattering it apparently brings the 
indoctrinated explorers to the verge of mental breakdown.
Bacteria bite back
If zoocentrism privileges ‘big like us’ animals in evolutionary and ecological narratives, 
anthropocentrism simply takes this bias one step further by elevating the human (or 
‘Man’) as a uniquely special animal who, through cunning and brilliance, has proven the 
fittest of all and has rightfully ascended to the top of the evolutionary heap. The Ag 
Survey team of ‘Drop Dead’ epitomize this ideology of human supremacy that relegates 
the entirety of the nonhuman world to the status of mute resource for human 
consumption. “Spearheads who went out to new worlds, some of them uncharted, some 
just barely charted,” these teams scour the galaxy “for plants and animals that might be 
developed on the experimental tracts” of the centralized agricultural planet Caph VII 
(1956, 12). This mission is fundamentally profit-driven: Simak sketches a universe of 
economic inequality wherein agricultural survey teams compete for bonuses and glory 
by procuring exotic organisms to exploit as comestible commodities. As befits their 
mission, these survey teams operate within a ruthlessly instrumentalizing and 
anthropocentric paradigm, bringing along a full component of experimental animals 
(Earthly and otherwise) to dissect in order to determine the safety of local conditions: 
“you can start killing off the little cusses to your heart's content,” one team member tells 
another (16). Simak’s scientists are steeped in an epistemic culture that denies the 
agency, subjectivity and entanglement of creaturely life by backgrounding and 
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instrumentalizing the more-than human world; like Traviss’ team of eager vivisectionists 
(2004), Simak’s own survey team is blithe to the power dynamics of the alien world on 
which they find themselves. 
It is particularly telling that the scientists’ response to the discovery that ‘critters’ are 
chimeras of ancient symbionts is not wonder, but a kind of despair that can only be 
mitigated by the violent reassertion of humanity’s rightful place at the top of the food 
chain. Biological remnants of ancient symbionts become mere varieties of ‘meat’ or 
‘unknown food,’ and the scientists quickly veer into the chillingly instrumentalizing 
rhetoric of how to best exploit the metabolic labour of critterly vitality within existing 
centralized production systems. “What kind of tolerance would the critter show to 
different kinds of climate?," worries the teams’ chief agricultural economist. “What was 
the rate of reproduction? If it was slow, as was indicated, could it be stepped up? What 
was the rate of growth?” (21). On the plus side, the surveyors soon realize the 
unprecedented profit potential of their so-called discovery: “Here was diversified farming 
with a vengeance! You had meat and dairy herds, fish pond, aviary, poultry yard, 
orchard and garden rolled into one, all in the body of a single animal that was a 
complete farm in itself!” (21). The critters “even saved one the trouble of going out to kill 
them” (15) and, once dead, provided a profitable carcass: “The food product seemed 
high in relation to the gross weight of the animal. Very little would be lost in dressing out. 
That is the kind of thing an ag economist has to consider” (21). At last, the survey team 
enthuses, “we'd hit the jackpot! We'd be going home with something that would make 
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those other teams look pallid. We'd be the ones who got the notices and bonuses” (21, 
original italics).
This instrumentalizating logic is shattered in the story’s denouement, when the critters 
stampede in a kind of inchoate rage, “as if they ran in some blind fury that was too deep 
for outcry” (25). The stampede destroys the scientists’ food supplies, thus forcing the 
humans to eat the only thing available, critter meat. Through this act of ingestion, the 
humans are exposed to microbial agents of symbiogenesis and metamorphose into 
critters themselves,
They don't fight you. They absorb you. They make you into them. No
wonder there are just the critters here. No wonder the planet's ecology is
simple. They have you pegged and measured from the instant you set foot on 
the planet. Take one drink of water. Chew a single grass stem. Take one
bite of critter. Do any one of these things and they have you cold. (33)
The ambiguity as to who or what “they” are—critters or bacteria—speaks both to the 
difficulty of getting out from under zoocentric narratives and the absurdity of attempting 
bifurcate the holobiont into ‘host’ and ‘symbiont’ in the first place. For the doomed 
scientists of SImak’s story, however, this absurdity does not register—what matters is 
the loss of the trappings of human subjectivity: “Forget us. We aren't human any 
more” (35).
The former scientists, now critters may not be “human” anymore, but at least some of 
their flesh is: the horror of the story is that human meat has been added to the ‘walking 
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menu’ that is critter embodiment. Schell (1997) corroborates Plumwood in identifying a 
deep dread of the fundamental meatiness of the human as a key trope in infection 
narratives. Disregarding our categories as they jump from species to species — often 
from animals we exploit for food—infectious agents threaten to strip away the veneer of 
human subjectivity to reveal the fleshy animal carcass beneath (Schell 1997, 119). 
Schell quotes from a popular science book on infectious diseases characterizing an 
infectious microbe as being able to
break through the lines that separate one species from another. It did not know 
boundaries. It did not know what humans are; or perhaps you could say that it 
knew only too well what humans are, it knew that humans are meat (Preston 
1995; in Schell 1997, 119).  79
In popular science discourses, Schell argues, infection makes meat of the human 
subject, obliterating the boundaries we have erected between ourselves and the 
animals we have already made into dead flesh. Even without the latent possibilities of 
bacterial symbiogenesis, the human consumption and incorporation of animal bodies as 
meat is a site of profound self-other anxiety; meat-eating at once reifies the 
carnophallogocentric human subject though the sacrifice of the animal other and 
potentially subverts the notion of that very subject’s exceptionalism by demonstrating 
that human and animal bodies are mutually nutritive. If meat-eating, as Fiddes has 
argued (1991), is (among other things) an expression of human mastery over 
nonhuman ‘Nature,' Simak’s ‘Drop Dead’ speaks to a deep-seated anxiety within 
carnophallogocentric discourses concerning the incompleteness of that supposed 
 The microbe under discussion is a virus, but the point applies just as well to bacteria79
 193
domination. In Simak’s story of meaty metamorphosis, an assemblage of lively bacterial 
actants allow the dead and eaten nonhuman to bite back, infecting the human diner with 
an alien agenda. ‘Drop Dead’s’ human scientists instrumentalize and devour ‘critters’ 
and in a twist of poetic justice are subsequently transformed into ‘meat animals’ 
themselves. Lomax (1989, 139) writes that in Simak’s SF, bizarre and dramatic human/
alien encounters break down taken-for-granted alien and human identity categories, 
with the gaze of the Other turning an unflattering mirror back on the human subject. 
’Drop Dead’s’ fateful encounter between agricultural economists and meat critters 
accomplishes just such a breakdown: the boundaries between self-other, human-animal 
and subject-object are obliterated in the nutritive encounter, in which the Other gazes 
hungrily back upon the human. The story “exacts the familiar dream vengeance on 
industrial capitalism” so prominent in Simak’s work (Pringle 1980, 67), punishing those 
who hew to the logic of instrumentalization by giving these ecocolonial plunderers a 
taste of their own medicine. The encounter with alterity reduces the neo-Darwinist 
economists of Simak’s survey team not just to their supposed substrate of base 
animality, but to the deadened life of always-already meat to which they themselves 
would relegate the more-than-human biotic world.
Xeno(symbio)genesis: Octavia E. Butler
Octavia Butler’s acclaimed Xenogenesis trilogy offers a starkly different vision of the 
symbiogenic potentials of alimentary encounters than that articulated in Simak’s ‘Drop 
Dead.’ In Simak’s bitterly ironic parable, rampant consumption leads to contagion and 
subsequently abjection. In Butler’s more ambivalent representation of the possibilities of 
 194
mutual transformation through eating, interspecies commensality leads to symbiosis 
and ultimately to an equivocally providential metamorphosis for each partner species. 
Thomas has argued that SF written by women is more likely to approach corporeal 
transformation as ambiguous or even empowering, rather than simply debilitating; 
Schell describes a similar tradition of SF narratives in which racialized ‘others’ are 
liberated rather than violated by symbiogenic transformations (Thomas 2000; Schell 
1997, 123). A Black feminist writer of SF in the late twentieth century U.S., Butler is 
renown for her relentless interrogation of the dynamics of domination, acquiescence 
and resistance (Melzer 2006, 54-6). According to Haraway, “[c]atastrophe, survival and 
metamorphosis are Butler's constant themes” (1991, 226); her work is deeply 
“preoccupied with forced reproduction, unequal power, the ownership of self by another, 
the siblingship of humans with aliens and the failure of siblingship within 
species” (Haraway 1989, 378). Blackness profoundly informs her challenging and 
ambiguous stories: “the narratives of slavery and the power relations inherent in those 
narratives, remain a disturbing feature” of her novels (Wolmark 1994, 3; also Haraway 
1991, 228; Dowdall 2017; Tucker 2007; Magedanz 2012). An avowed anti-utopian (Beal 
1986, 14),  her ambivalent narratives confound easy ideological pigeonholing, but may 80
be characterized as “centrally concerned with the exploration of transitional states in 
which the boundaries between self and other become fluid and in which the search for 
homogeneity is resisted” (Wolmark 1993, 29; Idema 2016). In these respects, Butler is 
perhaps uniquely well-positioned to critique dominant narratives of bodily transformation 
 Although Butler herself did not see her work as utopian (at least as of 1986) critical debate regarding 80
the utopian and dystopian dialectics in her work remains lively. See Stickgold-Sarah (2010)
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as a “loss of the human,” a state of abjection akin to that of ‘meat’—which is precisely 
what she accomplishes with her Xenogenesis trilogy. 
In Xenogenesis, a nuclear holocaust has decimated life on Earth, nearly obliterating the 
human population and devastating ecosystems and species worldwide. Protagonist 
Lilith Iyapo (a Black anthropologist from the United States) and other human survivors 
awaken on an alien spaceship two hundred and fifty years later, cured of their radiation 
poisoning and are given the chance to return to a restored Earth. The catch? They must 
submit to a process of genetic hybridization with their alien rescuers/captors, who call 
themselves the Oankali, a term loosely translating to “gene trader” (Butler 2000, 41). 
Their children will be human-alien hybrids sharing and exceeding the capacities of both 
species. The Oankali have sterilized all surviving humans—only through genetic 
hybridization with Oankali (achieved via interspecies copulation) are humans able to 
reproduce at all. As Holden (1998) puts it, “according to the terms imposed by the 
Oankali, humankind as we know it will cease to exist, either through attrition or through 
genetic intermixing with the Oankali” (231). The aliens—who resemble bipedal “sea 
slugs with limbs and tentacles” (Michaels 2000, 650)—are the product of exactly the 
kind of symbiotic evolution that ‘Drop Dead’s’ neo-Darwinist agricultural scientists 
viewed with such horror and anxiety. Oankali evolution was never a red-in-tooth-and-
claw struggle for existence or a ruthless competition for the survival of the fittest. 
Instead, the Oankali incorporate genetical material from other species they encounter in 
a process of conscious sympoetic evolution, hybridizing themselves with each 
successive “trade” of genes, much like the lateral gene transfer of Earthly bacteria,
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We’re not hierarchical, you see. We never were. But we are powerfully 
acquisitive. We acquire new life—seek it, investigate it, manipulate it, sort it, use 
it. We carry the drive to do this in a minuscule cell within a cell—a tiny organelle 
within every cell of our bodies. (41)
This organelle—“the essence of ourselves, the origin of ourselves," as the Oankali put it 
—enable the aliens to “perceive DNA and manipulate it precisely” (41) without resorting 
to technical mediation. It is not neo-Darwinian competition, but “that organelle’s 
invasion, acquisition, duplication and symbiosis” with the cytoplasmic and genetic 
material of so-called “partner species” that has driven Oankali evolution (544). The 
organelle enables the Oankali to hybridize “with life-forms so completely dissimilar that 
they were unable to even perceive one another as alive” (ibid.). Across millions of years 
and multiple “trades” and transformations, the Oankali are “always changing in every 
way but one—that one organelle” that constitutes the core of their identity and the 
engine of their evolutionary process (ibid.). 
Butler acknowledges her debt to the theory of symbiogenesis within the text, “describing 
mitochondria’s incorporation with human cells in an overt reference to the then-
speculative endosymbiotic theory” (Bollinger 2010, 42).  Nikanj, an Oankali character, 81
 Bollinger argues that the action of the Xenogenesis trilogy ”depends upon symbiosis, not 81
symbiogenesis, with the novels centring on the power dynamics between humans and the 
more-advanced Oankali rather than on the act of incorporating the organelle as a separate 
lifeform” (2010,42). While the narrative does not centre on the act of incorporating the 
intracellular organelle and the first novel indeed focuses on humans and Oankali as discrete 
entities, the following two thirds of the trilogy tell the story of the hybrid offspring of the first’s 
main characters. That the bulk of Xenogenesis’ narrative is related by hybrid characters who are 
the first generation of a new species born of symbiogenesis to me suggests that symbiogenesis 
does in fact play a significant role in the trilogy. 
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recounts how “mitochondria, a previously independent form of life, have found a haven 
and trade for their ability to synthesize proteins and metabolize fats for room to live and 
reproduce” inside human cells (427). Referring to a human character who has been 
genetically altered to receive the Oankali organelle, Nikanj points out that
We’re in his cells too now and the cells have accepted us. One Oankali 
organelle within each cell, dividing with each cell, extending life and resisting 
disease.… I think we’re as much symbionts as their mitochondria were 
originally. They could not have evolved into what they are without mitochondria. 
(427) 
in a similar vein, Butler makes explicit reference to the ubiquity of symbiosis in 
sustaining human life, giving the example of bacteria living in human intestines. “They 
could not exist without symbiotic relationships with other creatures," Nikanj muses. “Yet 
such relationships frighten them” (427). Part of Butler’s project in Xenogenesis is 
contesting this fear of symbiosis and the narratives of human exceptionalism and 
organismal atomism that inform and enable it. By acknowledging the symbiogenic 
origins of human life and crafting a speculative narrative of consciously-orchestrated 
xeno-symbiogenesis between humans and an alien species of consummate symbionts, 
Butler’s trilogy “recast[s] the usual origin story of the evolutionary rise to dominance of 
the heroic individual (that first organelle floating in the primeval soup) through ruthless 
competition and survival of the fittest” (Peppers 1995, 54). Put another way, Butler’s 
Oankali are the symbolic embodiment of diversity (Roberts 2000, 135), 
descendants neither of a Garden of Eden nor of some prototypical ‘first’ 
Oankali whose purity they have preserved in their lineage. On the contrary, 
 198
they are totally mixed or hybridized beings who are driven to strive for further 
hybridization. (Grewe-Volpp 2003, 161) 
Whereas Simak’s scientists are horrified by the boundary pollution of symbiogenesis 
and disoriented by the loss of the hegemonic evolutionary narrative of the heroic 
individual, the characters of Butler’s Xenogenesis survive by embracing these somatic 
hybridizations and narrative subversions.
Vegan ecofeminists from outer space?
As stressed previously, symbiosis is not a synonym for “mutually beneficial” (Haraway 
2016, 60); rather, it is a value-neutral term describing a relationship of close and 
protracted physical intimacy between different species. Symbionts can be parasites, 
enemies, or profoundly unequal partners (Margulis 2007). Perhaps this explains why 
Xenogenesis’ Oankali aliens provoke such varied and discordant readings, from 
nonviolent vegans (Harper 2011) embodying an ecofeminist ethic of antihierarchical 
interrelationality (Alaimo 2000) to anthropophagic (Hammer, 1996; Sands 2003) 
slavemasters (Grewe-Volpp 2003) and interstellar biopirates executing a eugenic 
pogrom of forced miscegenation (Stein, 2004; Slonczewski, 2000) to effect the genocide 
of the human species (Canavan 2016b). The following pages critically examine the case 
for understanding the Oankali as anti-hierarchical vegans, before broaching an as-yet 
undertheorized element of the trilogy (and the author’s entire oeuvre): namely, Butler’s 
enduring penchant for narratives of anthropophagy.
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A sophisticated and challenging text, Xenogenesis has generated a wealth of critical 
literature. Feminist thinkers from cyborg, posthumanist, science studies and critical race 
studies perspectives have found in the trilogy a rich repository of thematic material for 
analysis. Ecofeminists have found Xenogenesis and Butler’s work more generally, 
particularly generative: “by focusing on race, gender and nature, analytical categories 
central to ecofeminist discourse, Butler’s novels promise a rewarding ecofeminist 
reading’ (Grewe-Volpp 2003, 153; see also Alaimo 1998; 2000; 2010; Alonzo 2013; 
Agraso 2016; Harper 2011; Vargas 2009; Campbell 2010; Merrick, 2008). However, 
even within the broadly defined field of feminist ecocriticism, radically incommensurate 
readings of the trilogy coexist in uneasy proximity. For Harper, the Oankali are vegan 
saviours from the stars, come to show the surviving humans the error of their hierarchal, 
carnist and ecocidal ways. It is not insignificant, she argues, that “the Oankali, who 
‘save’ human beings, believe that a plant-centred diet is crucial for humans not to 
perpetuate violence or destroy their planet” (2011, 111). The Oankali aversion to 
violence and refusal to eat meat is one facet of the species’ uniquely embodied form of 
empathy wherein they share the sensations of the organisms around them (Alaimo 
2000, 405). Violence is “against their flesh and bone, every cell of them…To kill was not 
simply wasteful to the Oankali. It was an unacceptable as slicing off their own healthy 
limbs” (Butler 2000, 564). Dietary vegans who encourage humans to similarity adhere to 
a plant-based diet, the Oankali make clear that “they would neither kill animals for [Lilith] 
nor allow her to kill them while she lived with them” (Butler 2000, 90). As Harper points 
out, only the most violent and deplorable male characters in the trilogy crave or procure 
meat: one man even waxes nostalgic for hamburgers and rails against the Oankali 
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enforcement of a vegan diet shortly before attempting to rape Lilith (2011, 121), a scene 
that is perhaps the most pointed of Butler’s many literary mediations on the 
interdependency of violent ideologies and carnal urges (Sands 2003, 2; Hammer 1996). 
For Harper, the Oankali are ecofeminists par excellence, beings who pursue “no 
relationships based on domination” and for whom interpersonal violence or hierarchy is 
all but unthinkable (2011, 115). 
Perhaps the most arrestingly alien aspect of the Oankali is their haptic epistemology—
their “body knowledge," as Alaimo puts it (2000, 145). For the Oankali, to know is to 
taste—they “read” genetic material with their tongues and tentacles, which constitute 
their main sensory organs. The Oankali “literally consume genetic material, reading it as 
books” as well as depending on it “as an essential food” (Sands 2003, 8). Nutrition and 
epistemology are inseparable to the hungry gene traders, for whom “eating is a 
legitimate mode of intellectual, emotional knowledge” (Paresocli 2008, 81).  Alaimo 82
characterizes this aspect of the Oankali’s uniquely embodied mode of perception—“not 
through vision, which implies distance and abstraction, but through their sensory 
organs, which touch and taste genetic information”—as a form of knowing “inhospitable 
to hierarchies” (Alaimo 2000, 145). The Oankali thus “embody natureculture: they do not 
see the realms as discrete” (Alaimo 2000, 145). Alaimo argues that Butler’s depiction of 
 Paraescoli is not referring to Butler’s work here, but is discussing Samuel Delany’s Stars in My Pocket 82
Like Grains of Sand (1984), another SF text written by a Black author and published just prior to 
Xenogenesis; however, the insight is just as salient to Butler’s Oankali as it is to Delany’s many-tongued 
Evelmi. Taste-based epistemologies crop up in several different species in Delany’s Stars: in another 
scene a being resembling a giant sentient jellyfish offers some of “its” own flesh to the novel’s human 
protagonist, “if you’re hungry, I’d be highly complemented if you’d eat some of me. Indeed, if there’s any 
of you you can spare, body, hair, nail parings, dried skin..?” (1984, 69). For Parasecoli, Delany’s narrative 
understands “cannibalism as a sort of gift exchange between races” (2008, 81).
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the Oankali “provides a paradigm for feminism and anti-racism” and “confirms an 
ecological worldview of situated connectedness and constitutive interrelations” (2000, 
147).
However, as Haraway points out of the Oankali in Primate Visions, “hierarchy is not 
power's only shape” (1989, 380): the gene-traders’ claim to have avoided hierarchies 
does not necessarily mean “they have eschewed power” (Bonner 1990, n.p.). Butler’s 
complex narrative suggests a much darker and more coercive side to these supposed 
vegan ecofeminists from outer space. While they inflict no physical violence upon other 
motile species, the Oankali have no qualms about genetically “assembling” other 
creatures to serve their needs willingly, toiling happily as a beasts of burden aboard 
their masters’ starships (Butler 2000, 446). As one character observes, “humans put 
animals in cages or tried to keep them from straying. Oankali simply bred animals who 
did not want to stray and who enjoyed doing what they were intended to do” (Butler 
2000, 446). In biopolitical terms, the Oankali spurn clumsy and violent sovereign power 
in favour of a more coercive deployment of biopower (Foucault 1976). Empaths who 
feel the pain they inflict on other animals, the Oankali never kill, never ‘make die’—but 
they constantly ‘make live,’ and they are careful to ensure that the lives they bring forth 
are conducive to Oankali instrumentalization. This is as true for Oankali-human relations 
as it is for Oankali-other animal relations. Towards the end of second novel, a hybrid 
character makes the chilling observation that “[y]ou controlled both animals and people 
by controlling their reproduction—controlling it absolutely” (447). The Oankali achieve 
this by sterilizing all humans who refuse to submit to genetic hybridization and ensuring 
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that the only way cooperative humans can reproduce—or even experience sexual 
pleasure—is through Oankali mediation.  And reproduce they must: Oankali sex with 83
humans is depicted as “super-procreative” (Slonczewski 2000, np). “Oankali-human 
families are expected to produce children upon children,” hybrid offspring of the gene 
trade whose human genetic heritage will invigorate the next generation of Oankali 
explorers (ibid.). Lilith is not exaggerating when she describes herself as “part of a 
captive breeding program” (60), like a creature in a zoo: “we used to treat animals that 
way," she observes bitterly. The Oankali’s reproductive colonization (Stein 2004, 214) 
recalls not only modernity’s practices of human-animal relations, but also the sexual 
power dynamics of American chattel slavery (Martini 2009, 63); like so much of Butler’s 
oeuvre, Xenogenesis is haunted by “the spectre of coerced miscegenation” (Peppers 
1995, 50). Grewe-Volpp argues that despite their egalitarian social structure and 
preference for coercion rather than violence, the Oankali are not as anti-hierarchical as 
they would have the humans believe; they relate to humans “like slave-masters […] 
exercis[ing] power over them [and] forc[ing] them to submit to their own needs and 
desires“ (Grewe-Volpp 2003, 163). While the Oankali’s haptic epistemology might 
indeed be antithetical to dualisms (Alaimo, 2000) it certainly does not stop the aliens 
 Haraway argues that “Octavia Butler is a very frustrating writer in some ways, because she constantly 83
reproduces heterosexuality even in her poly-gendered species” (Penly and Ross 1990,16, in Grebowicz 
and Merrick 2013, 171 n8). Like all of Butler’s novels, Xenogenesis presents a relentlessly heterosexual 
future. As Haraway points out, “heterosexuality remains unquestioned, if more complexly mediated. The 
different social subjects, the different genders that could emerge from another embodiment of resistance 
to compulsory heterosexual reproductive politics, do not inhabit this Dawn” (1991, 229). Slonczewski 
elaborates, “Nowhere is there a role for non-procreative forms of sexuality, such as gay or lesbian 
relationships. While Butler’s characters occasionally take a critical view of homophobia, it is interesting 
that the Oankali "third sex," the ooloi, always takes a male form to seduce a female human, but a female 
form to seduce a male human” (Slonczewski 2000, np). The utter lack of LGBT characters in 
Xenogenesis might even be understood as a a kind of queer genocide: perhaps the Oankali have simply 
opted not to resuscitate any gay, lesbian or trans humans as part of their project of erasing any kind of 
sexual partnership that is not at least potentially reproductive. 
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from operating in domineering ways. They employ a strategy of “erotic 
colonization” (Stein 2004, 214) whereby they manipulate other creatures into serving 
their needs by neurally stimulating intensely gratifying sensations; the Oankali thus 
coerce humans into “forms of interspecies sex that brutally, yet pleasurably, incorporate 
humanity into an interspecies future” (Ahuja 2015, 380). Their ‘tasting’ genetic material 
from unsuspecting bodies raises uncomfortable questions of consent: in the case of 
Lilith, the Oankali “expropriat[e] her genetic/reproductive materials without consent and 
… combin[e] them into a mix that suits their needs for the “trade”” (Stein 2004, 215). 
The Oankali consume Lilith’s tissue, remix it with DNA from her dead lover and genetic 
material from three other Oankali ‘parents,' and reimplant it in her body without her 
knowledge; rather inauspiciously, this “coerced pregnancy” is first occurrence of xeno-
symbiogenesis between the two species (ibid.).
Acquisitive cannibalism?
The Oankali’s taste-based epistemology, intuitive from birth, also raises the 
uncomfortable possibility that these supposedly nonviolent vegan explorers from outer 
space might in fact be considered people-eaters. Hybrid character Akin recounts how, 
while being breastfed by his human mother, he begins to sample and analyze—to 
“taste," in the Oankali sense—“her flesh as well as her milk” (Butler 2000, 256). 
Consider the following exchange between Lilith and the Oankali Nikanj,
“It’s a good thing your people don’t eat meat. If you did, the way you talk 
about us, our flavours and your hunger and your need to taste us, I think you 
would eat us instead of fiddling with our genes.” And after a moment of 
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silence, “That might even be better. It would be something we could 
understand and fight against.”
Nikanj had not said a word. It might have been feeding on her even then—
sharing bits of her most recent meal, taking in dead or malformed cells from 
her flesh, even harvesting a ripe egg before it could begin its journey down 
her fallopian tubes. It stored some eggs and consumed the
rest… (2000, 689)
According to Hammer, this “revelation” that the Oankali actually eat the humans they 
come into contact with “constitutes the true climax of the story” (1995, 93). The Oankali 
“need human mates because they literally consume their cellular structures whenever 
they touch them” (Hammer 1995, 93)—it is through this alimentary encounter, this near-
parasitic relation of commensality, that the xeno-symbiogenesis of Butler’s trilogy is 
enacted. By tasting and consuming other creatures’ bodily tissues in order to know and 
understand them in the “certainty of the flesh” (Butler 2000, 476), the Oankali literalize 
St Clair’s assertion that “[i]ncorporation is the ultimate intimacy”; the Oankali would 
surely agree with her sentiment that “[t]here is no form of carnal knowledge so complete 
as that of knowing how someone tastes” (St Clair 1976, 1).
The Oankali predilection for surreptitiously nibbling on human flesh is but part of a wider 
pattern of anthropophagic tropes in Butler’s work. From the Clayarks’s ravenous hunger 
for human meat in Clay’s Ark (1996), to Doro’s hunger for fresh bodies to wear and 
discard in Wild Seed (1980) and Mind of My Mind (1978), to the vampires of Fledgling 
(2005) and the Oankali themselves, anthropophagy occupies a position of “prominence 
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and narrative significance in her major fiction” (Sands 2003, 2; Hammer 1996). Butler 
consistently deploys these “cannibal tropes in the service of narratives that emphasise 
the permeability of the skin boundary and the mutability of the self” (Sands 2003, 11)—
narratives that emphasize the transcorporeality of bodies, the incessant exchange of 
matter than sustains and characterizes embodied life (Alaimo 2010). This Oankali 
predilection to hybridize with rather than repudiate the Other needs to be approached 
critically; while it is true that concerns of purity and self-other hyperseparation are alien 
to them, this anti-dualism does not sanction their unfettered drive to “collect” (Butler, 
2000, 239) biomaterial from other lifeforms. When Butler describes the Oankali as an 
‘acquisitive’ rather than competitive species, she is surely not deaf to the term’s more 
mundane meaning of ‘greedy’ or ‘rapacious.’ The Oankali seek and consume difference 
because “they need it to keep themselves from stagnation and 
overspecialization” (Butler 2000, 239) and, crucially, because they have the power to do 
so with relative impunity. As Stein (2003) points out, “the Oankali’s biotechnological 
superiority serves as their mandate to colonize other species for their own needs and to 
appropriate genetic characteristics that will improve their own evolutionary needs” (213). 
The Oankali reap the biodiversity of each planet they encounter “to fuel new iterations of 
themselves” (Dowdall 2017, 512) in a colonial enterprise of interplanetary biopiracy 
(Shiva 1997). Slonczewski argues for understanding the Oankali as “consummate 
genetic engineers who sample the genes of all different organisms for their ‘interesting 
taste,’ rather as Americans choose to dine at ethnic restaurants” (2000, n.p.). This sort 
of “genetic consumerism,” wherein tissue is coerced or outright stolen from powerless 
creatures in order to serve Oankali needs and desires, for Slonczewski demonstrates 
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that “the closer one looks, the Oankali are not our opposites, but rather an extension of 
some of humanity’s most extreme tendencies” (2000, n.p.; Hammer 1996). There is 
ample textual evidence within the narrative of Xenogenesis to support my argument that 
the xeno-symbiogenesis effected by Oankali is not innocent, but coerced and 
profoundly unequal; the Oankali cannot be beatified as epitomizing ecofeminist ideals of 
embracing difference and living ecologically and nonhierarchically. Like Traviss’ 
Wess’har and the discourses of deep ecology they evoke, the Oankali spectacularly fail 
to meaningfully engage with alterity: “The Oankali acceptance of difference is more 
accurately an absorption of difference” (Holden 1998, 5). Even though human genetic 
material is present in the hybrid children of the two species, “it will be an Oankali 
species” (Butler 2000, 433),
“It will grow and divide as Oankali always have and it will call itself Oankali…. 
and the Humans will be extinct, just as they believe […] They will only be… 
something we consumed” (Butler 2000, 422-3, original ellipses)
Oankali remain Oankali, even when utterly transfigured—so-called “trade partner”
species are devoured. As Holden argues, “The Oankali consumption of difference turns 
out to be not much better than the human repudiation of difference; both result in a 
domination and/or erasure of the ‘other’” (1998, 51). 
Oankali estrangements
Chapter three argued (following Plumwood 1994, 71) that the incorporation of the other 
is a problematic way to deal with difference because it fails to take alterity on its own 
terms, instead “subsuming difference within a totalizing vision” that is articulated solely 
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on the terms of the self (Cheney 1994, 164). Unity or holism is achieved only at price of 
difference and difference is “indispensable” for any ecologically situated “self-in-
relationship” with a web of distinct others (Plumwood 1993, 20; Grewe-Volpp 2003, 
156). Rather than embodying ecofeminist ideals, perhaps we might better understand 
the Oankali as literalizing ecofeminist critiques; namely, of the logic of incorporation and 
the ecological devastation such an ideology vindicates. Not only do the aliens physically 
incorporate difference by tasting and consuming other species, but they also forcibly 
repudiate the ecofeminist aim of cultivating an ecological network of distinct and intra-
acting agencies of alterity. Unlike even the flawed Wess’har, who at least attempt to 
promote ecological flourishing for all Earthly creatures, the Oankali’s end goal is the 
total obliteration of life on Earth. They are in fact slowly cannibalizing not just humanity 
but the entire planet to build another living starship, at which point (some three hundred 
years in the trilogy’s future) they will leave Earth a lifeless debris field as they set off in 
search of new ‘trade partners’:
It was not only the descendants of humans and Oankali who would eventually 
travel through space, in newly mature ships. It was also much of the substance 
of Earth. And what was left behind would be less than the corpse of a world. It 
would be small, cold and as lifeless as the moon.….The salvaged Earth would 
finally die. (Butler 2000, 365)
As Slonczewski points out, “the fact that all of Earth’s species will ultimately vanish as 
the Oankali consume the planet does not disturb them” (2000, np). The next generation 
of Oankali will no doubt tote a well-stocked gene bank of Earth species with them on 
their journey and their own bodies will carry human genetic material to the stars, but 
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they will ultimately remain Oankali, remain self, remain one. Slonczewski is surely 
correct in her assessment that the Oankali do not oppose but rather intensify humanity’s 
most extreme “acquisitive” behaviours: “Humans disturb and pollute our ecosystem; the 
Oankali will literally consume every organic molecule of it” (Slonczewski 2000, np).
The Oankali do not just extend humanity’s rapacious appetites to monstrous 
proportions: they also intensify to the point of estrangement “the very qualities that have 
at various times been held up as the basis for human identity and superiority,” namely  
language, knowledge, emotion and reason (Martini 2009, 55), 
Among the many ways in which the Oankali destabilize human subjectivity, 
then, one of the most powerful is that they are too human; they exceed us in the 
very ways that are supposed to make us special and set us apart. (Martini 2009, 
56)
This is the brilliance of Butler’s trilogy—the Oankali “other” is at once radically different 
from and uncomfortably similar to, hegemonic cultural notions of the human subject. 
Fluctuating between difference and similitude, alien and human, villain and benefactor, 
the Oankali elude taxonomic capture. When a hybrid character articulates this apparent 
contradiction by asking, “What are we that we can do this to whole peoples! Not 
predators? Not symbionts? What then?” (Butler 2000, 443), the answer must surely be 
that the Oankali are both, neither and much else besides. Captors, saviours, vegans, 
cannibals, ecofeminists, ecophages, peaceniks, slavemasters: the Oankali occupy 
multiple and conflicting positions, resisting easy interpolation into any schemata of 
moral absolutism.  
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While my analysis skews towards a negative appraisal of the Oankali, I do not wish to 
suggest they be understood as monstrous (at least, not in a negative sense). As 
Hammer persuasively argues, 
Butler ultimately challenges us to think beyond the concept of monstrosity if we 
can; consequently, to think beyond the dichotomy of eating or being eaten and 
further still, to contemplate new, heretofore unimaginable kinds of pleasure and 
fulfilment. (1996, 95)
The bargain that the Oankali make with humans—hybridize or become extinct—may not 
be such a bad exchange after all (Hammer 1996, 94). As Martini points out, “[h]aving 
assimilated all the useful adaptive strategies they have ever encountered through their 
whole phylogenic history, the Oankali are essentially invulnerable to physical threats," in 
addition to possessing unparalleled intellectual and sensory capacities and a generally 
peaceful social structure (Martini 2009, 54). Humans who agree to reproduce with 
Oankali enjoy total freedom from disease and injury, radically extended lifespans and 
(as Slonczewski puts it) easy access to “super-orgasmic” tentacle sex (2000, np). Of 
course, these boons come at the cost not only of relinquishing any claim (however 
illusory) to a distinctly human subjectivity, but ultimately of extinguishing all planetary 
life. That the devoured Earth “would live on as single-celled animals lived on after 
dividing” might do little to mitigate the loss of untold billions of extinguished Earthly lives, 
but at least it offers the possibility of multispecies reworlding (Butler 2000, 365). While 
the Oankali’s consummately symbiogenic evolutionary trajectory offers a pointed 
critique of neo-Darwinist fantasies of ‘man’ pulling ‘himself’ up by the evolutionary 
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bootstraps through competition and vertical inheritance, Butler refrains from idealizing 
either the phenomena of symbiosis/symbiogenesis or the Oankali themselves. 
Xenogenesis essentially mounts a posthumanist critique “of the individual as a rationally 
self-determining, self-defining being and of individual identity as the source of 
agency” (Jacobs 2003, 91), simultaneously exploring the pleasures and possibilities of 
deconstructing boundaries between subjects (Vint 2007, 66) and insisting that 
subjectivities emerges in relations of response-ability through which worlds are 
constituted (Haraway, 2008a; van Dooren and Bird Rose 2017, 264-5): “tendencies 
towards subject boundary dissolution are never symmetrical and therefore cannot be 
innocent” (Pedersen 2011, 72). In Xenogenesis, human and Oankali subjects are 
differentially co-constructed through their response-abilities towards one another and 
the rest of the biotic world; Butler’s ambivalent narrative thus demonstrates her 
commitment to the Harawayan exhortation to “stay with the trouble” (2016) in ever-
negotiated relations of multispecies contingency.
Conclusion: Contact zones
Simak and Butler’s SF narratives of eating and transformation articulate divergent 
responses to the implications of symbiogenesis for the human subject. A powerful 
counter-epistemological origin story (Pepper 1995), the theory of symbiogenesis 
stresses that evolution can be driven by uneasy cross-species alliances, rather than 
being propelled (solely, primarily) by random mutation and natural selection—in other 
words, "successively enriched packets of ourselves” (Thomas, cited in Hird 2009, 83). 
This is heretical stuff, not only undermining heterocentric notions of reproduction 
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(Griffith, 2015) but striking at the very heart of neo-Darwinian biological orthodoxy (Hird, 
2009, 65). ‘Drop Dead’ foregrounds the economic underpinnings of evolutionary 
ideology by pitting a team of neo-Darwinist scientist-economists against a hungry 
species of symbiotic bacteria. For Simak’s scientists, the notion of subjectivity as an 
emergent multispecies assemblage is horrific and debasing, dissolving the outline of the 
subject and reducing the human to the abject status of ‘meat.' Butler’s more ambivalent 
response to the symbiogenic subject makes clear that “the perfection of the fully 
defended, ‘victorious’ self is a chilling fantasy” (Haraway 1991, 224); her depiction of 
“Oankali sexuality, epistemology, communication and politics all suggest that the fluidity 
and openness of the posthuman body might enable new forms of subjectivity and of 
agency, grounded in relation rather than separation” (Jacobs 2003, 92). By attending to 
Oankali-human relations in all their coercive specificity her narrative refuses to efface 
the subject as an ethico-onto-epistemological entity that provokes specific modes (and 
failures) of response-ability. Xenogenesis emphasizes instead that subjects emerge 
intra-actively within the non-innocent space of the contact zone, where species entangle 
and “redo one another molecule by molecule” (Haraway 2008a, 217). These contact 
zones, as Haraway reminds us, “are difficult places of violence, injustice and power 
differentials and it is precisely for the reason that sociality and responsibility are 
inextricably linked to them” (Grebowicz & Merrick 2013, 107). Xenogenesis’ human and 
more-than-human subjects emerge in just such a zone; as Haraway argues, Lilith “fights 
for survival, agency and choice on the shifting boundaries that shape the possibility of 
meaning” (1989, 379), enmeshed in a zone of “abject disempowerment, rape and an 
overall lack of consent in establishing the terms of the interspecies encounter” (Martini 
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2009, 58). In this way Butler’s narrative “forces us to face the subject—that 
overdetermined and ever-changing entity, structured by cultural inscription—while it 
refuses to allow us the solace of belief in a stable self” defined in juxtaposition to the 
other (Vint 2007, 76; Dowdall 2017, 517). Butler tempers her “critique of humanism and 
its foundation of human exceptionalism with her insistence on respectful consideration 
of the construct of humanity”—a generative tension that needs no critical reconciliation 
(Martini 2009, 62). Xenogenesis’ ambivalent narrative of interspecies entanglement 
concretizes Haraway’s insight that “[t]he more one looks, the more the name of the 
game of living and dying on earth is a convoluted multi-species affair that goes by the 
name of symbiosis, the yoking together of companion species, at the table 
together” (Haraway 2013, 145). Xenogenesis and material feminisms alike articulate a 
subject that is as always-already multiple, always-already in flux, emerging not 
autopoetically but only ever in sympoesis with a host of other lives and materialities 
(Haraway 2016). Ethics emerges in this interaction with alterity: by refusing to either 
erase the subject as an ethico-political entity or romanticize symbiogenesis as a 
synonym for the good, Butler’s narrative materializes Haraway’s argument that 
symbiogenesis and subjectivities alike are about “becoming with each other in 
response-ability” (Haraway 2016, 145). It is this commitment to the complexity of 
ecological embodiment that ecofeminist apparatuses are so well-equipped to parse. 
From the hungry perspectives of SImak’s symbiotic critter-bacteria and Butler’s 
acquisitive Oankali, earthly (hum)animals have always been meat, one way or another; 
the task is to negotiate, in shared corporeal vulnerability, our response-abilities towards 
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various, differentially entangled and excluded subjects as we move towards more 
sustainable and ethical relationships with Earth others (Plumwood, 1993, 2002).  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6. Conclusion: Imagining Otherwise
Dualistic configurations of subjectivity are hostile to other animals in multiple registers. 
The anthropological machine produces always-already human subjectivity by 
disavowing any characteristics deemed animalistic, while the biopolitical apparatuses of 
advanced capitalism discursively and materially ensnare other animals within economic 
relations of property and designate them ‘bare life,’ raw material for human 
instrumentalization. Not only does this ontology of subject-object dualism facilitate an 
interlocking respect-use dichotomy that excludes so-called ‘food’ animals from any 
possibility of political life, it actively mandates their perpetual sacrifice and consumption 
as integral to the performative enactment of the properly carnophallogocentric human 
subject. Extending subjectivity to encompass certain kinds of nonhuman others based 
on perceived similarities to valued human characteristics does little to challenge the 
sacrificial structure of subjectivity itself, which feeds upon on its subordinate others in a 
kind of perpetual “metaphysical cannibalism” that relies upon that which it disavows 
(Braidotti 1991). No wonder critics such as Haraway declare that “[t]he last thing [other 
animals] ‘need’ is human subject status, in whatever cultural-historical form” (2008b, 
176). Including (some) other animals in dominant constructions of subjectivity is hardly 
unproblematic: “The best animals could get out of that approach is the ‘right’ to be 
permanently represented, as lesser humans, in human discourse” (Haraway 2008b, 
176). Indeed, it has become axiomatic within animal studies discourses that moral 
extensionist approaches to more-than-human ethics risk reifying anthroponormative 
hierarchies or scales of worth, as the criteria by which we judge others as worthy of 
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inclusion in the moral community are inevitably skewed towards human capacities 
(Noske, 1989, xi). After all, 
there is no obvious reason for us to take mammals or fish or even bees as the 
bright line at which we make an agential ethical cut, bringing them into the fold 
of our moral regard. Why should we accord the cow more moral standing than 
the worm? (Shotwell 2016, 120). 
Or the worm more moral standing than the vegetable? Why should we accord the 
organism (if such a thing can even be said to exist) more moral standing than the cell? 
As Hird points out, “our current concern with human-animal relations obscure[s] 
bacterial intra-actions that have nothing to do with humans and are beyond human 
recognition” (Hird 2009, 28). In attempting to mitigate the effects of violent 
anthropocentrism on other vertebrates, Hird suggests, critical animal theorists end up 
reinforcing zoocentric assumptions by extending moral regard to a small selection of 
other animals while leaving the rest of the biotic world out in the cold of moral dismissal. 
Entangled ethics
Unlike some critical animal theorists (Weisberg 2014), I have no interest in foreclosing 
the possibilities of ethical alliances with bacteria, or semi-living tissue forms, or aliens, 
or plants or garbage dumps or ecosystems or any other agential assemblages—such 
an indiscriminately exclusionary agential cut would be incompatible with ecofeminist 
values and theory (Gaard 2016; Plumwood 2002). But attending to response-able 
entanglements with non-animal actants in no way requires backgrounding the 
exclusions enacted by particular agential cuts, as materialized within particular 
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sociotechnic apparatuses (Hollin, Forsyth, Giraud & Potts 2017); nor does it demand the 
withholding of ethical and political subjectivity from those creatures who need it most. I 
suspect that some posthumanist/neomaterialist critics underestimate how profoundly 
the prospect of nonhuman animal subjectivity challenges the metaphysics of 
anthropocentrism, which has for so long kept ethical and political subjectivity bulwarked 
behind a wall of human exceptionalism (Wise 2000). The assertion of subject-status for 
certain kinds of nonhumans at the very least destabilizes human supremacist ideologies 
that reserve moral considerability for (qualifying) members of the human species alone 
and render everyone and everything else at least potentially killable, on the far side of a 
respect-use dichotomy. As Pedersen asks,
if not only subjectivities, but also power relations are understood as organic, 
dynamic, genuinely unstable ecologies, why not use the open-ended 
indeterminacy of posthumanism to radically transform our consumption referents, 
theories and practices? (Pedersen 2011, 75) 
The value of including of animals within dominant configurations of subjectivity, as a 
strategic intervention within neoliberal capitalist regimes of instrumentalization, should 
not be lightly dismissed. For the billions of animals perpetually, generationally 
incarcerated in the animal industrial complex (and other animal use industries), legal-
political subject-status—however flawed—surely offers more opportunity to develop 
relations of multispecies flourishing than the current status quo of human moral 
exceptionalism. Acknowledging subjectivity as an onto-epistemologically contingent 
performance and embodied life as an ongoing entanglement of heterogeneous 
materialities “does not preclude an ethical consideration of the nonhuman animals who 
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will become food in a carnophallogocentric economy of sacrifice” (Struthers-Montford & 
Taylor 2018, 32).
Yet, all too frequently, new materialist theory has been “utilized to undermine normative 
claims about our ethical relationships toward other animals” (Stanescu 2015 n.p.; 
Weisberg 2014)—as Hird does when she declares that the prospect of “eating well with 
bacteria complicates animal rights discourse, vegetarianism and veganism” (Hird 2009, 
38; see Weisberg 2014, 103). An explanation of precisely how the recognition of 
bacteria as lively agents complicates the recognition of animals as subjects who 
unmistakably communicate their disinclination to be incarcerated, mutilated and 
murdered, is not forthcoming. Nor does Hird explain why it is only animal and not 
human rights discourses that are undermined by ethically attending to our bacterial 
companion species, whatever that might mean. This strategy of delegitimizing critical 
animal theory as myopic and parochial in its insistent focus on creatures who are in 
some ways ‘like us’ is nothing new. Decades ago, Davis (1995) diagnosed a similar 
derision towards farmed animals (and their advocates) within dominant discourses of 
environmental philosophy. Situating environmental ethicist Aldo Leopold’s (1949[1966]) 
influential exhortation to “think like a mountain” (rather than make a fuss about farmed 
animal suffering) within a long history of hierarchically dualistic and masculinist 
philosophizing, Davis shows how certain environmental philosophy discourses (eg. 
Knox 1991) have caricatured “animal rights” (CAS) approaches to ethics as “a one-note 
samba” concerned only with "little things” (Knox 1991, 31-32), like individuals and 
beings with feelings. An environmentalist sensibility, by contrast, in this account purports 
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to “listen to the entire fugue of rocks and trees, amoebas and heavy metals, dodos and 
rivers and styrofoam” (Knox 1991, 32). In this grand onto-epistemology, Davis argues, 
“the small tones of life are drowned out by the regal harmonies of the mountain and 
their ersatz echoes in the groves of the academe”: how could the soft voices of ‘meat’ 
animals ever hope to be heard over such “trumpet blasts and iron oratory”? (1995, 204) 
While many environmental thinkers have found that “it feels good to think like a 
mountain,” few have been similarly inclined “to think like a battery hen and view oneself 
and one's species through her eyes” (205). The contemporary iteration of this strategy is 
to declare bacteria, or viruses, or organelles, or multispecies agential assemblages 
“good to think with” and contrast this sophisticated perspective with the blinkered 
perspective of critical animal theory: in When Species Meet (2008), for example, 
Haraway shrugs off “the demands individual animals might make as ventriloquized in 
rights idioms” (28, italics added; see also Hird 2009). Agitating for the extension of 
subjectivity to other animals is mere “humanist posthumanism,” not the cutting-edge 
“posthumanist posthumanism” of visionaries like Haraway and Wolfe (Wolfe 2010, 125; 
Fraiman 2012).  Viewed in this light, the neomaterialist/posthumanist propensity to 84
sneer at critical animal theory’s demand for a more expansive conception of ethical 
subjectivity takes on a distinct air of theoretical purism. Thinking like or with a farmed 
animal, it seems, feels no better to many of the posthumanists and new materialists of 
today than it did to the environmental philosophers of thirty years ago.85
 Although Wolfe identifies Haraway as one of a handful of figures representing “posthumanist 84
posthumanism” (Wolfe 2010, 125), Haraway herself rejects the term, insisting “I am not a 
posthumanist” (2008, 19)
 Haraway’s chapter “Chicken” in When Species Meet (2008), written from the ironic perspective of 85
“species chicken” rather than any individual bird, does not (in my opinion) fall within the feminist tradition 
of theorizing in solidarity with the subaltern that Davis is advocating. 
 219
CAS and new materialism are not mutually exclusive ethical paradigms, as ecofeminists 
are well aware: recognizing the agency of non-animal entities and assemblages need 
not foreclose the acknowledgement of other animals as ethical subjects. Subjectivities 
coalesce as material-semiotic narrative nodes within motley agential assemblages of 
stuff. There is “no single causal factor determining the subject; the elements of 
subjectivity intra-act in a complex web,” emerging only ever in the encounter with alterity 
(Hekman 2010, 101). The material feminist insight that agency is an ongoing unfolding 
of worldly potentialities does not mean that the temporally and corporeally legible nodes 
that emerge within this dynamic entanglement do not provoke specific modes of 
response-ability. As Davis asks, are we to suppose “that creatures whose lives we 
humans have wrecked do not have paramount moral claims on us?” (1995, 202). In 
answering Davis’ query with a resounding “no," I do not refute but rather reaffirm a 
Baradian/Harawayan ethics of entanglement wherein ‘the subject’ emerges not as an 
ontic entity but as a narrative heuristic aimed at a specific configuration of alterity, a 
‘thou’ to whom the ‘I’ enters into specific relations of response-ability — even if both ‘I’ 
and ‘thou’ turn out to be contingent fictions within a field of various composed and 
recomposing agential assemblages (Buber 1923; Kepner 1992; Donovan 2016, 79; 
Haraway 2008a, 1-3). To be clear: I am not arguing that we need to specify our subject 
of care before we begin to care (a stance rightly critiqued by Schrader [2015]) but rather 
that being open to relations of care beyond the animal need not negate the specific 
response-abilities prompted by those creatures who yearn and suffer in ways 
contiguous to our own and who do so en mass at human hands. Identifying and 
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responding to the ethical obligations posed by particular relations demands “an 
altogether more fleshly consideration than references to non-innocence and ‘staying 
with the trouble’” (Giraud, Hollin, Potts & Forsyth 2018, 75). Anti-anthropocentric 
configurations of subjectivity, I have argued, stimulate ethical responses to alterity and 
subsequently intervene against the thanopolitical and ecocidal apparatuses of late 
capitalism. By diffractively engaging SF narratives about meat-eating, I have attempted 
to articulate a relational subjectivity grounded in response-ability rather than domination 
that does not cleave the human from the rest but recognizes that we are all becoming-
with one other in this mangle of worldly matter. Following Braidotti (2014) in “redefining 
contemporary subjects-in-process as accountable entities” (8) with whom to engage in 
mutually negotiated relations of response-abilities, I stress the urgency of materializing 
antidualist configurations of subjectivity as dynamic, performative and always-already 
relational. The sovereign, autonomous and skin-encapsulated human subject, coherent 
only though the symbolic and material sacrifice of the animal other, is not the only kind 
of subject-form possible.
The kind of ethical more-than-human subjectivity I have tried to articulate rejects the 
philosophical legacy of hyperseperation that chops the world into subjects and objects 
as not only ontologically untenable, but epistemologically violent. Such intense 
emphasis on boundary-drawing between what counts and what does not risks rejecting 
the ecological embodiment and inherent edibility of Earthly agents, all of whom, as 
Plumwood reminds us, are ultimately meat for one another (2008). If the world is 
comprised of subjects and objects and we must never consume the former, by default 
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anything we do consume must fall into the latter category—a pernicious double bind in 
which any body we consume (creaturely or otherwise) must therefore be an object, to 
be used ruthlessly and without compunction. Avoiding this respect-use dualism means 
that simply choosing to eat from the ‘object’ side of this false split, as if that solved the 
dilemma, is ethically untenable. Haraway is surely correct when she writes that “eating 
and killing cannot be hygienically separated,” that there is “no way to eat and not to 
become with other mortal beings to whom we are accountable, no way to pretend 
innocence or transcendence or a final peace” (2008, 295).
Vegan Subjectivities in D’Lacey’s Meat and LePan’s Animals
Following Quinn and Westwood (2018) in conceiving of vegan practices as subject 
positions from which to think (2), I would like to return to the human cattle dystopias of 
chapter two. Meat (D’Lacey 2009) provides an example of exactly the kind of 
subjectivity predicated upon delusions of transcendence and innocence against which 
Plumwood and Haraway caution. The novel’s sunlight-eating, ascetic insurrectionists, 
who eschew not only animal flesh but all earthly nutritive matter, vividly bring the figure 
of the purity-driven, ecologically alienated vegan subject to life. “I want my purity back," 
protagonist Shanti declares on Meat’s very first page, as he embarks on one of his 
excruciating daily runs loaded down by a backpack filled with rocks. This “corporeal 
mortification” (8) is “his only salvation” (2) from the sin accrued though his role as the 
most efficient bolt-gun stunner on the disassembly line of the Magnus Meat Processing 
Company—a clearer demonstration of a food ontology predicated upon Haraway’s 
salvational logic of penance could hardly be imagined. However, it is the novel’s 
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description of a quasi-religious cadre of meat-eschewing rebels that most conspicuously 
articulates Plumwood’s critique of the ecologically alienated eater. In the novel, Prophet 
John Collins and his “followers of the light” mount an insurrection against the carnist 
status quo, fighting with superhuman grace and strength to defeat the sluggish cannibal 
henchmen of the evil meat baron Magnus. “Unlike the meat-eating folk in the town,” 
Collins is “prepared to think about things differently,” and is ultimately able to find a way 
“to survive without causing harm to any other living thing” (138). He discovers “that 
refraining not only from eating meat, but from eating anything at all, changed the 
workings of his mind and gave him access to different levels of consciousness” (134). 
Collins and the most “advanced” (200) of his followers forsake eating altogether, instead 
finding nourishment through sunlight and breath with the eventual goal of transcending 
even these concessions to physical metabolism. “When enough wisdom and love had 
been acquired, even the need to breathe would become a thing of the past. People 
would understand they were immortal, that they had always possessed the potential 
without realizing it” (294). Aspiring “followers of the light” need not despair at the 
apparent unattainability of this level of absolute inedia: Shanti reassures himself (and 
the reader) that “[a]s a vegetarian he was halfway there already” (218). Clearly, 
veganism in Meat is understood as a matter of purity, a step on the path towards the 
ultimate goal of transcendence from physical embodiment altogether. This 
understanding of the “essentially or authentically human part of the self…as at best 
accidentally connected to nature and at worst in opposition to it” (Plumwood 1993, 71) is 
a corollary of hierarchical dualism’s denial of dependency upon its subordinate others, 
which come to be seen “as a source of anxiety and threat” (2002: 108). The 
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authentically human subject is thus positioned as outside nature, as a disembodied 
spirit only accidentally mired in mortal animal flesh; promises of salvation from death 
and bodily limitation are made possible by denying human continuity with and 
interdependency upon the rest of planetary life (49). One result of this denial is that 
humans are seen as “the only real subjectivities and actors in world” (19): this is literally 
the case in Meat, in which no animals other than humans appear in the entire story. 
Steeped in a dualistic conception of spirit vs. matter and articulated via a throughly 
Christian logic of sin and salvation, the vegan revolutionaries of Meat discursively 
corporealize in remarkable detail the figure of the ecologically alienated vegan 
pretending innocence of killing and dreaming of freedom from the shackles of the food 
chain.
However, vegan subjectivities are not monolithic (Quinn & Westwood, 2018): 
The vegan is not a stable subject secured by a fixed discourse. To be vegan 
means drawing lines by being committed to animal wellbeing, but also troubling 
the drawing of lines by querying the need for stable identities, definitive 
categories of selfhood and sovereign actions that rebuff all critique. (Schuster 
2017, 210)
The ecologically alienated vegan subject with delusions of innocence and purity, so 
prominent in Meat, is nowhere to be found in Animals (LePan, 2010). Instead, LePan’s 
novel deploys a bifurcated narrative structure in respectively emotional and rationalist 
registers to bring vegan and carnist ideologies into dialogue, historicizing the spatial and 
temporal contexts in which meat-eating operates and refusing to fully condemn or 
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condone any dietary praxis. Animals endorses neither veganism nor carnism, forcing 
the reader to confront the task of finding how “to live responsibly within the multiplicitous 
necessity and labor of killing” (Haraway 2008a, 8, in Vint 2010, 37); its depiction of fields 
of vegetable picked and tended by ‘mongrel’ slaves actively works to dispel the delusion 
that vegetable foods can a priori be assumed to be nonviolent. Animals emphases that 
any food needs to be understood a “loci of relations” as well as a corporeality (Heldke 
2012, 82),  “hustle and flow as well as sediment and substance” (Bennet 2007, 135); 86
readers are pushed to make up their own minds regarding how to ethically navigate the 
murky foodways of industrial capitalism. 
Against purity: critical intersectional veganism
As LePan’s Animals demonstrates, vegan subjectivities encompass a diversity of 
positions (Quinn & Westwood, 2018, 3) and need not entail a rejection of ecological 
embodiment or trade in dreams of purity, salvation and innocence.  To suggest 87
otherwise can only be seen as strategy of delegitimization (Adams, forthcoming): after 
all, many vegans themselves reject the rhetoric of veganism as an ethical endpoint or 
“manifesto for purity," as Giraud has amply demonstrated in her analysis of radical 
grassroots activist discourses (2013b; see also Torres & Torres, 2010, 10; Deckha 2012; 
Twine 2013, 139; Salih 2014, 65; Cole 2013, 218; Philips 2010, 11; Koletnik 2014; 
 Heldke finds the ‘silo-ing’ of animal/human/environmental concerns as separate domains problematic, 86
but her own analysis of meat’s ‘loci-of-relations’ consistently invisibilizes animals. “Heldke’s “withness” at 
most asks us to recognize the various [human] labour relations and environmental resources that we 
used in the making of the steak. The animal whose flesh became this steak, is never attributed 
subjectivity or recognized as a subject of these relations” (Struthers-Montford 2017, 65-66).
 “Just because vegans do not eat animal products does not mean that everything else they eat does not 87
somehow embed the (vegan) human in the rest of nature” (Twine 2014, 203)
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Wright 2015; Quinn & Westwood, 2018). Giraud points out that animal advocacy 
pamphlets and other activist literature demonstrate an acute awareness of food’s 
embeddedness in systems of exploitation that may exceed animal abuse (2013b, 111). 
Consider the following passage from a UK animal advocacy zine:  
When we purchase a food product at the grocery store, we can read the 
ingredients list and usually tell whether animals are murdered and/or tortured in 
the production process. But what do we learn of the people who made that 
product? Were the women paid less than the men? Were blacks subjugated by 
whites on the factory floor? Was a union or collectivization effort among 
employees crushed? Were a hundred slaughtered on a picket line for 
demanding minimum wage? (Dominick 2008, 13; in Giraud 2013b,111).
Blanket allegations that veganism espouses purity, as Adams (forthcoming) argues, are 
an example of a “truncated narrative” that “wrenches an ethical problem out of its 
embedded context” (Kheel 1993, 19). Purity accusations—when levelled against 
veganism as a monolithic whole rather than specific instances of ecologically 
disembodied eating ideologies, vegan or otherwise—distort and decontextualize the 
issue at hand. “Since we cannot live purely in this world,” Adams points out, “labelling 
veganism as purist offers a way to justify maintaining the violent and destructive status 
quo” (forthcoming). One need only look to how Haraway has been taken up in food 
activism to see how her arguments against purity-based food ontologies have been 
deployed to delegitimize plant-based diets as one end of an untenable ‘extreme,’ with 
the unfettered atrocities of animal industrial complex on the other (Giraud 2013a). “How 
much safer it is,” Adams reflects, to dismiss veganism as a form of purity or extremism 
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“than to get into the muck of what it means to care” (Adams, forthcoming). For those 
with means and access in developed countries, “veganism is a part of our resistance” to 
systemic hierarchical dualisms sanctioning violence and inequality, “and to use 
accusations that prevent a discussion about the real issues is dangerous” (Adams, 
forthcoming). 
Hierarchically dualistic configurations of vegan subjectivity stressing purity, innocence 
and transcendence of earthly response-abilities certainly exist—D’Lacey’s Meat did not 
magically appear out of nowhere—but they cannot be taken as indicative of vegan 
subjectivities as a whole. Haraway may not have had veganism in mind when she 
argued that “we must cast our lot for some ways of life (and death) and not 
others” (Haraway, 1997, 36), but this is precisely what vegans do by attempting to 
minimize harm within presently capitalistic and consumerist modes and means of 
production and consumption (Twine 2013, 139-40; Struthers-Montford 2017, 75). Rather 
than a capitulation to a hyperseperated logic of respect-use dualism or some top-down 
universal injunction against zoophagy, veganism can be understood as an socio-
historically embedded intervention against the machinations of an ecocidal 
carnocapitalist system that designates certain creaturely bodies—human and otherwise
—as legitimately exploitable (Kheel 2009, 235; Adams, forthcoming; Giraud 2013a, 
2013b; Pedersen 2011; Greenebaum 2017). As Giraud puts it, intersectional veganism 
is “a critical-theoretical tool with the power to both unsettle material forms of exploitation 
and the epistemologies that provide ethical legitimation for these practices” (Giraud 
2013a, 49; Pedersen 2011, 75; Kheel 2009, 235). “An entanglement of identity, practice 
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and ethics that refuses to sanction the carnivorous human subject” (Quinn & Westwood 
2018, 3), the embodied ethical praxis of veganism can be understood as counter 
hegemonic subject-position that disrupts carnophallogocentric norms by “contesting the 
dominance of animal-product consumption narrative[s]” in Western nation-states in an 
“ongoing struggle to produce socio-spatial epistemologies of consumption that lead to 
cultural and spatial change” (Harper 2010, 5-6). Neither naïve nor utopian, critical 
intersectional veganism constitutes a “worldly mode of engagement that acknowledges 
the realities of violence” and the insufficiency of individual consumer response-ability 
without letting such insufficiencies preclude action (Pick 2012a, 68). 
Conclusion: New stories, new directions 
The preceding chapters have deployed a diffractive approach to attend to the 
performative enactment of subjectivity through the intra-action of differentially-
constituted agential assemblages and material-discursive apparatuses. In arguing for 
the ethical urgency of moral extensionist approaches to nonhuman subjectivity, I also 
acknowledge the exclusionary boundaries that are inevitably enacted by such an 
agential cut. However, I maintain that these agential cuts need not dichotomize subjects 
and objects, bios and zoë; as I have argued throughout, cleaving the morally 
considerable from that which is available for use constitutes an ecologically incoherent 
and epistemologically violent paradigm born of denial-of-dependency and other 
machinations of hierarchical dualism. I have drawn upon SF about meat-eating to 
articulate the transcorporeality of material bodies and the pleasures and possibilities of 
deconstructing boundaries between subjects in ways that do not seek to assimilate 
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differences, but proliferate and transform them. This material feminist approach to the 
agential enactment of subjectivities complements rather than contradicts the normative 
commitments of critical theories aimed at promoting animal flourishing. Following a 
plethora of feminist animal scholars, I argue that critical, contextual vegan practices, 
rather than espousing an ideology of transcendence or purity, encourage ecological 
embodiment by “commingling with and responding to the symbolic and biological 
agency of encountered, ingested matter” (Pick 2012a, 82) in an ongoing “labor of love 
and justice that works hard to see clearly not only the webs of interspecies relations as 
they are but as they could be” (Pick 2012b, n.p., emphasis mine). This subjunctive 
frisson between what is and what could be is a prime example of estrangement, 
identified by Braidotti as “a method to free subject formation from the normative vision of 
the self," in this case the carnophallogocentric subject (Braidotti 2009, 527). Perhaps 
this is why SF has always offered such rich material for critical-theoretical engagements 
with more-than-human subjectivities. A literature of cognitive and affective 
estrangement, SF imagines worlds as they could be and brings them into dialogue with 
our own (Delany 1984a, 117); “it is a discourse that allows us to concretely imagine 
bodies and selves otherwise, a discourse defined by its ability to estrange our 
commonplace perceptions of reality” (Vint 2007, 19). In this way, both SF as a genre as 
veganism as a material-discursive praxis push the subjects of advanced capitalism to 
respond to each other, in Haraway’s words, “in relentless historical, nonteleological, 
multispecies contingency” (2008a, 8) and participate in the ongoing work of imagining 
and enacting our shared worlds differently.
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The narratives engaged in this dissertation deploy the estranging techniques of SF to 
complicate and contest human/animal and other hierarchical dualisms that have long 
undergirded configurations of ethico-political subjectivity. Through literary 
representations of creaturely hierarchy reversals and slippages, alliances with semi-
living materialities, weird intimacies across species and scales and ethically ambiguous 
more-than-human metamorphoses these science fictional meat stories “challenge the 
notion that humans are in the story all by themselves” (Fawcett 2000, 145), a belief that 
is “not just ordinary human bias [but] a cultural agenda tied to dreams of progress and 
modernization” (Tsing 2015, 155). However, this does not mean that any of these 
narratives are faultless examples of intersectional storytelling. Each contains serious 
shortcomings: The Wess’har Wars (Traviss 2004-8) espouses retrograde gender politics 
while The Space Merchants (Pohl & Kornbluth 1953) and “Drop Dead” (Simak 1956) 
exclude women from narrative agency altogether. Meat (D’Lacey 2009) is quite simply a 
misogynist nightmare. The In Vitro Meat Cookbook (van Mensvoort & Grievink 2014) 
entrenches the centrality of animal flesh in culinary culture, “Season of the 
Babies” (DeFord 1959) and “Morality Meat” (Sheldon 1985) deploy the figure of the 
farmed animal with little accountability to real farmed animals themselves and Oryx and 
Crake (Atwood 2003) is palpably hostile to animal advocacy. Bone World’s (O’Guilín 
2007-14) racial dynamics are fraught at best, Animals (LePan 2010) ambivalently 
reinscribes gendered and ableist dualisms and the otherwise excellent Xenogenesis 
(Butler 1987-9) is marred by its relentless heterocentrism. New stories are needed, 
notably from queer, feminist, Indigenous, racialized and/or non-Anglophone storytellers; 
ecocritical feminist engagements with SF must continue to strive to provide space in 
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which the voices of the subaltern can be heard on their own terms (Gaard 2017, xv). 
This dissertation is no exception; only one of my main SF authors is a person of colour, 
only one (that we know of) is queer and none are Indigenous or writing in a language 
other than English or from a perspective other than Western (post)industrial. 
Methodologically, my analysis has largely elided queer theory and sexuality studies 
perspectives; certainly, queer theory has considerable sympathetic resonances with 
material feminism and has much to offer critical engagements with literary subjectivities 
and agencies beyond the human (Merrick 2008; Mortimer-Sandilands & Erikson 2011; 
Barad 2011; Chen 2012; Ahuja 2015; Griffiths 2015; Quinn, 2018). While this 
dissertation has been largely been concerned with critiquing the Western tradition from 
within, this strategy has its shortcomings (Belcourt 2014); Indigenous perspectives are 
invaluable in figuring out affirmative alternatives to settler ontologies of hierarchical 
dualism, as Indigenous scholars such as TallBear (2011; 2013; 2015; 2017), Belcourt 
(2014) and Robinson (2013; 2014; 2017) have argued. Indigenous ontologies have also 
in important ways prefigured CAS, material feminist and science studies theoretical 
preoccupations (such as more-than-human subjectivities, agential realism and 
symbiogenesis) (Deloria 2001; TallBear 2011; Watts 2013; Todd 2014; Struthers-
Montford 2017). Despite these limitations, what I hope this dissertation does offer is a 
sustained exploration of the generative overlap between critical animal and new 
materialist theories and an articulation of the ways in which ecofeminism is well-
positioned to effect such an exploration. Following Giraud (2013a; 2013b), Gaard 
(2017), Struthers-Montford & Taylor (2018) and others, I argue that these orientations 
need not be positioned at loggerheads. Animal advocates need not reject kinetic 
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ontologies of transcorporeal, multispecies becoming-with and posthumanist/
multispecies/neomaterialist thinkers need not dismiss critical animal theorists as 
sentimental simpletons marching to the beat of a one note samba. Diffraction as critical 
methodology is about reading differences through differences, about discerning patterns 
of differences that matter; “there is nothing to be gained by artificially magnifying the 
differences” between CAS and posthumanist neomaterialism’s overlapping political 
positions (Nimmo 2015: 193). Future research at the intersection of critical material 
ecofeminism, critical animal studies and science fiction studies has ample opportunities 
to collaboratively bring forth an “on-going apparatus that seeks to produce research that 
is attentive, plural, partial and politically ambitious” (Hollin, Forsyth, Giraud & Potts 
2017, 24) in its mandate to understand and imagine “what kinds of care, regard and 
responsiveness might be possible for us in relationship to the natural world” (Plumwood 
2002, 165). In doing so, subjectivities must be re-imagined ecologically and enacted “in 
terms of concrete practices of restraint and humility” (2008, 325), with humans firmly 
situated as embodied animal beings, enmeshed with and accountable to a much larger 
community of actants on a finite planet.
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